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SUBMITTING A PAPER TO JOURNAL OF RETRACING AFRICA

Journal of Retracing Africa (JORA), a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary African studies journal, welcomes submissions of original, previously unpublished manuscripts on a broad thematic and chronological range. JORA is committed to publishing articles that provide theoretically informed analysis on the social, economic, cultural, and political transformations in African societies during the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. It aims at deconstructing misconceived, mistaken, and missing narratives on Africa and Africans, thus providing a holistic appreciation of the African experience.

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Editor's Preface

The *Journal of Retracing Africa* (JORA) is honored to publish the second volume dedicated to some of the issues surrounding Africa's socio-political and economic development. The attitude in the West over the last three decades has been to exaggerate and generalize problems in Africa and ignore many positive news that typify modern Africa. This unreliable approach has continued to becloud proper understanding of the problems African countries face, the domestic and external forces that created them, and the efforts Africans have made to address them. The impression that Africa remains a lost continent persists in the minds of many in the Weste in spite of the fact that six out of the thirteen fastest-growing economies in the world are located in Africa: Rwanda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia.[1] As the World Bank's *June 2015 Global Economic Prospects* reveals, these African countries possess the highest projected Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) from 2014 through 2017.[2] JORA publishes articles that provide a much more balanced and comprehensive analysis of the complex and challenging social, economic and political transformation in Africa since the precolonial period.

We witnessed a significant increase this year in submissions. This second volume of JORA includes three articles and 18 book reviews. In "Leadership and African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty Africa," Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu examines the remarkable progress made in Africa fifty years since independence, the obstacles that threatened to hinder the development of African economies, and the strategies to facilitate rapid economic development fifty years ahead. He argues that Africa's future promises to be bright if political leaders in their various countries place "local human resources or domestic agency" at the epicenter of developmental process, abandon their "fixation on extractive economies," and embrace a policy that "sees development as the primary responsibility of endogenous agency."[3] Emphasizing the importance of leadership as a critical agent of change, the author concludes that "Only countries that have transformational leadership embodied in a developmental state can achieve such a change in the highly competitive global economy."[4]

The role played by the Aro sub-cultural Igbo group in the social, political, and economic development of Eastern Nigeria since the precolonial period has not

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[1]World Bank Group, *June 2015 Global Economic Prospects: The Global Economy in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015).

[2]Ibid.

[3]Chikwendu Christian Ukaegbu, "Leadership and African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty Africa," *Journal of Retracing Africa* 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 1.

[4]Ibid., 26.

been fully studied. In "The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade," Ndu Life Njoku argues that the Aro were at the center of the transformative (though controversial) activities that shaped the history of precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial eastern region of Nigeria. As Njoku shows, "the negative and positive experiences that neighboring Igbo communities had of the Aro since the fifteenth century helped to evoke hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand and wonder, awe, and admiration on the other."[5] The author concludes that that the contemporary perception of the Aro had roots in the dominant role they played during the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade and the assertive manner they confronted British administrators during the colonial rule. The British attitude to the Aro people was a mixture of reluctant admiration and mild resentment. As one official puts it, "Thirty- five years ago the country was opened up and we knew little about the natives, but we did realize that the Aro were very different from the other tribes in those parts."[6] Similarly, another official wrote that the Aro established "their relatively great intelligence, as compared with other native tribes."[7] On the other hand, the people's use of that intelligence to outwit British colonial officials earned them a bad reputation. As one colonial official puts it, the Aro "have done a lot of harm as if they are sent to bring the mail they levy blackmail."[8] Njoku's article offers a priceless insight into how dominant ethnic groups in Africa such as the Aro engaged with colonial rule and sometimes thrived economically despite the dictatorship that characterized colonial rule.

One of the major obstacles to the economic development of Africa, especially since the 1990s, is the relentless waves of terrorist attacks across the continent and the resultant sense of insecurity. Nowhere in Africa is this threat potentially more consequential than in Nigeria, Africa's largest economy. In "Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the Imperative of National Consensus," Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa shows how Nigeria's social, economic, and political order has been increasingly challenged by the Boko Haram terrorist organization. Placing political variables at the center of his analysis, Alozieuwa argues that the "outburst" of the sect derived from the "sense of exclusion by some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country."[9]

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[5]Ndu Life Njoku, "The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade," *Journal of Retracing Africa* 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 29.

[6]Rhodes House, Oxford MSS., Afr. S. 375 (3), *The Resurrection of the Long Juju*, 1908, 2.

[7]Cd. 1768-10, Colonial Reports—Annual, no. 405, Southern Nigeria Report for 1902.

[8]National Archive Enugu, CSE 1/86/43, *3rd Political Report*, Major H. Trenchard, Ababaliki, March 17, 1908.

[9]Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, "Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the Imperative of National Consensus," *Journal of Retracing Africa* 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015):51.

The author shows that Boko Haram has reshaped Nigeria's political and security landscape, especially since 2002.[10] It reveals that the activities of the sect have continued to create havoc across many northern states, threaten southern states, and scare foreign and local investors and workers. The sect has become more or less a criminal enterprise bent on irrational killings of innocent civilians in Nigeria, the highlights of which was the kidnapping of more than 200 young Muslim and Christian students at gunpoint while they were sleeping in their dormitories at the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno state on April 14, 2014. This article reminds us that the violence and destructiveness of Boko Haram poses a formidable threat to Nigeria's attempts to construct a united, modern, and prosperous country.

The eighteen book reviews published in this volume capture the rich and complex experience that define modern Africa. They cover a wide range of periods, regions, and topics such as Middle Eastern immigrants in French colonial West Africa, dance and music in Malawi, war on drugs in modern Africa, agriculture and the challenge of food security, Africa's foreign relations, healthcare and survival, imperialism and decolonization, postcolonial migration, identity crisis, the Cold War politics, women issues, and economic challenges. Our book reviewers brought their expertise to help our readers understand the diversity and richness of Africa's histories, peoples, cultures, and societies. The articles together with the book reviews will certainly make for a fascinating read.

Special thanks are due to our authors and book reviewers for their dedication, and for trusting us with their manuscripts. Many thanks to our readers for revising the manuscripts with care and intelligence. Without the dedication of members of the editorial team, this volume would not have appeared. Thank you. I am especially indebted to Drs. Tiffany F. Jones and Tamba M'bayo for accepting more than their fair share of responsibilities to ensure that this volume is published. This volume, more importantly, benefited from the unrelenting support of Berkeley Electronic Press, Eastern Kentucky University Libraries, University Programs at Eastern Kentucky University, the African/African-American Studies program and the Department of History at Eastern Kentucky University. I appreciate them.

Ogechi E. Anyanwu
Editor-in-Chief.

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[10] Ibid.

Leadership and African Agency for Development in Post-Fifty Africa

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Abstract: The year 2010 was a model year for the celebration of fifty years of political independence among African countries. Assessments of the human condition in Africa show that the continent, especially sub-Saharan Africa, has lagged behind other regions of the world in terms of development. Based on the analysis of the constants of development, this paper argues that effective development is fundamentally driven by the maximum deployment of organized endogenous human agency defined as the capacity of individuals or groups to think, act, and impact their social environments. Because African agency was not properly shepherded in the first fifty years of independence, transformational leadership through the instrumentality of the developmental state is the path to effective development in post- fifty Africa. This requires three key development strategies namely, inserting local human resources or domestic agency to the center of development activity; exit from fixation on extractive economies to a deliberate policy of value-added production embodied in industrialization; and a paradigm of development knowledge that sees development as the primary responsibility of endogenous agency.

Keywords: Transformational, Leadership, Development, State, Agency, African, Infrastructure, Governance, Transactional, Value-added, Industrialization, Endogenous

Introduction

Seventeen African countries celebrated fifty years of independence in 2010. Many more march towards that milestone each passing year. Fifty years of independence from colonialism is worth celebrating. But sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has lagged behind other regions in the march to development whether defined as better quality of life, provision of basic needs, productive capacity, global competitiveness, or degree of technological advancement. At independence, this lag in development was attributed to the lack of qualified human resource; an absence of finance and technological capital; a postcolonial state that fanned the embers of antagonistic parochialidentities; and a peripheral participation in a world economy dominated by the great powers. These factors have become enduring aspects of Africa's socioeconomic structure where structure is sociologically defined as enduring patterns of roles, positions, power, resources, and relationships that inhibit or

facilitate human agency.[1] Agency refers to the thoughts and actions that individuals and/or groups deploy to impact their own lives, the lives of others, and the social institutions of their societies.[2]

The constraining effects of the structural factors mentioned above still manifest in one form or another to inhibit development in the region. However, continuing to blame them suggests that Africans are passive to structures from which they cannot free themselves. Africans are not slaves to structural conditions. Rather, domestic agency in each country awaits transformational leadership to lead citizens to unleash their hidden and untapped capabilities. The call for infusion of endogenous or domestic agency in development recognizes that humans are not blind and dull objects that carry out whatever is predetermined by structure; rather, they are active beings who individually or collectively use their knowledge and resources of their natural and social environments to transform their social institutions.[3] Africans are hard working. They exert tremendous physical and mental energy as they incessantly struggle to keep body and soul together. That the investment of human resource in the last fifty years has not resulted in a better life for the majority means that African agency has not been channeled in an organized way.

In the context of national development, organized human agency, henceforth known as organized agency, occurs when the political leaders of a country consciously channel the motives, ideas, skills, and capabilities of their citizens toward assuming primary responsibility for transforming their societies. Organized agency is primarily endogenous or domestic, it exists and is harnessed within each country. But potentially useful exogenous or external agency can be borrowed when necessary. Organized agency derives from the sense of readiness to act that leaders inspire their citizens through development-oriented policies and plans, investment in physical and social infrastructure, support of domestic entrepreneurship and a conscious effort to place the citizens at the center of the development process.

Martin Meredith's rigorous and dispassionate chronicle of lostopportunities in Africa's first fifty years of independence corroborates the thrust of this paper that African agency was disorganized and wasted in the first five decades following

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[1] Richard Munch, *Sociological Theory: From the 1850s to the Present* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1994). Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Anthony Giddens, "Structuralism, Post-Structuralism and the Production of Culture," in *Social Theory Today*, eds. Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 195-223.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

independence.[4] The gross domestic products per capita (GDP/capita) of Ghana, Namibia, Gabon, and Cote d'Ivoire were higher than South Korea's in 1960.[5] By 2008, South Korea's GDP/capita had skyrocketed; the figures for Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire dropped from their 1960 levels while Ghana and Namibia posted infinitesimal increases.[6] The United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Asha-Rose Migiro provided a reflexive perspective on Africa's development dilemma saying:

> as we celebrate Africa's achievements, opportunities and potential, we must also honestly address the realities and challenges that confront the continent. Too many babies still die in infancy, too few children find places in school, too many farmers cannot get their crops to market, and too many factories lie idle for lack of spare parts, skills or investment.[7]

To effectively mobilize and deploy organized domestic agency, leaders of post-fifty Africa should in a more direct way conceptualize the popular indicators of development as part of drivers of development. Popular indicators of development refer to generic factors exemplified by the indicators of human development reported in the United Nation's annual *Human Development Reports (HDR)*. The early measures which included life expectancy, literacy, and gross national income (GNP, now GNI) per capita[8] have expanded to include measures such as gender empowerment, poverty, inequality, personal freedom, and so on.[9] These measures are often interpreted as outcomes rather than causes of development because they appear as ends not as the means to development.

By contrast, there are indicators which catch the eye as the real drivers of development but are not given the attention they deserve in the discourse, policy, and practice of African development. These include the status of a country on technological inventions and innovations, the degree of creative destruction in the economy, technical competitiveness, investment in research and development, rate of value-added production, the degree of backward and forward integration in the national economy, the degree of industrial research and development, and the volume of value-added exports.

Scholarly attention to Africa's development often centers on the generic

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[4]Meredith Martin, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty years of Independence* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

[5]Angus Maddison, "Historical Statistics of the World Economy GDP and Per Capita GDP: 1-2008 AD," accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ernest Harsch, "Weighing a Half Century of Independence: Beyond Hey Days and Sobering Reality Lies Untapped Potential," *Africa Renewal*, August 2010, accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence.

[8]UNDP, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[9]UNDP, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

measures. These real drivers of development in modern society are treated as if they are not reachable by Africans. Yet the latter were central to the transformation of the societies that are now known as developed nations. Indicators such as life expectancy, education, and GNI per capita indeed act as promoters of development because they help to build efficient human capital, the elements of agency, which help to drive the development process. The problem is that development theory and practice, including the human development reports, often treats these human development measures as dependent variables.

The highly anticipated Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is a case in point. Will the status of a developing nation change to that of a developed country if it meets all the expectations of MDG by 2015? What if the said country remains an extractive economy, possesses little or no value-added production, occupies a marginal place in global competitiveness and innovation, and remains captive to the vagaries of global commodity prices? As in previous cases of national development, whether in the Western nations or in latecomer nations, Africans must take primary responsibility for operating and expanding these drivers of development for societal transformation if the next fifty years are to be significantly better than the first half century of missed opportunities.

Cognizant of the centrality of organized domestic agency to national development, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation emphasized that development is an endogenous and a self-reliant endeavor.[10] It should stem from the heart of each society which in sovereignty defines its values and vision for the future, relies primarily on its members' energies, its natural and cultural environment, and encourages participation by all.[11] These insightful principles of development corroborate the history of ancient civilizations. They are consistent with the process of industrial development in Western societies. And they are verifiable from the experiences of successful latecomers to development from the first half of the 20th century to the present.

Drawing from the precepts of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, embedded in the centrality of endogenous agency, this paper states that given the long history of national development in different countries at different epochs, the successful paths or what can be called the constants of national development are now well known in development theory and practice. It argues that a transformational leadership within a developmental state is the appropriate framework through which to shepherd citizens for the emergence and deployment of an organized

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[10] Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, "What Now: Another Development," (Uppsala, 1975), accessed May 15, 2012, http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/75_what_now.pdf.

[11] Sheila Coronel and Kunda Dixit, "Setting the Context: The Development Debate Thirty Years After What Now Development," *Dialogue* 47 (June 2006): 13-27.

domestic agency for national development. National development, here, refers to the ability of citizens who under the leadership of a developmental state apply their mental and physical energies to transform their natural resources and social and economic environments for individual and national self-actualization.

The Centrality of Organized Endogenous Agency

Development has never been a gift from one developed nation to an underdeveloped other. There is hardly a case in history where the people of one society developed another society and altruistically handed it over to the latter as a gesture of goodwill. Foreigners who through colonization transformed the economies of other societies either decided to settle in the area and where settlement was not possible, they established intensive and extensive extractive mechanisms to transfer as much as possible the resources of the colony to the metropole.[12] Leaders and citizens or individual societies, therefore, have always been the prime movers of national development. That is why foreign aid is different from national development. Leaders of aid receiving countries decide whether to put aid to fruitful use or misuse it due to incompetence or corruption or both.[13] Or still, leaders can become so complacent with or dependent on aid that they lose the motivation to aggressively pursue positive institutional change.[14]

Another endogenous agency-related constant is that development cannot be outsourced or offshored. A country where leaders are complacent with hiring outsiders to build and maintain their national infrastructure stands on the façade of development.[15] Many natural-resource-rich countries that use their money to buy most of their basic needs and luxuries from other countries still have the characteristics of Third World countries. Therefore, heavy dependence on foreign skills inhibits development because national development is about what the people can do for themselves by themselves rather than what foreigners can do for them.

A country is defined as developed not only because it has high gross national income per capitam generated from the luck of having abundant natural resource a country is developed because it has the capability, through the skills and creativity of its people, to produce its needs of primary and value added products.

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[12]Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *The American Economic Review* 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401.

[13]William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Effort to Aid the Rest of the World Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.* New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid is Not Working* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[14]Dambisa Moyo, *Why Aid is Not Working and Why There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007).

[15]Harold Kerbo*, World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

Almost all countries classified as developed nations or core countries exhibit this characteristic. They import their needs as a matter of choice based on their calculations of the economic gains of importation over domestic production. But when import-penetration threatens their economy they apply their human and natural resources to produce in order to continue meeting their needs. Here, we see development as primarily the national capability and capacity to produce rather than as improvement in the quality of life of citizens only. The World Bank put it succinctly; resource-rich countries may have substantial foreign exchange earnings, but this wealth may not translate into a country's competitiveness or employment creation.[16]

By contrast, countries classified as developing have limited capability to produce value-added goods or to import them by choice. Importation of manufactured goods is a major component of their national budgets. The result is that high import penetration causes the structural distortion of the economy.[17] That is why Obafemi Awolowo observed that an underdeveloped country is one in which natural and human resources are partly unutilized, partly underutilized, and partly misutilized, and in which there is a gross deficiency in the quality of three production agents namely labor, capital, and organization.[18]

That development cannot be a gift from one developed country to a less developed other, nor can it be outsourced to people of other countries, is consistent with the principles prescribed by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. Development is therefore an endogenous and self-reliant endeavor. But supranational agencies undertake many projects designed to provide basic needs such as food, water, healthcare, education, and electricity in many sub-Saharan African countries. These are factors of foreign assistance for daily survival, not national development for self- actualization. The Tap Project launched in 2007 by the United Nations Children's Educational Fund (UNICEF) worked to provide clean water in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mauritania, and Togo, one among a string of projects in Africa dating back to 1952.[19] There are also those projects undertaken by international non-governmental organizations such as Africare, which has been working on economic development, women

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[16]World Bank, *World Development Report 2012-13: Jobs* (Washington, D.C.: 2013).

[17]Harold Kerbo, *World Poverty: Global Inequality and the Modern World System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

[18]Obafemi Awolowo, "The Path to Economic Freedom in Developing Countries," A Lecture Delivered at the University of Lagos, March 15, 1968, accessed May 16, 2012, usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com.

[19]UNICEF TAP Project, http://www.unicefusa.org/mission/survival/water/tap-project; UNICEF History, Milestones, 1946 -1955, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.unicef.org/about/history/index_milestones_46_55.html.

engagement, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene across Africa since 1970.[20] Therefore Africa has been receiving international assistance on basic needs from pre-independence to more than half a century after independence, yet the continent remains poor and underdeveloped.

The social disruption, human misery, and deaths that occurred in the Horn of Africa in 2011, especially Ethiopia and Somalia, due to drought in that year had been recurrent phenomena for many previous decades.[21] John Dollar's visual image of hunger in Ethiopia due to drought and famine in the time of Emperor Haile Selassie is not different from the situation which occurred in the same country in 2011.[22] Imagine that the countries in the Horn of Africa were located in Western Europe, Japan, or the region of the miracle economies of East Asia, the effects of drought in that region would long have been stably ameliorated using relevant technology, and organizational and managerial efficiency, to anticipate and control the situation.

Donor countries and supranational agencies continue to intervene across Africa to control age-old diseases such as malaria, polio, measles, and cholera. Lawrence O'Donnell, MSNBC's anchor of *The Last Word* in the United States, in collaboration with UNICEF, established the Kids In Need of Desks (K.I.N.D.) project in 2010 to solicit funds for desks for Malawian school children.[23] It procured 40, 000 desks for school children in Malawi at the cost of $3 million in its first year.[24]

The project provided tens of thousands of desks to Malawian school children and their teachers for a better learning and teaching experience. The project also provided jobs and therefore was a source of livelihood for Malawians who built the desks.[25] This great humanitarian accomplishment brought invaluable joy and enthusiasm to the school children as they enthusiastically offloaded their desks as the MSNBC camera beamed on their happy faces. O'Donnell, UNICEF, and donors from the United States and other countries deserve appreciation for their benevolence.

However, this magnanimous project underscores the marginal status of organized domestic agency in the development process in Africa. Was the lack

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[20]Africare, accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.africare.org/africares-approach/.

[21]Gabe Joselow, "World Bank Drought Plan Focuses on Ethiopia, Kenya," accessed June 10, 2012, www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/World-Bank-Drough--; IRIN, "Ethiopia: Somalis Living from Drought to Drought," accessed May 15, 2012, www.Irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=93200.

[22]"The Emperor's Birthday," DVD, Directed by John Dollar (New York: Filmmakers Library, 1992).

[23]L. O. Donnell, "Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund, One Year Later" (December 15, 2011), accessed May 25, 2012, www.thelastword.msn.com/_news/2011/12/15/9451755-last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.

[24]Ibid.

[25]S. Muller. "Last Word K.I.N.D. Fund One Year Later," accessed November 19, 2014, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/last-word-kind-fund-one-year-later.

of chairs in schools because of nonchalance on the part of the government, leadership deficit, bad management on the part of public bureaucrats, or was it that the Malawian nation really lacked $3 million with which to provide 40,000 chairs for school children? Desk-deficit schools abound in Sub-Saharan Africa including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, South Africa, and more, with more deficits in rural than urban areas.[26] No amount of donations will ensure sustainability of school supplies until Africans regularly make or buy the supplies by themselves.

An American physician was perturbed, indeed shocked, when she observed Nigerian physicians perform an emergency cesarean section without light due to lack of electricity.[27] She quickly arranged for solar powered kits to be supplied free of charge to hospitals. But the reality of that country is that once the first set of supplies are out of order, they may neither be replaced nor be repaired. Hence the status quo ante of surgeries in lightless conditions will return. However, performing surgery in the dark would not be typical of hospitals in Nigeria given that installation of power generators as back up for the unsteady supply of electricity from the national grid has become a permanent feature of institutions and organizations. But it is also commonplace for power generators to breakdown and remain unrepaired for a considerable length of time. In such cases, organizations may work without electricity until the equipment is repaired or replaced.

With much reliance on formal and informal foreign aid, leaders of African countries are yet to live up to the examples of newly developed countries such as those of East Asia and some parts of South Asia. Endogeneity suggests that 'development stem from the heart of each society as it defines its values and visions of its future while primarily relying on its own strength and resources in terms of human and natural resources'.[28]

It does not mean that countries should reject external assistance especially in times of emergency. Rather, leaders of African countries erroneously perceive external assistance as a permanent component of national development. Recent development successes in Asia occurred without significant foreign aid as a

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[26] Abibatu. Kamara, "First Lady Receives 4000 Lap Desk for School Children," accessed May 21, 2012, http://awoko.org/2011/05/02/first-lady-receives-4000-lap-desk-for-school- children/; Yanhong Zhang, "Urban-Rural Literacy Gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Roles of Socioeconomic Status and School Quality", *Comparative Education Revie*w (November 200 Christie O' Riley, "Solar Suitcase' Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth," CNN, February 28, 2013, accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solar-power.6): 581-602.

[27] Christie O' Riley, "Solar Suitcase' Saving Moms, Babies During Childbirth," CNN, February 28, 2013, accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/health/ cnnheroes-stachel-solar-power.

[28] Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.

proportion of the recipient country's income.[29]

William Easterly further noted that the West itself achieved gradual success through market and democratic reforms over many centuries, not through top-down 'big plans' offered by outsiders.[30]

The pursuit and acceptance of foreign assistance, including basic needs, as normal and regular aspects of a country's political economy and development strategy sideline endogenous agency from playing a central role in the development process. It perpetuates national psychological dependence on outsiders and prevents effective development from taking place. Endogenous agency, amongst other things, entails that countries deploy their human and natural resources to expand and deepen the productive sector especially in agriculture and industry, thereby expanding the store of resources and creating more wealth with which to provide for the needs of their people.

Another common characteristic of developmentally successful countries is that they combine import substitution and export-oriented industrialization**.** The history of development suggests that national wealth is not and should not be based on the extraction and marketing of natural resources alone. But African leaders have been fixated on extraction of natural resources. A monocultural economy is structurally incoherent because it lacks backward and forward linkages and the resulting multiplier effects that diversify and strengthen the economy.[31] In Nigeria where oil exploration started in 1958, the country has been unable to develop a robust capability for a sustainable backward linkage in the oil sector through domestic refining of crude oil for domestic use. Instead, it spends a lot of foreign currency on importation of petroleum products and depends on expertise from advanced countries to build its new refineries or maintain existing ones. The same is true of other African countries that boast of varieties of natural resources but whose leaders lack the knowledge of policies, or the courage to enact policies, that transform and upgrade those natural resources in the value chain.

Africa's weak performance in value-added production was well captured in a recent conference announcement by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University. The conference held in June 2013, fifty-three years after the modal year of independence among African countries regretfully stated:

New evidence shows that between 1975 and 2005 the diversity and

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[29]William. Easterly, The End of Poverty: *Economic Possibilities for Our Time* by Jeffrey D. Sachs Washington Post, Sunday, March 13, 2005, accessed May 17, 2012, http://www. washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/articles/A25562-2005Mar10.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Kerbo.

sophistication of industrial production and exports declined in most African economies. Today, Africa's industrial sector is in many ways less advanced than in the first decade following independence.[32]

The industrial infrastructure established by former colonial masters in some countries may have sustained Africa's industrial sector in the first decade but that industrial foundation was not sustained by post- independence political leadership. The United Nations Industrial Organization (UNIDO) cited by Jomo Sundaram, Oliver Schwank and Rodiger von Arnim observed that immediate post-independence Africa gained ground in labor intensive manufacturing until premature trade liberalization of the 1980s exposed African infant industries to global competition for which they were unprepared; the policy preference was simply to abandon existing industrial capacity thereby precipitating de-industrialization.[33] Regardless of what the obstacles are, and no matter how much natural resources African countries have, the living conditions of the majority will not change for the better without economic diversification through the expansion of value-added production. Put another way, Africa must industrialize in order to achieve sustainable development. That is the story of the majority of developmentally successful countries. The primary sector, agriculture and other extractive activities, however, should not be neglected. Rather, and as in the case of South East Asia, agriculture and the entire extractive sector should be developed to full capacity to provide national food security and raw material to support value-added production for economic transactions in the global capitalist system.[34] That brings up another truism about developmentally successful countries namely, countries, past and present, have attained development through active participation in the global capitalist system**.**

Even the former Soviet Union, a world power, with an economic system different from the world capitalist system had a partial attachment to the latter. Industrial development in Russia benefitted from Western capitalist entrepreneurship, technology, and management style before and immediately after the October Revolution of 1917 and the resultant establishment of a communist

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[32]United Nations University. "Call for Papers, Learning to Compete: Industrial Policy in Africa", (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 2013), accessed May 25, 2012, http://unu.edu/news/announcements/seeking-papers-on-african-indust.

[33]UNIDO cited in Jomo Sundaram, Oliver Schwank, Rodiger von Arnim, and Rodiger L.von Arnim, "Globalization and Development in SSA", UN Department of Economic Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, No. 102, February 2011, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2011/wp102_2011.pdf.

[34]Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley, & Peter. Lewis, "Tracking Development in South- East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy," *Development Policy Review* 30, S1 (2012): S5-S24.

state.[35] Granted that East-West trade was minimal during the Soviet era, Russia used any opportunity afforded by trade to acquire valued Western technology.[36] China has enhanced its prosperity by fully participating in the global capitalist system. The miracle economies of East Asia and Japan attained their now enviable status by operating within the world capitalist system. Emerging economies are operating within the same system.

The global capitalist system is not altruistic. There is no Santa Claus in international relations. Leaders of developed nations often protect the interests of their countries first. Concessions are made, or gifts are given, in exchange for present or future material, cultural, or ideological gains. Hence only strong states in developing countries succeed in the world capitalist system. A strong state does not mean a dictatorship or the classic autocratic regime that obtains and maintains citizen compliance through the use of instruments of state terror.

A strong state means a government with sufficient organization, power, and freedom to achieve its development goals.[37] According to Obafemi Awolowo, economic freedom exists where a sovereign country independent of outside control or direction organizes the exploitation and deployment of its total resources for the benefit of its people. The idea of a strong state, therefore, means that political leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert autonomy from domestic and foreign vested interests by enacting and implementing policies that are primarily in the best interest of their citizenry. In development theory and practice, a strong state is equivalent to a developmental state.[38]

A developmental state is proactive, interventionist, ambitious, autonomous, energetic, and courageous. It invokes nationalism and patriotism as it enacts, implements, and supervises its policies. It has a vision of where it wants to lead the country. It recognizes the dominant ideology of neoliberal globalization, operates within it, but is not slave to it. It situates its development policies and practices within its unique history and borrows relevant models from outsiders rather than depends on them. It uses national revenue to solve the people's problems and invokes integrity and honesty in the allocation and investment of public resources. Furthermore, a developmental state believes that with good

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[35] Peter Gatrell, "Reconceptualizing Russia's Industrial Revolution), in *Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution* eds. Jeff Horn, Leonard N. Roseband, & Merritt Roe Smith (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 2010) 229-250; Peter Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2013).

[36] Daniel Yergin, "Politics & Soviet-American Trade: The Three Questions," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977.

[37] Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 16th Century (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Kerbo.

[38] Kerbo, Ibid.

leadership and organization, citizens can unleash their capabilities to multiply and add value to natural resources to uplift themselves and society on a sustainable basis. Hence a developmental state eschews a dependent mentality and promotes a sense of national self-efficacy where leaders and followers join to boldly take their developmental destiny in their own hands. Therefore, a developmental state is a champion of organized indigenous agency and national self-reliance.

A developmental state is similar to a transformational leadership. It has bold visions and takes bold steps to implement its visions.[39] It makes leaders out of followers so that the latter can effectively mobilize the larger society to pursue the collective end.[40] Subordinates of the apex leader in a developmental state have the ability to mobilize those below them. Cabinet officers in the executive branch of the central government, administrative heads and their aides at the provincial level, and local government functionaries have leadership capacity and enthusiasm for development as should the president of the country. The legislature at national and provincial levels of government in a developmental state is focused, courageous, imaginative, and makes transformational rather than mundane and self-serving laws.

Governors or administrative heads of provinces see the economic development of their provinces, states, regions, or districts as their primary responsibility, not the responsibility of the national government. Just as there are strong states, so should there be strong provinces, regions, or districts. The administrative head and elected and appointed officials of the Ashanti Region of Ghana, for example, should see the development of the region as their primary responsibility. That is why Arthur Stinchcombe defines a strong province or region as one that keeps the local part of a commercial flow of goods and services going, integrates that flow within a cosmopolitan system of flows governed by a central government, other provinces, or other sovereign states and builds institutions that arrange such things as residences, churches, education, retail trade, and other activities that make up life.[41] Therefore, the distributionist governance practiced by provincial, state regional and local government officials in some African countries does not facilitate development. By distributionist governance I mean the habit of political officials at regional and local levels to be complacent with monthly or periodic allocations of revenues from the national government without making imaginative

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[39] James Burns, Transforming Leadership (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

[40] Iain Hay, "Transformational Leadership," accessed April 29, 2012, http://www. leadingtoday. org/weleadinglearning/transformationalleaders; Mathew Kelly, (2003). Academic Advisers as Transformational Leaders. The Mentor: An Academic Journal, January 1, 2003, accessed June 2010 http://.psu.edu/dus/mentor/03010mk.htm; Gary Yukl, Leadership in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989).

[41] Arthur Stinchcombe, "How Can Provinces Govern?" Unpublished Work in Progress.

policies that can multiply those subventions by creating an environment that enables citizens to expand productive activity. All state and local governments in Nigeria depend on allocations from the national government for financing most of their programs and this creates a disincentive to maximize collection of internally generated revenue.[42] The situation in Kenya and Ghana with respect to allocations to counties and district assemblies respectively is similar to that of Nigeria.[43] Leaders of strong regions engage in regenerative governance by creating an environment for economic expansion, increased employment opportunities, and infrastructural modernization.

Consequently, the rule of thumb definition of development as improvement in the quality of life of citizens' is no longer a helpful model for steering development in post-fifty Africa or anywhere for that matter**.** Resources with which to improve quality of life do not fall from the sky. National development is driven by the promotion of drivers of development through the deployment of organized individual and collective domestic agency embodied in the efforts and activities of the citizens themselves. Consistent with centrality of domestic agency on which this paper is anchored, achieving development in post-fifty Africa entails that African leaders of developmental states create appropriate conditions under which the creative and physical energies of their citizens will be optimally harnessed**.** Leaders of a developmental state or developmental regions can, for example, challenge and provide incentives to its universities to construct mini refineries as part of building domestic capability for a steady flow of petroleum products.[44] Or national, regional and local governments of a country can strengthen, broaden and deepen national and regional entrepreneurship and the industrial sector by procuring all their operational needs from local firms.[45]

The Federal Executive Council of Nigeria, in 2010, approved the importation of one thousand plastic bins for the collection of garbage in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the premise that products made by Nigerian firms were

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[42]Michael Oseni, "Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) in Nigeria: A Panacea of Development," *European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 21, no. 1 (2013): 1052-1066, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.journalsbank.com/ejhss_21_1.pdf.

[43]Mwangi Kimenyi, "Kenyan Devolution and Resource Sharing Calculator," Brookings, (October 2013), Accessed November 24, 2014.; Daily Guide, Ghana, "District Assemblies' Common Funds at 10%" (May 2013).

[44]Chikwendu C Ukaegbu, "Leadership Fatalism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: Imaginative Policymaking for Human Development," *Philosophia Africana* 10, no 2 (2007): 161-182.

[45]Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, "Imaginative Policymaking for National Development," *The Guardian*, (Lagos, Nigeria, October 28, 2010).

inferior.[46] A political elite that takes development seriously will see the purchase of local manufactures as a means to strengthen the manufacturing sector. In another instance, the government of Senegal accepted a paltry $13 million from a foreign firm to fish on its waters for four years. The superior technology of the foreign company quickly depleted the fish population, displaced indigenous fishermen and women, and increased unemployment and economic insecurity in the area.[47] Tanzania's gold mine is a hotbed of conflict between foreign firms and local residents because the latter perceive themselves as marginal to a lucrative resource in their native land.[48]

Harold Kerbo noted that developmental states do not enter into international agreements that put their citizens in precarious positions.[49] Other commentators note that the liberalization of trade occasioned by the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s coupled with the influx of Chinese textiles in the 2000s have caused a significant decline of the textile sector in Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, and Nigeria.[50] The latter scenario is not conducive to Africa's quest for development given the importance of the textile industry in the industrial development of nations.

A developmental state knows that globalization creates winners and losers, and that guided free trade rather than unbridled free trade has been the norm i n m a n y of international economic transactions in the global system. For centuries, national governments have enacted laws, charted colonial and imperialistic paths, made policies, waged wars, negotiated and signed treaties, led business delegations, funded research and development, and designed strategies in search of positive outcomes for their national economies. These are elements of state intervention too. The British government played an active role in the 19th century Industrial Revolution previously attributed solely to the magic of the invisible hand.[51] Richard Lehne observed that government influence over business in America

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[46] "EC Approves N927m for FCT Waste Bins," *Nigerian Tribune* (September 23, 2010), accessed March 16, 2012, http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/ news/11458-fec-approves-n927m-for-fct-waste-bins.

[47]"Globalization: Winners and Losers," DVD, Directed by Keely Purdue, Films for the Humanities and Sciences (Princeton, NJ: 2004).

[48]Nicholas Bariyo, "Deadly Clashes at Tanzania Mine," *Wall Street Journal* (November 14, 2012), accessed http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578119.

[49]Kerbo.

[50]Deborah. Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2009; Asianews, "Chinese Textile Tsunami Hits Africa" (April 26, 2005), accessed May 4, 2012, http://www.Asianews.it-en,Chinese-textile-tsunami-hitsAfrica.

[51]Jeff Horn, The Industrial Revolution: Milestones in Business History (Westport CT.: Greenwood Press, 2007); Patrick O'Brien, "Deconstructing The British Industrial Revolution As A Conjuncture and Paradigm for Global Economic History," in Jeff Horn, 21-46.

has even become more pervasive in recent decades.[52] The British government played the role of a developmental state during the Industrial Revolution; so did German, Belgian, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Scandinavian governments in the industrial development of their respective countries.[53]

The UN's Economic Report on Africa 2011, was premised on the thesis that Africa needed a developmental state even though it was a well-known fact that strong activist states enabled development in Southeast Asia, Japan, and other places where development had occurred in world history.[54] Even Walt Whitman Rostow, a foremost protagonist of neoliberal, modernist developmentalism, assigns a central role to the state in his outline of stages of economic growth. According to Rostow, the takeoff of economic growth is characterized by the emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the economy as a serious high-order political business.[55] We now know, from the East Asian experience, that a developmental state can emerge and operate successfully anywhere and at any time there emerges a political group that takes development seriously.

A developmental state is not an abstract entity. It is people, human beings, elected officials, plus bureaucrats and technocrats in leadership positions who are responsible for policy and action that empower their citizens to transform their socioeconomic environments. Aware of the circumstances of their own societies, leaders of a developmental state find ways to shepherd their citizens to prudently create, manage, and expand national or local financial, physical, social, and production infrastructure on the path to development. China currently earns the attention and respect of the world as its political elite successfully shepherds the national economy and human resources on the path to national development through prudent policies and management.

On the Importance of Prudent Management of Financial, Physical, and Social Infrastructure

Countries that make it in the development process seek ways to avoid the burdens

[52] Richard Lehne, *Government and Business: American Political Economy in Comparative Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).

[53] Jeff Horn, et al., *The Industrial Revolution: Milestones in History* (Westport CT.: Greenwood Press, 2007); Ian Inkster, "Cultural Engineering and the Industrialization of Japan" in *Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution*, Jeff Horn, Leonard. N. Roseband, and Merritt Roe Smith, eds. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010): 291-398.; Kristine Bruland, "Reconceptualizing Industrialization in Scandinavia in Horn," 125-150.

[54] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "Economic Report on Africa, 2011: Governing Development in Africa, The Role of the State in Economic Transformation," accessed November 2012, http://www.uneca.org/era2011/ERA2011_ENG-fin-pdf.

[55] Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

of foreign debt**.** Avoidance of debt, especially external debt, is part of prudent financial management. For example, the cancellation of a sizeable chunk of Nigeria's foreign debt by core countries in 2005 lifted it out of the debt burden. Nigeria paid the final installment of its foreign debt in April 2006. But in August 2014, the head of the Debt Management Office put that country's foreign debt at $9.38 billion.[56] The latter is a conservative estimate because the World Bank and the World Fact Book noted that Nigeria's external debt had reached $13 billion by 2011.[57] At the present pace, Nigeria steadily marches towards re-incurring as much as the $18 billion debt forgiveness it received from international lenders less than a decade after.

Of the thirty-nine countries listed under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, thirty-three were in Sub-Saharan Africa and the majority of them had attained completion status, the point at which debt relief was irrevocable.[58] If a primary objective of debt relief is to free up resources for social spending including more spending on health and education, that purpose stands defeated if, as in the case of Nigeria, these thirty-three SSA countries soon after debt forgiveness incur new debts, become re-saddled with the burden of debt servicing, and use the latter as an excuse for not spending on sectors such as education, health, poverty reduction, infrastructure, technology acquisition, and capital formation for economic modernization. Consistent with the central argument of this paper, avoiding the debt burden is the responsibility of state actors who themselves should be part of organized domestic agency. Countries that have made it on the journey to development have placed a premium on high quality education while at the same strengthening their economies.

Indicators of educational progress often cite quantity or enrollment trends but de-emphasize quality or how well education prepared its recipients to effectively function in their positions and roles in society. Flagship compendium of human development indicators, "Human Development Report" is a good example of the emphasis of quantity or rate of enrollment over quality or how much and how well students learn. The education component of the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) is also premised on enrollment rather than on quality. But does progressive increase in enrollment in all levels of education mean the production

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[56]O. Abioye and I. Onuba, "Nigeria's External Debt Rises to $9.38 billion: DMO,"*Punch Nigeria,* August 20, 2014.

[57]World Bank, International Debt Statistics (Washington, D.C. 2013); Central Intelligence Agency. Debt-External, The World fact Book, 2013, accessed November 19, 2015, www.gov.library/ publications/ theworl-factbook/rank.order/2079rank.html.

[58]World Bank & International Monetary Fund, "Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative," January 10, 2013.

of human agents competent enough to lead and manage national development? A study of quality assurance in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa conducted by Peter Materu (2007) further illustrates this problem. In that study, a university student in Ethiopia responded thus:

> Most donors define African education success in terms of how many students are being graduated and how many students are in school. The quantity issue is of course one thing that should be addressed, but it shouldn't be the whole mark of any education intervention in Africa. How an African resource could be better utilized by an African child for an African development should be the issue.[59]

That African education should produce an African child capable of utilizing an African resource for African development is consistent with the infusion of organized domestic agency in the development process. Studies of education in Africa leave doubts on the capacity of the educational institutions to effectively play this role. David Johnson laments that the children who complete primary schooling in Africa leave with unacceptably low levels of knowledge and skills."[60] A study by Justin van Fleet cautioned that the prognosis for the economic future and social development of Africa was gloomy because over half of the children complete primary school without learning basic skills.[61] Peter Materu notes that poor governance and insufficient qualified academic staff contribute to decline in the quality of higher education in Africa.[62] Otherwise why would international agencies, including the World Bank, and national governments spend tremendous amounts of financial and human resources on an alternative concept known as capacity building in Africa?[63]

Capacity building entails the enhancement of skills and capabilities of individuals and groups to enable them to be effective participants in their social and economic environment. Educational institutions around the world play this role. One can surmise that the proliferation of capacity- building programs in Africa by national, international, and supranational agencies in the last three decades means that national education systems have lost their ability to continue to play

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[59] Peter Materu, "Higher Education Quality Assurance in sub-Saharan Africa: Status, Challenges, Opportunities, and Promising Practices," The World Bank Working Paper, No.124. 2007.

[60] David Johnson, The Changing Landscape of Education in Africa: Quality, Equality and Democracy (Oxford: Symposium Books, 2008).

[61] Justin van Fleet, "Africa's Education Crisis: In School But Not Learning," Brookings, (September 17, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/09/17-africa- education-crisis-van-Fleet.

[62] Materu.

[63] World Bank, Capacity Building in Africa: An OECD Evaluation of World Bank Support' (Washington, D.C. 2005).

the role of producing human capital for effective leadership and management of the development process.

Worthy of emulation is Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party who as leaders of a developmental state were determined to promote the principle of an organized domestic agency for national development. They implemented a policy of massive economic restructuring with emphasis on technology, computer education, and human capital development, which led Singapore to develop as a leader in electronics, petrochemicals, and international trade.[64]

Granted that education is very important as a driver of development, higher education is not a sufficient condition. Studies show that most people in developed countries do not have university education.[65] But the majority lives at middle class level. Studies in the United States have found a rise in the rate of unemployment.[66] The apparent oversubscription to higher education in some African countries is a function of weak economies dominated by preponderant numbers of ultra-micro and non-gainful economic activities in the ubiquitous informal sector. Strengthen the economy in such a way that secondary school graduates with or without additional short term vocational education can find gainful employment, and you will see a drop in the number of applicants to universities. Strengthen the economy in such a way that the majority of first degree graduates secure gainful employment, and you will see a drop in the number of students rushing to pursue higher degrees. In the ideal scenario, however, liberalization of and greater access to higher education in Africa continues. But those who pursue higher education will do so not because they see time in tertiary institutions or graduate education as a temporary diversion from the anxieties of joblessness, but because they actually want to and are capable of achieving educational success. This is the story of many developed countries.

Because the majority of the economic activity in Africa takes place in the unorganized informal sector where people are in an unending struggle to scrape by, the economy is unable to play the role of a receptacle for educated people. A developmental state shepherds citizens to bring organization, direction, and dynamism to the economy through imaginative laws, public policies and actions. In the end, additional investments greatly needed to improve the quality and quantity of education will achieve intended goals of producing citizens who can effectively

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[64]Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000).

[65]OECD, "Education Policy Analysis: Focus on Higher Education 2005-2006," accessed May 21, 2012, http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/38140461.pdf.

[66]Kelly Bedard and Douglas Herman, "Who Goes to Graduate/Professional School: The Importance of Economic Fluctuation, Undergraduate Field and Ability "accessed November 25, 2014, econ.ucsb.edu/-kelly/grad_june06.pdf.

conceptualize and implement national development goals.

That the development process entails conceptualization of visions and implementation of policies by the people of a given society is another constant. There have been lots of think tanks, blue prints, conferences and summits about everything in the purview of development in Africa. Everything said at conferences on the state of infrastructure in any African country can be summarized in one sentence, namely, something must be done about the poor state of physical infrastructure in that country. The U.S. - Africa Business Forum which took place in Washington D.C. on August 5, 2014 was no different. One of its sessions, "Powering Africa: Leading Developments in Infrastructure," focused on the problems of physical infrastructure on the continent, especially the intractable deficiencies in the power sector.[67]

Therefore there is more than enough information which a developmental state can use to steer a country to the path of sustainable development. It is time to stop talking and start doing something. It is common knowledge that investment in physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, water works, rail, air, and sea ports) has several advantages in all societies.[68] It is a sure source of creating jobs in a country. A developmental state can use it as an avenue to broaden, deepen, and strengthen the skill capacities of indigenous technical skills and the scale and scope of production in firms that supply construction inputs. The modernized items of infrastructure facilitate the movement of people, goods, and services. Good infrastructure is a powerful pull of domestic and foreign investments because capital responds positively to where conditions for doing business are most cost-effective.

The World Bank's Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED) verified this proposition in a series of studies of African economies from the 1980s to the early 2000s. World Bank researchers lucidly defined the infrastructural problems of many African countries including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Cameroon Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and others. Those studies observed the infrastrastructural deficiencies of many African countries and projected their costs to business activity.[69] The Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) jointly conducted similar studies and corroborated the findings of the RPED on the

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[67] U.S.-Africa Business Forum, Mandarin Oriental Hotel: Washington, D.C. , August 5, 2014, accessed November, 26, 2014 http://usafricabusinessforum.bloomberg.org/#/agenda.

[68] A. Ghani & C. Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding A Fractured World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[69] World Bank, *Pilot Investment Climate Assessment: An Assessment of the Private Sector in Nigeria. RPED* (Washington, D.C. September 2002); See http://search.worldbank.org all?qterm+RPED&title=&filetype= for studies of various African countries.

poor state of infrastructure in Africa.[70]

Similarly, a study of the transport situation in Africa showed that only 14.2 percent of the roads in SSA were tarred and rail and air services deteriorated due to poor maintenance of railways and runways.[71] Vivian Foster and Cecilia Briceño Garmendia report that forty-eight SSA countries generate the same amount of power as does only Spain; thirty countries experience power shortages and regular interruptions in service; and serious gaps exist in the various aspects of transport infrastructure and water supply.[72] SSA started with stocks, similar to South or East Asia, of roads, telephone, and power but these regions had left Africa behind by the year 2000.[73] Foster and Briceño-Garmenda attribute this slow pace of infrastructural development in SSA to constraints posed by geography, high costs of services, funding gaps, oil price shocks, political conflicts, and the high number of atomized or small nation-states, among others.[74] These are not good excuses for poor performance among African countries because the developmental state is all about surmounting constraints. There is no country that attained development without obstacles on its way.

Declare a national emergency in an African country on revolutionizing the national infrastructure through investments in public works. The result will be jobs, jobs, jobs; and more jobs if the inputs for the construction and maintenance of public works are sourced locally. It does not require special summits, white papers, or conferences, to know that a government that wants to inject domestic agency at the center of the development process can tie job creation to the contracts it awards indigenously and foreign-owned firms operating in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, or services in its country. Establish mechanisms to ensure that firms that win such contracts strictly adhere to the job creation requirements of contracts and insist that indigenous professionals have decision-making positions, challenging roles, and avenues of learning by holding such jobs. The role of a developmental state, therefore, is to make and implement policies that enable private firms to make profit.[75] Private firms, in the process, expand

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[70] Mans Soderbom and Francis Teal, *The Performance of Nigerian Manufacturing Firms: Report of the Nigerian Enterprise Survey, 2001* (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) & United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2002).

[71] UNECA, "The Transport Situation in Africa". United Nations Economic And Social Council: Economic Commission For Africa, Fifth Session of the Committee on Trade, Regional Cooperation and Integration (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 8-10, 2007), accessed September 15, 2013, http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/ctrci/5th/The-transport- situation-Africa.pdf.

[72] Vivian. Foster and Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, "Africa's Infrastructure: A Time For Transformation" (Washington, D.C.: Agence Francoise de Development & World Bank, 2010).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Atul Kohli, S*tate-Directed Industrialization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

production, and thereby create many employment opportunities that enhance the effective participation of domestic agency in development while eschewing corruption.

That unbridled corruption cripples the ability of a developing country's governments to steer development is another constant**.** Corruption, the use of political power for private gain, is a familiar characteristic of human societies. While no society is exempt from it, it is more blatant and destructive in some than in others. Toke Aidt found a strong negative relationship between growth in wealth per capita–a measure of sustainable development–and corruption.[76] Global Financial Integrity reports that Africa lost more than $854 billion through illicit financial outflows between

1970 and 2008 perpetrated by domestic and foreign actors; sub-Saharan Africa experienced the bulk of the illicit outflow.[77] From what we know about development, countries that have been successful in the journey to development in the last fifty years have done so on the strength of high national savings as the experiences of the Tiger economies and China show. Loss of a significant bulk of national revenue to private bank accounts through corruption, high internal and external debts, the high costs of government in some countries, and the absence of strong national, regional, and local tax collection regimes constrain overall national savings in African countries. Hence prudent management of national revenue is a stock of positive domestic agency that leaders of countries need to exhibit in post-fifty Africa.

Leadership and Domestic Agency for Post-Fifty Africa

What we know about development, or the constants of development, summarized above means that the governing elite of respective countries in post-fifty Africa at all levels of government must tow a path different from the previous fifty years. They should exert ownership of the development process and apply the developmental state as the tool with which to achieve development goals.

Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley, and Peter Lewis observed that South East Asians were much poorer than Africans at the time of independence in the 1960s but by 2005, South East Asians were two and half times richer.[78] When Lee Kuan Yew became Prime Minister in 1959, Singapore's GNI per capita was

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[76]Toke Aidt, "Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2) (2009): 271-291.

[77]Dev Kar and Devon. Cartwright-Smith. "Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development," *Global Financial Integrity*, March, 2010, accessed October 5, 2011, www.gfip.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=299.

[78]Jan Kees van Dongee, David Henley and Peter Lewis, "Tracking Development in South- East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Primacy of Policy," *Development Policy Review* 30, (S1, 2012), S5-S24.

$400,[79] but it astronomically grew to $43,000 by 2011.[80] This is a history-making performance and national development is about a nation making history. By contrast, the average GNI per capita in SSA in 2011 was only $1,257 the lowest among world regions with many countries in the region below $1000.[81]

Some may quibble that Singapore is a small city-state and therefore not comparable to most African countries in landmass, population, ethnic diversity and its attendant sociopolitical problems. The success of Lee Kuan Yew was not because of the small size of his country but because of his development-oriented mindset premised on an acute sense of personal independence (which he translated into state autonomy), plus his courage, a sense of self-efficacy and love for the progress of his people, traits which are not easily apparent in African leaders. African leaders may wish their countries to look like the United States of America or France, or for their cities to look like Paris, Shanghai, or Dubai but will not ask how those countries and cities got there. One of the strengths of Lee Kuan Yew is his ability to look at societies which have succeeded, identify what he could borrow from their experiences (external agency), and combine those with the strengths of his own society (endogenous agency).[82]

As the saying goes, "opportunity knocks but once." Lost years and lost resources, natural resources especially, will never return. That 51 percent of SSA population live under $1.25 a day fifty years after independence is not a cheery situation.[83] Nor should we cheer that 70-80 percent of Africans struggle to eke out a living in the unorganized, unpredictable, rough, and some tines, ungainful informal sector. That African leaders allow other societies to continue to dump their value-added goods on a continent with a weak industrial base does not elicit hope for industrial development in the near future. Reports about low standards of education as highlighted above also pose a handicap to national development.

That the development process in SSA has not been steered towards the infusion of an organized self-reliant agency is contrary to the history of pioneer developed countries of the West, the experience of recently developed countries of East Asia, and the ongoing high speed of national development in China. A former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi laments

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[79] Calestous Juma, "Development: Learning from Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew," Belfer Center: Harvard University, January 30, 2013), accessed February 10, 2013, http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication/22709/development.

[80] World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, D.C: December 21, 2012), accessed March 21, 2013, http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GNIPC.pdf.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Graham, Allison & Robert Blackwill, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grandmaster's Insights on China, the United States, and the World* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012).

[83] United Nations, "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011," *New York Times*, June, 2011.

that dependence on imports of manufactured goods coupled with a superficial manufacturing sector portends a continuously weak economic future for his country.[84] The rest of SSA, except South Africa, falls within the scope of high dependence on imported manufactures.

High dependence on imports does not indicate a development process propelled by the society's reliance on its own strength and resources, its members' energies and its natural and cultural environment as rightly prescribed by The Dag Hammarskjold Foundation.[85] High dependence on imports also corroborates the concern expressed by the World Institute for Development Economics Research that Africa's industrial sector was less advanced fifty years after independence.[86] Mo Ibrahim noted that Africa's lag in economic development rests squarely on the way Africans have governed themselves and no amount of aid, he says, can move the continent forward; hence Africans should get up and take on the responsibility of development.[87] In the same vein, President Obama said to the Ghanaian parliament, "The future of Africa is up to Africans."[88]

Ibrahim and Obama underscore the importance of endogenous and self-reliant development. The future of Africa will not belong to Africans if they cannot establish sustainable backward and forward linkages in their economies through value-added production and if they continue to allow countries more hungry and aggressive to continue to exploit and use the continent's natural resources to secure their own national development. Achieving endogeneity and self-reliance will therefore depend on how state actors in post-fifty Africa define their role. One way is to define the African development dilemma as a governance problem; the other is to see it as primarily a leadership question.

Governance Versus Leadership: Complementary Yet Distinct

Governance means making and managing public or organizational policy, organizing people and material resources, controlling and encouraging subordinates to exercise skill and commitment to achieve excellence in a given set of assignments. In the realm of public affairs, governance refers to the range of policies public officials enact and actions they take to manage the affairs of

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[84]"Central bank of Nigeria Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (SLS) Responds to Some Internet Inquiries on Fuel Subsidy," accessed March 10, 2013, Usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com on behalf of Mobolaji Aluko, January 5, 2012.

[85]Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Ibid.

[86]United Nations University.

[87]Mo. Ibrahim, "How and Why Africa Should Solve its Problems," *This is Africa: A Global Perspective*, July 25, 2013, accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/ Perspectives/How-and-why-Africa-should-solve-its-problems?ct=true.

[88]Barack Obama, "Text of Obama's Speech in Ghana. July 11, 2009," accessed July 12, 2009, http://www.washingpost.com/wp-content/article/2009/07/11.

society.[89]

Good governance is highly necessary and very much needed in Africa because it can yield positive incremental change. Similar to transactional leadership the rate of change from good governance alone is slow and circumscribed.[90] Stepping into the path towards another half century, Africa needs more than ordinary managers of national affairs. The continent should aspire for leaders that move their people to achieve profound institutional change. The latter is the role of transformational leadership. In which case, leadership is different from governance. While good governance aspires to perfect the status quo, good leadership is determined to transform the status quo to a higher order. Truly, Africa's development is both a leadership and governance problem. But leadership supersedes governance because a good or strong leader can inspire his/her followers to practice and sustain good governance practices.

Leadership is a bundle of attributes and actions including knowledge, vision, courage, drive, imagination, determination, transparency, decisiveness, motivation, patriotism and nationalism deployed by occupants of strategic positions to move their citizens towards profound and positive societal transformations. According to Lee Kuan Yew,

> All said and done, it is the creativity of the leadership, its willingness to learn from experience elsewhere, to implement good ideas quickly and decisively through an efficient public service, and to convince the majority of people that tough reforms are worth taking, that decide a country's development and progress.[91]

This means that leadership creativity, a critical attribute of transformational leadership, will spread to citizens who then apply and expand their creative potentials to the highest possible levels.

In real terms, transformational leaders in post-fifty Africa will assert independence and exercise courage in making choices in the best interest of their countries within the global system of economic, political and cultural interaction. They will lead their people to return quality and excellence to education, revolutionize infrastructure and modernize productive activity in agriculture and industry; make a determined effort to shepherd the industrialization of their countries; insert indigenous professionals and labor at the center stage of building national infrastructure; and deploy imagination to make policies that generate

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[89]Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, "Development Lag and the Imperative of Transformational Leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Perspectives on Leadership in Africa*, eds. Egodi Uchendu, et al. (Nsukka, Nigeria: Afro-Orbis Publishing, 2010).
[90]Hay.
[91]R. Velloor, cited in G. Allison & R. Blackwill.

employment in public and private sectors of society.

Transformational leadership is inward looking but does not isolate its society from the global system. It assumes ownership of the national or local development problem depending on the layer of leadership. It enables followers to unleash hidden and untapped capabilities and brings transparency and accountability to the fore of national affairs. The motto of transformational leaders in post-fifty Africa should be, u*se the people's money to solve the people's problems.*

The World Bank projects that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa would grow from 4.9 percent in 2013 to 5.2 percent in 2015 because of an increase in export volumes from several countries that discovered mineral deposits in recent years, namely Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.[92] Oliver August added his voice to the list of optimists of Africa's economic future.[93] But some skeptics such as Richard Dowden see this optimism as greatly exaggerated because optimists talk about rise in GDP due to income from extractive sectors without mention of Africa's place in manufacturing value added exports and the lack luster performance of African leaders in governance.[94]

Furthermore, the 2013 Human Development Report projects that 60 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa will still live in extreme poverty by 2050.[95] That will be close to 100 years after the modal year of independence. One may say that 60 million is substantially lower than the 371 million in extreme poverty in 2010.[96] By contrast, however, zero population and only 2 million people will be in extreme poverty in China and India respectively by 2050.[97] The optimistic projections on China and India may derive from the speed, breadth, and depth of economic modernization especially in the export of manufactures ongoing in both countries.

In their analysis of the role of manufacturing in the future of global growth and innovation, James Manyika et al. identified leading countries on indicators such as value-added, production of energy and resource- intensive commodities,

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[92] World Bank & International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, *Global Economic Prospects: Sub-Saharan Africa Region, 2013* (Washington, D.C.: January 2013).

[93] Oliver August, "Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent," *The Economist*, March 2, 2013, accessed April 8, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august.

[94] Richard Dowden "Africa: The Myth of Africa's Rise," Foreign Policy (January 4, 2013), accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/04/the_myth_ of_africa_s_rise; Richard Dowden, "Little evidence of 'Africa Rising' in Ibrahim Index of African Governance" October 1, 2014), accessed November 26, 2014 http://www. royalafricansociety.org/blog/little-evidence-%E2%80%98africa-rising%E2%80%99- ibrahim-index-african-governance.

[95] UNDP, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

technology innovators, and installed capacity of industrial robots.[98] No African country was mentioned on any indicator of manufacturing. Further, a study of technology transfer conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) found that Africa was the smallest importer of capital goods and the least favored destination of R&D projects.[99] The findings of James Manyika et al. and UNECA are similar to the drivers of development listed at the beginning of the present paper. They are also consistent with the proposition that African political and economic leaders should treat both the indicators of industrial innovation and productivity and indicators of basic needs as drivers of development rather than treat the latter as ends in themselves.

Conclusion

The success of African countries in development in the next fifty years depends on a paradigm of development that accords unequivocal and dedicated primacy to domestic human power/agency. As the United Nations rightly observed, if African countries are to achieve substantial reduction in poverty, they need to go through a process of structural transformation involving a decrease in the share of agriculture and an increase in the share of industry and modern services.[100] African countries should not expect other countries to do this for them because it is a historical incontrovertibility that development is neither a gift nor can it be outsourced. More than fifty years of foreign aid or development assistance has not brought Africa close to achieving development as we know it in history. Only countries that have transformational leadership embodied in a developmental state can achieve such a change in the highly competitive global economy. The goal of transformational leadership is both to shepherd and empower citizens to define, own and surmount national development challenges by infusing organized indigenous agency into development vision and action. That is the history of development left by transformational leaders in both advanced countries and the newly developed ones.

Africa's development, especially post-fifty Africa, will not be different. Inserting domestic agency at the center of national development requires government policies that challenge Africans to independently initiate and

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[98]James Manyika et al., "Manufacturing the Future: The Next Era of Global Growth & Innovation". McKinsey & Company, November 12, 2012, accessed April 21, 2013, http:// www.mckinsey.com/ insights/manufacturing/the_future_of_manufacturing.

[99]UNECA, "A Technological Resurgence? Africa in the Global Flows of Technology," *UNECA Series on Technology Transfer for Africa's Development*, United Nations Publication, 2010.
[100]UNDP, 2011.

consummate development programs. It will also require a conscious policy and an unflinching determination by leaders to shepherd their countries to develop. Development studies started in advanced countries on the premise that poor countries needed help. The unintended effect of that premise is that it created a mentality of dependence on advanced countries by Africans including well-educated African leaders. Effective infusion of domestic agency in national development will require a fundamental change in the content and substance of development knowledge from the present model that fetishizes external agency, especially the agency of foreign countries, to a paradigm that conceptualizes development as the sole responsibility of endogenous agency. The education sector will be at the forefront of the effort to redirect development theory and practice that emphasize an endogenous perspective.

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Notes on Contributor

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The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade

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Abstract: The Arochukwu people, popularly known as the Aro, are the most debated sub-cultural group in Igboland. The Aro, whose ancestral home is near the Cross River, and their co-Igbo neighbors were an integral part of the early history of the hinterland of the southeastern region of Nigeria. The Aro dominated commerce, politics, and religion in the region in pre-colonial times. With the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade in the fifteenth century, they emerged as significant players. The Aro's role in the region in both precolonial and colonial times has shaped the way they are perceived in contemporary Igbo society. This article examines two sides of the image of the Aro people in contemporary Igbo society and argues that the negative and positive experiences that neighboring Igbo communities had of the Aro since the fifteenth century helped to evoke hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand, and wonder, awe, and admiration on the other. The article traces the origins of this dual perception of the Aro and analyzes the reasons why it persists.

Keywords: Southeastern Nigeria, Igboland, Aro, Slavery, Inter- group Relations, Trade, Precolonial era, the Atlantic Slave Trade, Migration, Diaspora

Introduction

The literature on inter-group relations in pre-colonial southeastern Nigeria acknowledges the influence of the Aro in the region.[1] The Aro dominated their neighbors in the hinterland, especially during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. The leading role the Aro played in the slave trade led to their dominance and resulted in what came to be "the fear of the Aro" by neighboring communities, villages, and towns. This fear has in turn led to the generally held view that the overall Aro's positive influence "also had a dark side."[2] The fear of the Aro was so strong that in the early years of colonial rule, a British official observed that Igbo and non-Igbo groups in the hinterland still dreaded their Aro neighbors.[3] That fear

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[1] K. O. Dike and F. Ekejiuba, *The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria, 1650-1980: A Study of Socio-economic Formation and Transformation in Nigeria* (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1990), 223-226.

[2] Kate Meagher, Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria (Ibadan: Heinemann, 2010), 34.

[3] G. Ugo Nwokeji, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and Population Density: A Historical Demography of the Biafran Hinterland," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2000): 633.

derived from the slave trade, which, as Inya Eteng argues, "left enduring hatred between the Aro and their war mercenaries, on one hand, and community-casualties of their slave raids, on the other."[4] Apollos Nwauwa insists that the Aro owe "their notoriety" not only to what they did with their famous religious deity, Ibini Ukpabi, but also to their skill in the formation and operation of a network of trading oligarchy, mainly in human cargoes, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries.[5]

From the era of the slave trade in Igboland there remains "an ambivalent social attitude of most people of various Igbo sub-groups toward their Aro neighbors."[6] This article discusses some of the factors that shaped this attitude toward the Aro within Igboland, and how in modern times a "dual image" of the Aro exists.[7] It attempts to establish the veracity and nature of this dual image, as well as its ethno-historical underpinnings. Aro participation in the Atlantic slave trade is an especially important point of reference particularly because the scale of their activities and involvement in the trade constituted a critical turning point in their relations with their neighbors.

Aro Relations with their Neighbors

Decades before and after the fifteenth century, the southeastern region of Nigeria was characterized by great population movements, human settlements, and demographic changes resulting from migrations, raids, intra/ inter-ethnic squabbles, and various socio-economic tensions and challenges. Aro relations with the rest of their Igbo neighbors within this region can be interrogated in five important historical stages. The first was the pre-Atlantic stage. This stage, which began before 1400, was the period when the forces which led to the basic formation of the Aro demographic composition, their fascinating state or kingdom, and their economy were systematically coming into fruition through an elaborate network based on a combination of the various institutions of trans-local connections.[8] As K.O Dike and F. Ekejiuba note, early Aro demographic configuration and development

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[4]Inya Eteng, *Onye Ajuru Aju Anaghi Aju Onwe Ya: Ndi Igbo in Post-Civil War Crisis of Disunity,* 2004 Ahiajoku Lecture (Owerri: Ministry of Information, 2004), 46.

[5]Apollos Nwauwa, "State Formation and Evolution of Kingship Revisited: A Case Study of the Origin of the Aro Kingdom," in *Between Tradition and Change: Sociopolitical and Economic Transformation among the Igbo of Nigeria,* ed. Apollos Nwauwa and Ebere Onwudiwe (Glassboro: Goldline & Jacobs Publishing, 2012), 41.

[6]Ndu Life Njoku, "The Atlantic Slave Trade, Environmental Changes, and Human Migrations in West Africa: the Case of the Aro of Southeastern Nigeria," *Igbo Studies Review* 1 (2013): 32.

[7]This is similar to the dual image of the Jews in English and American literature. See Jay L. Halio, ed., *The Merchant of Venice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4-5.

[8]Njoku, "The Atlantic," 20-23; Nigerian National Archives, Enugu (hereafter, NNAE.) H. F. Mathews, ARODIV 20/1/15: Being the various accounts of Intelligence Reports on the Aro Clan, Arochukwu District, Calabar, 1927; A. Harneit-Sievers, Constructions of Belonging: Igbo Communities and the Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 18-20.

economy derived, on the one hand, from an internal source, that is, from a series of small-scale migrations from the savanna fringes of the central plateau of the region, only to converge in the rainforests of the Cross River basin.[9] No doubt, this laid the foundation for the transformation of the Aro economy through the intensification of agriculture, competition for productive resources, and the growth of commerce. On the other hand, an external source of change derived mainly from the Atlantic slave trade, which also increased the momentum of internal migrations.

The second stage, which dates from about 1500, was that of the Atlantic slave trade. The Aro economy had developed before the Atlantic slave trade began, but the Atlantic trade was an important agent of change that contributed in developing the perceptions of the Aro by their neighbors. The slave trade era witnessed the emergence of the three-legged Aro trading oligarchy: the commercial, the diplomatic, and the cosmological/oracular. Positioned as the middleman in the Euro-African trade, and eager to meet the demand for captives by rising up to the challenge of tapping the thickly populated Igbo hinterland, the Aro entered into various alliances with neighboring communities, availing them to the sought-after European trade goods and procuring slaves in exchange. They not only used their dreaded oracle, the Ibini Ukpabi, to achieve their commercial goals, but also hired people of neighboring Igbo war-like clans of Abam, Ohafia, Edda, and Nike to assist them with captive-catching, expeditions, or raids, and to generally protect Aro interests and enforce their will whenever it was necessary to do so. The United States of America's domination of the modern world is similar to the Aro influence in the area. R. C. Njoku succinctly captures this:

> As the US today controls the world with superior technology and military muscle, the Aro employed the use of their all-powerful oracle, known as the Ibinukpabia (Long Juju), and their military alliance with the Ohafia, Abam and Eda as instruments of fear and domination. The Aro-Ohafia-Abam-Edda military alliance, like the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accorded the Aro the military muscle to threaten and often raid other communities who were opposed to their commercial and religious interests.[10]

Thus, the Aro emerged as the leading captive-recruiting merchant class of the region.[11] With the clear advantage they had over their neighbors, Aro traders seized and enslaved populations, grew wealthy by selling many slaves, while retaining

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[9]For details, see Dike and Ekejiuba, 31.

[10]R. C. Njoku, "Neoliberal Globalism in Microcosm: A Study of the Precolonial Igbo of Eastern Nigeria," *Mbari: The International Journal of Igbo Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008): 59.

[11]Martin Klein, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and Decentralized societies in West Africa," Public Lecture, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria, January 22, 2000, 11.

some for domestic use. By so doing, they were able to maintain and sustain a complex network of client-patron relationships across Igboland and beyond, with their Arochukwu homeland as the metropolis.

For the majority of people in the Igbo hinterland, the rise of the Atlantic slave trade led to high-level feelings of insecurity.[12] As a result of Aro- instigated raids, many villages either had their community life disrupted or simply ceased to exist. That European officers in latter-day colonial Nigeria filed reports about villages that had been "exterminated" or "almost exterminated"[13] suggests the prevalence of high incidences of raids to meet the demands of the trade, especially from the eighteenth century onward when the increasing demand in the Americas for African captives provoked changes in the interior of the Bight of Biafra.[14] At the end of such raids, "the practice then was for majority of survivors to seek refuge, for instance, in nearby hilly or forested locations, where, in some cases, they might try to set up brand new communities; it was also not unusual for some survivors to escape to their maternal home, that is, the land of birth of their mothers."[15] Available evidence indicates that during this period when the business of slaving was the most lucrative business available, households across Igboland became prepared to migrate at a moment's notice, to change occupation, residences, and social networks with little apparent hesitation.[16] The incessant sense of helpless preparedness and readiness to switch gears, in some cases, made the capacity to maintain recognizable and usable forms of collective solidarity and collaboration difficult. In the economic realm, the crisis which came in the wake of the Atlantic slave trade created major challenges related to maintaining the level of well-being for people of the non-exploiting classes at the lower ends of the slave market economy. Socially, the arrival of immigrants, European goods, and images that were perceived as "strange" created feelings of anxiety. Along with these were stories about cannibalism associated with the export trade, which created an atmosphere of fear and hatred for stranger elements, including the

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[12] For details, see Njoku, "The Atlantic Slave Trade," 26-28.

[13] NNAE., F. A. Goodlife, "Intelligence Report on the Otanzu, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, 28935 CSE 1/1/5, 1933 & 1952; NNAE., I.R.P. Heslop, "Intelligence Report on the Nkalu Clan, Orlu District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, CSE 1/85/6197A, 1936.

[14] Njoku, "The Atlantic Slave Trade," 27-29; see, also, Ndu Life Njoku, "Women's Resistance against the Slave Trade in Igboland, Southeastern Nigeria," *Ofo: Journal of Trans-Atlantic Studies* 2, no. 1 (June, 2012): 34.

[15] Udochukwu E. Akukwe, (retired teacher, now trader, age 81), interview with author, Umuejechi, Nekede, Owerri, Imo State, December 15, 2013.

[16] Chief Anthony Ogu, (trader, age 80), interview with author, Afor-Eziama Market, Eziama, Ikeduru, Imo State, November 28, 2014.

Aro.[17] In the face of the challenges that these developments posed, however, the Aro still triumphed. Over time they established settlements in parts of non-Aro Igboland and beyond, with invitation in some cases, along with large quantities of assorted gifts, from those desirous of their presence.[18]

The third stage is that of legitimate trade which began about the last decade of the eighteenth century. For the generality of the people of southeastern Nigeria, this stage was a critical period of commercial transition from trade in "human cargo" to trade mainly in oil palm products. Particularly for the Aro, the picture and challenge this new stage presented, as Chima Korieh points out, were such that "they were unable to monopolize the palm oil trade in the same way they had monopolized the slave trade. Unlike the slave trade, the production and marketing of palm oil were readily open to local competition since the oil could be produced by anyone who had access to the trees."[19]

During this period of legitimate commence the Aro struggled to smoothly transition to agricultural production, thus threatening their control of the better part of the southeastern regional market. The difficulties the Aro faced in making this shift, coupled with the threat to their regional dominance, underscores the viewpoint that in the period before the legitimate trade, the Aro economy was indeed driven by the slave trade.

It also gives credence to the crisis of adaptation view expressed by A. G. Hopkins and others in reference to the Aro in the context of the legitimate trade that opened up a new market economy.[20] However, that the transition diminished Aro control of trade did not mean a total collapse of their trading system. On the contrary, Aro hegemony did not end as they became active to some extent in the new palm produce trade in parts of the region by using old trading contacts, organizational skills, and capital accumulated during the slave trade. The stage of colonial rule saw a change in Aro regional position of dominance, with the proclamation by the British of a Protectorate over the whole of southern Nigeria in 1900. This political action automatically brought the Arochukwu district within the Old Calabar Administrative Province. The British understood clearly that to consolidate power in the conquered areas, they had to undermine the Aro influence.

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[17] The initial story then was that those enslaved were taken to the coast for sale to *ndi Potokiri,* that is, people of Portugal, who would eat them up. Pa Nduka Clifford Opara (village elder, age: 85+), interview with author, Umuokoro, Achi Mbieri, Mbaitoli, Imo State, December 18, 2013; and Udochukwu E. Akukwe**.**

[18] Uche Ohia, *Patriotism and Community Development: A History of Arondizuogu Patriotic Union* (Aba: Silverduck, 2007), 6-7.

[19] Chima Korieh, "The Nineteenth Century Commercial Transition in West Africa: The Case of the Biafran Hinterland," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2000): 597.

[20] See, for example, the arguments of A. G. Hopkins as captured in Korieh, 597-598.

As the British colonial officer, Colonel Moorhouse, put it: It was inevitable, in my opinion, that in the extension of the [British] Administration, there should be a conflict between the Government and the Aros in the conditions that existed at the time." He insisted that "It was in order to break down the trade monopoly of the Aros far more than any missionary influence that the decision to open up the country was made.[21]

With colonial rule in place, the British embarked on an anti-Aro expedition between 1901 and 1902 during which they defeated the Aro. This defeat culminated in the destruction of their major source of influence - the Ibini Ukpabi oracle.[22] The defeat of the Aro and the destruction of their oracle paved the way for the gradual introduction of Christianity and Western culture into Arochukwu and the rest of the Igbo territory.[23] Although Western influence undermined Aro power in the region, the pre- conquest Aro-inspired migrations and intermingling yielded various forms of inter-group relationships between the Aro and their neighbors in the Igbo and even non-Igbo areas. Although Aro migrations and settlements had various long-lasting effects, the most prominent result is the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of Igboland and beyond, encapsulated in what is popularly referred to as the "Aro Diaspora."[24] In spite of the many challenges which the Aro in the homeland and those "in Diaspora" had to face especially during the colonial era, quite a good number of them still distinguished themselves in the different areas they found themselves, often taking advantage of Western education to enhance their prestige. Such Aro sons as Mbonu Ojike, Alvan Ikoku, K. O. Mbadiwe, S. G. Ikoku, Reverend Inyama, to mention just a few, had the impact of their achievements felt in the post-colonial period in the fields of politics, education, and religion, among others.[25] However, to what can the Aro be said to owe their ascendancy in Igboland? Moreover, what generally were their capabilities? To these questions, we now turn.

Domains of Aro Influence and Capabilities in Igboland

Aro traders were unarguably the driving-force behind Aro success and ascendancy in Igboland. The traders owed their reputation, influence, and dominance more to an accident of geographical location than to anything else. Arochukwu was

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[21] Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna (NNAK), Minute dated 28/9/1920 attached to letter No. 2532 of 17/12/21 in the file Conf. NO.80/1920.

[22] The oracle, associated with immense religious and judicial powers, was the instrument of Aro commercial dominance in the Igbo country (and beyond): NNAE, ABADIST 20/1/3– Long Juju of Aro Report on, 1909-1923.

[23] NNAE, ARODIV, 20/1/15, 13; NNAE., ARODIV, 31/1/55, 15.

[24] Njoku, "The Atlantic," 31-32; see Ohia, 6-8.

[25] Dike and Ekejiuba, 325-329.

strategically located around the Enyong Creek, which links it to the main artery of the Cross River system – "the highway by which 'light and civilization' would penetrate the remotest recesses of the *terra incognita* inhabited by the Ibo, the Ibibio and the Ogoja peoples."[26] Therefore, it had the advantage of commanding the gateway into the densely peopled Igbo hinterland, apart from being within easy reach of the main southeastern Nigerian coastal ports. Thus, with a location that was favorable, the Aro naturally manipulated their geographical advantage to gain high economic status.

Aside from a favorable geographical location, the Aro had the advantageous influence of the authority of the widely famed Ibini Ukpabi oracle. The oracle conferred on the Aro the appellation "*Umu Chukwu*" ("Children of the high God"), making them almost untouchable as they traversed the length and breadth of the Igbo territory.[27] In addition, there was the Aro military alliance system which they relied on to protect their interests. They made use of the services of war-like neighboring Igbo clans who, even on short notice, served to ensure the protection of Aro interests in the region. Any analysis of the factors and strategies behind Aro success and dominant influence in Igboland is incomplete without recognizing the remarkable Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure, and their flexible social system embodied in the trinity of the trader, the diplomat, and the oracular agent. With their array of exotic wares, wherever the itinerant Aro trader paused, prominent men literally fell over each other to host him, and even tried to lure him to establish a resting place of sorts. Then, the readily available agent of the Aro oracle would act as a guide for consulting the oracle, and also serve as a guarantee for security along hazardous routes. Finally, the presence of the Aro diplomat was necessary for ending those inter-community feuds, which were adjudged unprofitable to Aro interest because of the challenges of insecurity they posed to travelers. Additionally, the presence of the diplomat was a known deterrent to attack from potential invaders because of both the fear of real or imaginary repercussion from the dreaded Aro oracle and the fear of the inevitable military reprisal that would certainly follow such action.[28]

The image of the Aro in Igbo development history hinged essentially on what constituted Aro sources of influence and capabilities, especially in the slave trade era. It is possible to present these in five distinct domains. The first is "the domain of human social capabilities." This embodies Aro ability to apply common-sense

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[26] A. E. Afigbo, "Trade and Politics on the Cross River Basin, 1895-1905," *Journal of the Historical Society of Ghana* xiii, no. 1 (1972): 21.

[27] Pa Michael Abiakam, (retired trader/village council elder, age 90+), interview with author, Ogonaluma, Umuoziri, Inyishi, Ikeduru, December 23, 2013; and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

[28] Ohia, 6.

psychology in controlling the land and peoples of their homeland region. After mastering the regional land and river transportation network systems, Aro traders and diplomats divided the environment into two parts: the abode of "bush people," whom they called *ndu mba ohia*, and the abode of "littoral people," or *ndu mba mmiri*. While the "littoral people" consisted of all those who lived close to the coast, such as the Efiks and the Ijaws, "bush people" referred to those who lived in the hinterlands.[29]

Being in direct contact with the coast-based Europeans, the littoral communities were better armed and they were also largely organized under centralized political structures. Additionally, their men of authority occupied a strategic middleman position in the slave trade. By virtue of the geographic location of such communities, the Aro avoided raiding them for captives. Rather, exchange of trade goods, which included human cargo, and diplomatic cooperation with the leaders of these communities, mainly through the instrumentality of the Ibini Ukpabi, were the defining characteristics of the relationship between these communities and the Aro. On the other hand, seeing the "bush people" of the decentralized Igbo hinterland largely as people of "primitive tribes" that were very much uninformed about the goings-on in the coast-based Euro-African relations at the time, the Aro designated their abode as the main source of captive extraction. The abode of the littoral people was the main destination point of captives before shipment across the Atlantic. Little wonder then that the catchphrase for punishing a recalcitrant fellow in the Igbo hinterland during that period of insecurity was simply: *iresi ya ndi mba mmiri*;[30] that is, "to sell the fellow off to the littoral people" or people of the coast. Furthermore, the Aro, not insensitive to local cultural forms, were thoughtful and smart to appropriate and put to use the important element of trust, building it into their unequal social relations with their neighbors. To facilitate this, they dutifully adopted the dialect of their host. Moreover, in recruiting professional load carriers from host communities, the Aro relied on the advice of local men of authority, whose trust and confidence they earned and to whom they gave material presents, but also a promise to provide for the load carriers' security/protection. In addition, they re- invented the institution of *Igbandu* ("blood pact") to service their trade relations. Whereas *Igbandu* was originally used, for instance, to re-establish confidence between disputants, especially in kinship relationships, the itinerant Aro trader used it in forming friendships and alliances with alien groups.[31] In other words, they adapted the institution to establish strong links with non-Aro Igbo

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[29] Pa Abiakam and Pa Opara.

[30] Udochukwu E. Akukwe and Pa Opara.

[31] For details, see, F. I. Ekejiuba, "Igba-Ndu: An Igbo Mechanism of Social Control and Adjustment," *African Notes* VIII, no. 2 (1972): 9-24.

sub-groups, thereby making it possible for them to gain entry into areas where a forcible entry would disrupt trade by generating hostility or resistance. Thus, *Igbandu* removed the element of mutual suspicion, established confidence in the contracting parties, and made it obligatory for local chiefs and men of authority to keep trade routes open and secure for Aro traders to ply their business without hindrance.

Next is "the domain of economic capabilities" under which the Aro became the major purveyors of European trade goods, including the exotic/ luxury ones, such as gun and gunpowder, obtained from within the abode of the littoral people. With such goods, they endeared themselves to the elites in the abode of "bush people," and stimulated differences in wealth and social status in these communities. For instance, the possession of a gun by an individual, and the firing of gunshots during ceremonies, such as funerals, soon became indicators of a high-level social status.[32] Thus, the Aro depended on the coast-bound export trade to generate luxury goods with which they increased their power and prestige vis-à-vis their neighbors. As a result of exposure to what was perceived by the standards of the time as "better things of life," expectations were raised, and this "created in these areas a new class of men anxious to acquire wealth and titles – a class with whom the Aro also allied to extract captives through kidnapping and occasional raids."[33] Therefore, Aro dominance was based on wealth accumulation through trade and military power, as is evident in the politico-legal domain

With the influence and authority conferred on them by their oracle, the Aro became key negotiators in local socio-political disputes, enthroning the justice system of their oracle in the abode of the so-called "bush people." With time, the Aro justice system became fundamental to the social organization of people in various parts of the Igbo hinterland.[34] For instance, as an integral part of the traditional Igbo judicial system, consulting with the Ibini Ukpabi oracle at Arochukwu became an effective means of achieving genuine reconciliation and of re-establishing confidence between disputants whose relationship was so strained that normalcy was impaired. With their justice system installed, even without having to push ultimately for the acceptance of their political lordship, the Aro used the services of fighting allies to assert some quasi-political supremacy whenever the need arose. By the same token, however, the allies were also used to

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[32]Chief Joseph Ndubuisi, (retired teacher, aged 75 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2013; and Mazi Sunday Okoro, (retired teacher, aged 65 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2014.

[33]Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

[34]See, for instance, NNAE, J.G.G. Allen, Intelligence Report on the Ngwa Clan, Vol. 1, 1933, 41; see, also Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 105; Pa Opara and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

raid for captives in the abode of the "bush people."

The importance of the Ibini Ukpabi in Aro ascendancy should not be overstressed. As much as the oracle was paramount in the imposition of Aro hegemony, it operated in perfect symbiosis with the great Aro commercial acumen: the utilization of contacts made in the course of promoting it to advance Aro commercial interests, and vice versa. As pointed out earlier, the ability of the Aro to impose their authority in Igboland also rested on their military prowess. The exercise of the ability to implement this policy was, however, guided by tact because, as Alan Burns explains, the Aro were not a military people but owed their power to their relatively great intelligence when compared with the neighboring groups.[35]

Under the "domain of culture and cosmology," the Aro advertised their oracular power and propagated the *Ekpe/Okonko* society in many parts of Igboland,[36] using the cult members to further expand their commercial interests. Remarkably with time, the use to which the Aro put their oracle contributed in influencing or changing Igbo cosmology, having impacted the Igbo worldview, as Aro agents were often invited to different parts of Igboland to help to establish local shrines, or *Ihu Chukwu*, of the great *Chukwu*, the high God of the Igbo pantheon. For the Aro, the spirito- psychic field involving occultism and the use of charms was very useful in the very dangerous business of slaving. Though risky, under the effective protection of their dreaded oracle, and distinguished as "children of the high God," the Aro confidently strutted from one community to the other, directing the procurement and movement of captives.

Finally, there was "the domain of the physical environment." With no encumbrances, the Aro travelled and traded extensively in the course of which they built up a sequence of resting places stretched out as a trade diaspora along the trade routes. The subsequent proliferation of Aro settlements in pre-colonial Igboland was a corollary of these resting- places. According to David Northrup, the more important resting places gradually became trading centers, and finally Aro settlements.[37] From these trading centers, new settlements were, in turn, founded owing either to Aro initiative or the initiative of a local man of authority. This was the genesis of "Aro imperialism," which became the

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[35] Sir Alan Burns, *A History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 215.

[36] For information about the power of the *Ekpe* society, see NNAE File No. B 1680/15 J. N. Cheetam, "Report on Secret Societies," 1915; see, also, John N. Oriji, "Transformations in Igbo Cosmology during the Slave Trade: A Study of the Genesis of Place-Names, Totems and Taboos," in Nwauwa and Onwudiwe, eds., 106; and, F. Ekejiuba, "Aro Worldview: An Analysis of the Cosmological Ideas of Arochukwu People of Eastern Nigeria," *West African Religion*, 8 (1970): 1-11.

[37] David Northrup, *Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1978): 126.

foundation of effective Aro hegemony. Once a settlement was formed, as Uche Ohia notes, the Aro acquired landed property and took wives from among their host communities. Such affinities served both to ensure peaceful co-existence and to increase the size of Aro groups since, while freely marrying non- Aro women, the Aro men at the time never permitted their daughters to marry a non-Aro.[38]

Thus, the Aro migrated and settled permanently in choice or strategic parts of Igboland either to enable them advertise and promote the powers of their oracle, or simply to be better able, among other things, to tap captives from even the most isolated but well-populated hinterland communities. This strategy produced two types of Aro: "the *Aro-uno,*" the home-based Aro or those Aro who remained at home in Arochukwu, and "the *Aro-mba*" or "*Aro- Uzo,*" the Aro abroad or the Aro living outside the homeland.[39] In other words, the strategy led to the formation of Arochukwu confederacies, which maintained direct links with the Atlantic market even though they were not under any central authority.[40]

With the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria, most non-Aro Igbo, for fear of domination, became determined to halt Aro expansion into neighboring territories, an expansion that had been going on for hundreds of years. In many cases, the Diaspora Aro soon began to be treated as "aliens," especially under the Native Lands Acquisition ordinances of the British colonial state, notwithstanding the number of generations for which they had been settled in non-Aro areas, or the means through which they acquired titles to land. In some cases, they were made not to acquire land, or alienate it, without the permission of their indigenous landlords.[41] In the final analysis, commercial reasons connected to the Atlantic trade were certainly not the exclusive motive for Aro migrations/settlement outside their immediate homeland, but they were, indeed, a powerful incentive for temporary or permanent movement of the Aro across the Arochukwu borders. They moved across their home borders in order to bridge different contexts in the commerce of the time, or, they just left Arochukwu as fortune-hunters in search of greener pastures elsewhere. Accordingly, Aro migrants can best be described as entrepreneurial pioneers, as bricoleurs making the best out of the changes associated with the trade of the Atlantic community. So, even though it is valid to say that the Atlantic trade did not shape or initiate Aro responses to changes in the region, it did set the parameters for the forms of change that took place in the area. For the Igbo hinterland area of southeastern Nigeria, migrations by a predatory group

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[38] Ohia, 7.

[39] Ibid.

[40] G. Ugo Nwokeji's *The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in the Atlantic World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[41] Njoku, "The Atlantic," 31-32.

like the Aro were undertaken to cope with environmental and demographic changes and demands occasioned by the slave trade and resistance to it. Thus, trade and environmentally instigated migrations resulted in the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of the Igbo territory and even beyond; but, for the same reason, they also form the background factors of what later led to their dual image.

Aro Dual Image

In the context of ethno-history, the dual image of a people rests upon their achievements, exploits, and performance recognized as impacting favorably or profitably and otherwise on some other people or groups. The dual image of the Aro is a function of the level of their overall attainment rooted at all levels of their material, psychic, and spiritual being. At the exoteric level, it derives from a people's ethno-history and culture; that is, from the level of their material and non-material achievements, modes and methods of living, and the story which is told, or history which is written, about them.[42] Each group of people is a product of history. Their past has brought them to where they are today.

A dual image can be the attribute of an individual person or a group. An individual can have this image either as a result of what he has achieved as a person or by belonging to a group that has made a particular mark in human history because of its placement on the ladder of culture and civilization. Thus, a Mazi Nwachukwu Okoroafor of Arochukwu, even if he is a lily-livered fellow will attract, at least outside his Arochukwu homeland, the same dual image associated with an average Aro man because of the Aro exploits in the past. An individual achievement can be a freak occurrence, but a group's achievement can, and usually does, gel into a system or what we may call "culture and civilization."[43] Thus, for emphasis, the achievements and exploits of an individual cannot confer a dual image on a group, though a group's achievement/exploits can confer a dual image on a person who belongs to it, even if he was an outright failure. That an individual's exploits or achievements cannot give a group a dual image is like the old story or adage that a tree cannot make a forest, or one swallow makes a summer.

The exploits or achievements from which a dual image derives can fall into any of the following three fields of activity: i) mentifacts by which we mean mental constructs; ii) socio-facts or social institutions and usages; and iii) artifacts or tools for doing work. In the field of mentifacts are areas such as philosophy and ethics; in socio-facts things like religious, political, economic and legal

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[42] A. I. Nwabughuogu, "Ugwu Ndi Igbo in the Nigerian Nation State," *Ugwu Abia* (Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 33-34.

[43] A. E. Afigbo, "Ugwu Isi Oji or the Blackman in the Context of Global Civilization," *Ugwu Abia*, (Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 59.

systems, social life and values, language, etc., count; and artifacts are such things as material tools for getting things done. Put in simpler terms, human social achievements and exploits can be compartmentalized into two large fields, the spirito-psychic and the mental-material fields. For pre-colonial Igboland, especially in the heydays of the Atlantic slave trade, the spirito-psychic field, which includes occult and oracular powers, was, in a sense, almost the exclusive playing turf of the Aro through the instrumentality of their Ibini Ukpabi oracle. With this oracle, Aro cosmological influence in the context of their relations with communities in the Igbo hinterland, for example, spread out to take Igboland (*nay*, the south-eastern region) by storm.

Even though the mental-material field, in this case, Western science and technology, was the private domain of the West, the Aro were at least among the first of the hinterland southeastern Nigerian peoples to have a toehold claim in this field through their middleman position in the trans- Atlantic trade. Aro acquisition, through trade with Europeans at the coast of items such as gun and gun powder, umbrella, narrow, etc., at a fairly early historical age paid off for them as it constituted part of the secret of the dazzling successes they recorded in their many-sided relations with the rest of the Igbo. This trade, indeed, set the foundation for their early superior positive and popular image in Igboland, which became an important basis of their domination of the region. It is possible, now, to highlight some crucial aspects of this domination, which are germane to the issue of an Aro dual image in the area.

Igboland was predominantly a decentralized society whose growth and development, given the overall impact of the slave trade, was not in any way promoted by internal Aro exploitation for captives. Decentralized societies were victims rather than predators within the Atlantic slave system. There were two kinds of decentralized societies in the context of the slave trade: those raided by outsiders and those internally exploited for captives. Igboland fell into the second category. At no time did any neighboring non-Igbo group directly raid the Igbo for captives.[44] Together with their allies, the Aro did. They masterminded the raiding of communities and sub-groups, especially in the Igbo hinterland, but were themselves never raided. To fall into the hands of an internal group of predators was, for all intents and purposes, worse than to be raided by outsiders. Aro-led internal exploitation of their own ethnic group proved quite disastrous for Igboland. Thus, by the middle of the 18th century the area had become one of the most important sources of slaves for the Euro-African trade.[45]

Further, it may well be that the internal Aro predatory role was mainly

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[44]Njoku, "Women's Resistance," 33.

[45]Northrup, chapters 1-3.

responsible for the existence of the village-type political structure in most parts of Igboland, such as outside Oguta, Onitsha, and parts of western Igboland. The Aro strategy of internally exploiting and tapping Igboland inch by inch weakened societal solidarity and undermined any successful anti-slave resistance. With the Aro strategy of instigating inter- and intra-group squabbles, resistance could not be possible in the absence of a centralized authority.[46] The strategy may have exposed the Aro to the generally advantageous small-scale political organization of non-Aro Igbo communities, which, at the time, they may have found suitable, at least in the short run, for their captive extraction business. But, in the long run, such a strategy also discouraged the game-changing move towards political centralization. As Kate Meagher rightly avers, Aro "predatory relationship with the Igbo hinterland, which involved the encouragement of slave raiding and other institutions of slave procurement, may have contributed to their inability to consolidate their extensive coordinating role into the formation of a centralized state."[47] In any case, the fact remains that, tapping one village after another was, *par excellence*, the Aro "divide and rule" policy, or a "divide and *enslave*" tactic, suitable to their slaving business since it kept local units fragmented and therefore vulnerable.

The Aro, whose own in-built and self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through slaving activities was to see it more as a means of exchange than as means of production, contributed in building the foundations of a spineless feudalism in pre-colonial Igboland. They first led the way in inoculating the Igbo with the virus of a *nouveau appetite* for European trade goods, leading, in the end, to the "de-industrialization" of the indigenous economy.[48] Next, they stimulated differences in wealth among the Igbo in a manner that paved way for a rabid acquisitive propensity and instigated the commoditization of "everything around them and the commercialization of life" leading to "the rise of mercenary instinct in a good number of the people."[49]

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[46] It is obvious that the Aro preferred that the fragmented polities of Igboland remained decentralized and bound together by social and economic institutions, which Elizabeth Isichei in *A History of the Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976) describes as "a dense network of tiny capillary veins," 67.

[47] Meagher, 32.

[48] For details on some local industries that were affected, see NNAE, ABADIST 9/1/1303– Akwete Cloth Weaving, Aba Division, D.O. Aba to the Resident, Owerri Province, Umuahia, 18 June, 1947; NNAE OP. 1760 Vol. 1, Local Industries Ondist 12/1/1224; and NNAE Memo No. NS. 810/16 of May 31, 1938, from D.O. Nsukka to Senior Resident, Onitsha Province; according to P. A. Talbot, the "export trade in (local) cloth flourished until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, whence it gradually declined owing to great expansion in the import of Manchester goods." P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their History, Ethnology and Languages with an Abstract of the 1921 Census* Vol. 3 (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 941.

[49] Victor Ukaogo, "Clapping with One Hand, Sleeping with One Eye: Repositioning the Igbo Agenda in a Competitive and Globalizing World," *Igbo Studies Review*, 1 (2013): 111.

Under the influence of the Aro, accumulating captives and selling them off into slavery became the much sought-after occupation in order to "get-rich quick" and as a means to provide revenue to purchase European goods. Domestically, it even became a class status symbol to acquire captives and use them as slaves. In fact, the growth of the local Aro-driven slave trade created sinister opportunities for capital accumulation by the elite, but also imposed burdens on the agricultural economy because of the undue emphasis on the enslavement process, the institutionalization of slavery, and the neglect of the subsistence sector due to the heightened commoditization of human beings.[50] Thus, the Aro may be the precursors of "the negative entrepreneurial spirit that is today legendary and proverbial in Igboland."[51]

In the area of cosmology, the proliferation of oracular deities in pre- colonial Igboland is traceable to the Aro. Monday Noah's research shows that "the Long Juju," as visiting Europeans nicknamed the Aro oracle, was specifically designed or re-designed for the commoditization of human beings, and might have been the largest single vault in the region "where human beings were held awaiting shipment."[52] Dike also considers the Aro oracle as the medium through which the captives exported from the ports of the Niger Delta were largely recruited, and estimates that half or more of the slaves exported from this region had passed through its mysterious portals.[53] As we noted earlier, the influence of the Ibini Ukpabi contributed in changing Igbo cosmology, with deities and shrines mushrooming in different parts of Igboland as if in emulation of the Aro. Yet, the influence of the Aro oracle continued to dwarf other oracles such as the Igwekala of Umunoha, the Ogbunorie of Ifakala, the Amadioha of Eziama, the Agbala of Awka, the Kamalu of Ozuzu, etc.[54] Given the foregoing, it may be difficult to rule out that, considering the extent of their cosmological impact on the rest of Igboland, the Aro may also have laid the institutional foundations of ritual slavery, or the Osu caste system, in parts of the Igbo hinterland.[55]

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[50]Njoku, "The Atlantic," 28-29; this was in spite of the fact that the Aro brought new crops, such as *Ede Aru* – a special type of cocoyam allegedly introduced in Igboland by them (the Aro), as its name suggests. Pa Opara.

[51]Ukaogo, 111.

[52]Monday Noah, *Old Calabar: The City-States and the Europeans* (Uyo: Scholars Press, 1980), 75.

[53]K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 40-41.

[54]For the role of the oracles in integrating Igboland, see Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Oracles and Inter- group Relations," *South-western Journal of Anthropology*, xiv (1958): 295-317; Interview with Mr. Harrison Nwachukwu, aged 78 years, retired civil servant, Umunah, Orlu Local Government Area, Imo State, 21/12/2013.

[55]The evidence on the institution of Osu "suggests that it is of relatively recent origin, and adopted its present form in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade;" see, Isichei, 6.

The Aro art of long distance trading, as well as their habit of migrating, settling, and integrating into host societies have had a demographical impact on the greater part of non-Aro Igboland, resulting in high population densities, population re-configuration, the fear of domination on the part of host communities, and land disputes. The ripples of some of these may have worsened the negative image of the Aro. But, the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure which manifested in their art of long distance trading also manifested in the Diaspora Aro's habit to contribute meaningfully to the development of host society, while not forgetting their homeland. On another front, the Igbo, now well-known for their presence in virtually all parts of the civilized world, would appear to have emulated or copied the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure. Shrewd and resourceful, the pre-colonial Aro had led the way in introducing local institutional mechanisms, such as armed convoys, organized rest houses, marital alliances, fictive kinship, and indigenous credit system, for overcoming the risks and lightening the burden of long distance trade in the then fragmented and insecure pre-European political environment of Igboland and environs. It has therefore been rightly argued that the rapid expansion of the Igbo diasporas was a product not only of population pressure at home, but of the prior development of social "blueprints for migration" in pre-colonial Igbo social organization.[56] The organization of traders and fortune hunters into itinerant groups created a framework for migration that did not rupture linkages between migrants and their home areas. Pre-colonial institutions requiring the annual return of migrants to their home town for festivals were well established among the Aro, and spread to other Igbo groups with the passage of time.[57] According to a study on entrepreneurs in Nnewi, which was a commercial Igbo town, "systems of apprenticeship also followed a diasporic pattern, in which masters settled apprentices in other parts of Nigeria in order to widen their networks and avoid problems of oversupply in a given area."[58]

Thus, what is now the Igbo diaspora began, in a very real sense, in the pre-colonial era as the Aro trade diaspora in order to benefit maximally from the slave trade. The Aro successfully colonized strategic trade routes and places in non-Aro Igboland and beyond in their own form of Aro *lebensraum*, if you will.[59] Clearly, the Aro were successful, in part, because their trade diaspora was not tied to the apron strings of the political agenda of an expansionist state. To some extent, therefore, they were the precursors of what one may now refer to as the modern globalization of the Igbo, continuing, as it were, from where it stood following

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[56] Meagher, 41.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Njoku, "The Atlantic," 28-32; Ohia, 4-8.

the abolition of the slave trade.

Finally, the character of Anglo-Aro relations during the period of colonial conquest, and the nature of Aro resistance influenced Anglo-Igbo relations for the better part of the colonial period. Unlike the majority of the rest of the Igbo sub-groups, the Aro perceived rather quickly that the presence of the British posed a great threat to their economic interests.[60] Although they realized the military superiority of the British, the Aro believed that they were clever enough to outwit them:

> They decided therefore to engage in endless negotiations while, at the same time, determined not to yield an inch of territory to the British. Employing to the fullest that Aro capacity for sweet but tortuous double-talk, they got the British bogged down in fruitless negotiations for five years. It was not until 1899 that the British were able to see through the Aro game and decided on military conquest. The experience left a decided impression on the British about the Igbo.[61]

Because of the nature of Anglo-Aro relations, the British and the Igbo never really came to love each other, even if there existed until the end of colonial rule a certain uneasy type of admiration between them. Aro predatory relationships with the rest of the Igbo, which involved the encouragement of raiding and other institutions of captive procurement, impacted Igboland. However adventurous, enterprising, and materially successful the Aro were through their key role in the slave trade in Igboland, the flipside is that their ascendancy and influence are irrevocably tied to the unpleasant memory of a remarkable aspect of brutal Igbo history.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the dual image of the Aro is traceable to the central role they played in the slave trade in Igboland, the memory of which lingers in the

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[60] A British colonial officer captured an important part of the Aro economic interest during this period as the phenomenon of "clandestine slave dealing, especially in small children," being an internal trade which the British needed to get "automatically and completely suppressed." For details see NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, vol. 1 Williams, acting Secretary, Southern Provinces, to Governor, December 13, 1939; and, NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, Vol. 1 Chief Secretary for the government, February 5, 1924.

[61] G. N. Uzoigwe, "Ndi-Igbo in Modern Nigerian History," unpublished manuscript. The slave trade and the Aro oracular practices persisted for more than a decade after their formal elimination, leading to a second destruction in 1912. In fact, it took several decades of repression and punitive sanctions to dismantle the economic systems and sanctioning powers of Aro-centered commercial organization. See A. E. Afigbo, Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981). On the doggedness with which the British colonial administration hunted down the agents of the Aro see, also, A. E. Afigbo, "The Eclipse of the Aro Slaving Oligarchy 1901-1927," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 6, no. 1 (Dec. 1971): 3-24.

consciousness of many Igbo people in southeastern Nigeria. The Aro dominance of pre-colonial Igboland was notoriously based on the cold logic of their built-in and self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through infamous slaving activities. That the slave trade could and did develop in the context of the southeastern Nigerian hinterland despite the absence of a strong centralized power was largely because of the Aro factor. Within the context of the Atlantic economy, it is to their credit that the lack of a central government in Igboland during this period did not prevent the formation of a complex commercial network, one that remarkably was, in part, supported by private enterprise dominated by the Aro people. Aro trade merchants were successful as cultural brokers who connected small Igbo communities to the wider world. With great wealth amassed in the process, the Aro were emboldened by their achievements and came to refer to themselves as "Aro *oke-Igbo*" ("Aro – the great Igbo" or "Aro – the male Igbo"); and they were reverentially regarded throughout precolonial period as "the government" of that period.[62] The respect accorded to the Igbo by their neighbors was due in part to Aro economic, religious, and military power. The Aro oracle commanded respect that extended to Isoko, Urhobo, Idah, and Idoma.[63] A German Doctor, Hermann Koler, reported in

1840 that the dominance of the Igbo language in the southeastern region and the respect neighboring societies had for the Igbo had to do with the Aro-driven trade of the Igbo and their warlike nature.[64]

Yet, one cannot account for the many-sided setback of Igboland as a result of the slave trade without the unsavory realization that it has much to do with the predatory role of one of its very own sub-groups. The Aro remain a critical aspect of the unpleasant memories of inter-group relations in pre-colonial Igboland. The place of the Aro in the pre-colonial history of Igboland can be better explained in the context of a successful creation of a network of an exploited people connected to the Atlantic economy. This is so because the Atlantic Ocean, and with it the Atlantic economy, redefined Igboland, and on this ocean a trauma is inscribed.

One aspect of the aftermath of pre-colonial Aro activities in Igboland is that many Igbo sub-cultural groups tend to loathe the Aro presence to the extent of abhorring relating closely with them and even forbidding marital ties with them. As one oral informant cynically put it, "Even if we now have started trusting the

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[62] Ohia, 5 and 7.

[63] Nwabughuogu, 35.

[64] Hermann Koler, "Bonny and Igboland in 1840," reproduced in Elizabeth Isichei, Igbo Worlds (London: Macmillan, 1977), 14-17.

Aro, the demon in them we do not trust!" [65] Those who refuse to trust the Aro have continued to harbor anti-Aro sentiments; they continue to view their presence with suspicion, easily justifying their attitude by evoking memories of "what they regard as the treacherous Aro activities in the age of the Atlantic trade of the not-too distant past."[66] Nonetheless, there are still people across Igboland that are convinced that Aro socio-economic ascendancy in the area, far from constituting a disaster, was an unmitigated blessing. To this group, the Diaspora Aro have been whole-heartedly accepted in their midst as their kith and kin, having lived in their host communities for decades, if not centuries. This has often been portrayed by statements such as: "*Ndi Aru bu Bekee mbu anyi ma; ha weteere anyi ihie,*"[67] which translates to "The Aro were the first Europeans/white men we knew; they brought us civilization."

The introduction of the slave trade marked a great turning point in the history of Igboland. The Aro participation in the trade had some positive, though mainly negative, repercussions for the Igbo people, who still evoke m e m o r i e s   o f its impact. Studying the Aro-Igbo aspect of the long history of the trade and its repercussions advances a better understanding of the interplay of international and local socio-economic dynamics in intra/inter-group relations. For in Igboland, inter-group relations over these centuries were not overtly guided by the alliance of coercion and capital.[68] On the whole, the study analyzes the role of the Aro in the slave trade in Igboland and the reason for the kind of memory it evokes in contemporary social relations among groups in the area. Additionally, it reveals how a particular understanding of the tensions and complexities of a critical aspect of the Igbo present is embedded in the past.

Acknowledgments

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[65] Anonymous informant. One, however, thinks that the so-called "demon in the Aro" is all about their shrewdness and ability to succeed against all odds.

[66] Njoku, "The Atlantic," 32.

[67] Pa Opara.

[68] Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1982 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).

Notes on Contributor

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Beyond Political Islam: Nigeria, the Boko Haram Crisis and the Imperative of National Consensus

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Abstract: The escalation of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria that peaked in 2010 has led to the emergence of many theories to explain its causes. These theories focus on the socio-economic/ human needs, vengeance, the Islamic theocratic state, and political dimensions. Beside the socio-economic perspective, which harps on the pervasive poverty in the North, the theocratic state analysis seems compelling not only because it fits into the sect's mission to Islamize Northern Nigeria and carve it out as a distinct political entity, but it also resonates with political Islam, the driving ideology behind such Jihadi groups as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) with which the sect has been linked. While this paper identifies with the political causes perspective in offering more cogent explanation of the crisis, it goes beyond theory to underline empirical facts that have shaped the group's violence. It argues that in its current dimension, the Boko Haram crisis is squarely an outburst of a sense of exclusion by some powerful political forces from the northern part of the country. To save the country from similar crises in the future, Nigerian leaders should devise clearly-defined periodic power-sharing formulae that can enable its component parts to have a voice.

Key Words: Boko Haram, Political Islam, Global Islamic Crescent, Political Militia, National Consensus**.**

Introduction

This paper analyzes the nature of the current terrorism in Nigeria by situating it within the context of the country's extant democratic milieu and political experience rather than lumping it together, in Ankie Hoogvelt's terms, with the broader theme of the "current Islamist crescent."[1] It adopts the popular name Boko Haram to identity the terror group that has waged an unrelenting campaign of violence against Nigerians since 2009. Otherwise the official name of the group is *Jamatu'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'wati wal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad). This clarification removes

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[1] Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: the New Political Economy of Development (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001).

certain ambiguities which have beclouded the sect and its activities and obviated a clearer understanding of the objective of the current violence. Such ambiguity invariably hindered to some extent the state's ability to properly diagnose the problem at the initial stage and respond appropriately. That failure on the part of the state enabled the group to metamorphose into the lethal monster it has now become.

Boko in Hausa language means book (education). Haram on the other hand means sin. Since the education common to the people of Nigeria is the western model, boko has come to generally mean, western education. Boko Haram therefore means western education is a sin. This name was given to the *Jamatu'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'wati wal-Jihad* by the Nigerian media because of the general assumption that the group's philosophy seems to resist western education. The group has however contested the misrepresentation. According to one of the sect's members, Mallam Sanni Umaru,

> Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilization" is forbidden.
> The difference is that while the first (Boko) gives the impression
> that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West…
> which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy
> of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader. It
> includes education but not determined by Western Education.[2]

Mallam Umaru's exposition on the group has no doubt inspired the attempt to explain the group's emergence and philosophy within the clash of civilization theoretical framework. Advanced by Samuel Huntington, the theory argues that in the post-Cold War era, people's cultural and religious identities will constitute the primary source of conflicts in many countries of the world.[3] Based on that theory, Ezeani E. Onyebuchi and Chilaka F. Chigozie argue that the violent extremism going on in Nigeria amidst the transformation of the country's politics could be understood as a clash of civilizations.[4] Hence the driving force of Boko Haram is religion, with Islam violently questioning Western values. This foundation resonates with the global political Islam from which Islamist groups generally draw their inspiration.

This paper goes beyond the general theory of Boko Haram's religious origin.

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[2]Cited in Ezeani Emmanuel Onyebuchi and Chilaka Francis Chigozie, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Problem of Insecurity in Nigeria," in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited, 2013), 204.

[3]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remarking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuter, 1996).

[4]Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 205.

While it acknowledges its religious posturing, the paper critically interrogates the sect's assumed religious background and contextualizes it within the general political milieu in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria from where its violence began and spread. In doing this, the paper attempts to draw attention to how this phenomenon actually first arose and how it has grown to acquire the life it has today. The paper emphasizes the sect's violence, which has constituted a major security challenge confronting contemporary Nigerian society. In this regard, it considers the critical junctures, first, when the sect originally known in its immediate environment as non-violent in its propagation of its Islamic messages began to acquire arms; and second, the intersection at which it jettisoned its non-violent posturing, even prior to the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, before finally turning its rage against the larger Nigerian society.

Boko Haram's Early History

According to Nnaemeka C. Okereke, initially, the Boko Haram sect had no specific name as its members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the perception of the local population.[5] Therefore, either as Yusufuya sect, Nigerian Taliban, Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji, Shabaab Muslim Youth Movement, Boko Haram, or Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda'awatiwal Jihad, a name of which the sect approves, the exact date which the sect manifested on the Nigerian landscape remains largely a subject of speculation. While some tendencies trace the origin to 1995, others argue that the group was founded around 2001 or 2002. Similarly, the founder of the group is also contested. It is either ascribed to one Lawan Abubakar, who left for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, or to an evangelical group formed by Muslim students at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state, who reportedly felt dissatisfied with Western values.[6]

Relevant to this analysis, however, is that Mustapha Modu Jon, known as Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, was the leader of the group in 2009 when the Boko Haram stand-off with security forces gained wider national attention. Under Yusuf, the sect was said to have recruited its membership of mostly women and children, school drop-outs and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates most of who tore up their certificates.[7] Like the origin, the sect's propensity for violence

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[5]Nnaemeka C. Okereke, "Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko Haram Crisis," in *Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies*, eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Ahmed A. Sokoto (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd, 2011).

[6]Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories on Nigeria's Security Challenges in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency," *The Peace and Conflict Review* 7, no.1 (2012), accessed December 26, 2013, http://review. upeace.org/.

[7]Okereke, 450.

has also been a subject of controversy. Certain accounts cast Yusuf as someone whose preaching tilted towards violence. This was premised on the fact that he derived his inspiration from the works of a fourteenth century legal scholar, Ibn Taymiyya, who preached Islamic fundamentalism, and was also considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East.[8]

There was also an account that Yusuf, a native of Girgir in the Jalasko local government area of Yobe state, received Quranic education in the Chad and Niger Republics and was imbued with radical instincts, which generated friction between him and other moderate Islamic scholars such as the late Jafa Adam, Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir.[9] Remarkably, Yusuf was the son of Mallam Yusuf, a clerk at the Maiduguri office of the Kaduna State Transport Authority, who later abandoned his secular job to found an Islamiyya school where he taught the recitation of the Qur'an to *Almajiris (*street children). Yusuf Jr., a secondary school drop-out soon joined his father in his Quranic School, where his profound oratorical skills were honed. According to Simon M. Reef, it was here that Yusuf Jr. developed the effortless ability to convince people about the sincerity of his cause; his charisma also began to manifest.[10] He became so popular, grew in influence, and effortlessly succeeded his father. Going by this version of Yusuf's background, that projects him as one imbued with radical instincts, and which forced his relocation from Borno, where he grew up to Yobe his home state, he could be perceived as one with trouble-making potentials. Indeed, although he was said to have initially gone about his preaching peacefully, his views nonetheless drew attention from other Islamic preachers who saw both his preaching and interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to authority.[11]

On the other hand, despite the inspiration Yusuf drew from Ibn Taymiyya, other accounts had him as someone who was opposed to any form of violence and who insisted that it was against the teaching of Islam. He resisted some of his followers' relentless beliefs that "an Islamic state was realizable through preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers."[12] Such a personality trait contrasts significantly with that of Yusuf's successor, Abubakar Shekau, the Kanuri psychopath who "enjoys of killing anyone that God commands me to kill, the way

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[8]Mohammed Aly Sergie and Toni Johnson, "Boko Haram," accessed December 26, 2013 www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko- haram/p25739.

[9]Freedom C. Onuoha, "Countering the Financing of Boko Haram Extremism in Nigeria," *African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Extremism* 2, no. 1 (December 2011), 94

[10]Simon M. Reef, "Foi's Neighbours Open Up on Sheriff," People's Daily, August 10-16, 2009, 6.

[11]Okereke, 457.

[12]T. Suleiman, "The Plot to Islamize Nigeria," *Tell*, November 30, 2009, 12.

I enjoy killing chicken and rams."[13] The emphasis on the personality difference between Yusuf and Shekau becomes useful for the purpose of ascertaining, as I have noted elsewhere, whether the sect's current level of radicalization is a function of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the state, or due to the accession of its leadership of Shekau.[14] It is noteworthy that before the death of Yusuf, the sect had already acquired arms and had also violently protested the killing of seventeen of its members who were on a funeral procession.

Boko Haram, Political Islam and Militant Islamic Violence

The concept of "political Islam" has generally been adopted by many scholars to identify the seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics - an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.[15] Hence, for Ibrahim Muazzam, in its contemporary forceful form, political Islam "is a modern ideological construction and not the product of a historical continuity with an essentialist Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of people. It is the result of a protracted societal crisis of multi-dimensional proportions revealing an ongoing dialectic between Muslims and their socio-economic political environment."[16]

The rise of Islamist movements, Muazzam further notes, is thus, a result and a symptom of a society in crisis - the outcome of a process of development that has taken place in these countries, which includes rapid urbanization and social mobilization that has exceeded the capacity of the system. He also perceives that the activism of some of the Muslim groups as a function of the social, economic, and political context found in the various societies.[17] Hoogvelt blames the crisis on colonialism and globalization, and argues that the contemporary Islamic revolt is the consequence of millions of people who do not have any prospect of being incorporated into the new global system. As she notes, "It is the failure of the national evelopment strategies in the neocolonial period, coupled with the recent episode of globalization that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent."[18] Hoogvelt further makes the point that Islamic resurgence is best understood as a politics of identity in response to exclusion. In an attempt to remove the

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[13]"Nigeria's Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in profile," May 9, 2014, accessed November 16, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18020349.

[14]Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories."

[15]Charles Hirschkind, "What is Political Islam," Middle East Research and Information Project, accessed December 23, 2013, http://merip.org/mer/mer205/what-political-islam.

[16] Ibrahim Muazzam, "Security Challenges in North Africa and the Maghreb," *African Strategic Review* 2, no. 2 (April/May, 2011):39.

[17] Ibid.

[18]Hoogvelt, 199.

pejorative edge from "political Islam," however, Charles Hirschkind argues that despite the militant violence that has given practical meaning to the concept, it is not all forms of contemporary Islamic activism that revolve around trying to "capture the state."[19] He contends forcefully that

> The vast majority of these movements involve preaching and other *da'wa* (missionary) activities, alms giving, providing medical care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting what is considered in the society to be public virtue through community action.[20]

The early history of the Boko Haram in Nigeria casts the group both in Hirschkind's idea of the political Islamic groups which try to promote public virtue through community action and Hoogvelt's Islamists who have raised the spectra of the jihad.[21] For instance, Yusuf's refusal to yield to the pressure by some of his followers to take up arms as a way of realizing an Islamic state aligns the Boko Haram sect with Hirschkind's characterization. Similarly, Sanusi Mohammed, a journalist who had studied and had interacted with some leaders of the sect prior to the outset of the crisis, insists the sect was "not founded as terrorist group as erroneously believed in some quarters."[22] Even after Yusuf's death, given its anti-government posturing, it would have been uncharacteristic of the group to agree to mediation by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was seen as an unofficial envoy of the government. That meeting held on September 15, 2011 and aimed at opening a channel of dialogue between the government and the terror group, and had in attendance Yusuf's father in-law, Babakura Fugu, a known gun dealer who made his property at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri available to his son in-law for his religious activities.[23]

Certain tendencies about the sect, however, project it as a jihadist group. At its earliest periods, Yusuf leveled charges of corruption and failure to preach pure Islam on the sheiks that appointed him leader after Lawan Abubakar's departure.[24] Under Abubakar Shakau, the sect later declared its intention to Islamize Nigeria and truncate the country's democracy. One of the earliest names

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[19] Hirschkind.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Hoogvelt, 198.

[22] "Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi" Saturday Sun, January 21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/boko- haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.

[23] Andrew Walker, "What is Boko Haram?" Special Report (USIP), accessed 17 November, 2015, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf.

[24] Emma Ujah, et al "Yar'Adua orders probe of Boko Haram leaders' killing," Vanguard, August 4, 2009, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/yaradua-orders-probe-of- boko-haram-leaders-killing/.

of the sect was the Taliban; the leadership of the group also trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are well-known as the Taliban's abode; and after the attack on a police station in Kanamma, Yobe state, the sect briefly flew the Taliban black flag as a gesture symbolizing commonality of cause.[25] Some members claim to have trained in Afghanistan. Very germane here is that the Soviet resistance, from which the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria seemed to draw its inspiration, occurred against the backdrop of the Soviet replacement of the traditional Islamic practices and social conventions in Afghanistan. The call for a jihad in Afghanistan and its day-to-day implementation were not initiated by Muslim states as such, but by transnational Islamic religious networks. Thus, to the Boko Haram sect, which is part of this network, a "defensive jihad," according to the Sharia, obliged every individual Muslim to participate.[26]

The sect leader, "Yusuf …embraced technology, [and] believed Western education should be 'mediated through Islamic scholarship', such as rejecting the theory of evolution and Western-style banking. He preached a doctrine of withdrawal."[27] And in spite of the unheeded complaints of a group of fifty Maiduguri-based Islamic clerics, who claimed to have warned and complained to "the government and security agencies about the activities of Yusuf," not until the murder of Yusuf, his father in-law, Fungu, alleged, financier Foi, and members of the sect at a funeral procession in Maiduguri, did the Boko Haram violence scale up in the North-East.[28]

Noteworthy is that the government had made available the sum of a N100 million blood money to the sect for the loss of some of its leadership. While the acceptance of the blood money from the government by the sect does not conform to a true jihadist movement, Boko Haram's current level of radicalization could well be a function of the ascension of Shekau. Indeed not until late August, 2011, after it had expanded the scope of its violence outside of the North-East, vis-à-vis the bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja, were there any credible links between the sect and some al-Qaeda regional affiliate groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somali's al- Shabaab.[29] Furthermore, the fractioning of the sect into two groups, with one focusing on local grievances, namely, the ascendency of a Muslim to Nigeria's presidency, and the other seeking

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[25]Joseph Lengmang, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism: A Critical Reflection in the Light of the 'Boko Haram' Phenomenon in Northern Nigeria," in *Religion and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria*, ed. Shedrach G. Best (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers Ltd, 2011), 98.

[26]Cited in R. Shackleford, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Rise of the Taliban," accessed November 17, 2015, http://voices.yahoo.com/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-rise-the-367600.html.

[27]Sergie and Johnson.

[28]Okereke 455.

[29]Sergie and Johnson.

alliance with external jihadi groups dedicated to imposing Islamist rule across the world, raises doubt about the group's genuine commitment to the global Islamist agenda from the outset. Despite reference to the establishment of an Islamic government, the revelation that the Boko Haram was out to end the 1914 amalgamation that brought together the Northern and Southern Protectorates to form the country called Nigeria[30] fits into the political feud theory that the Boko Haram violence revolves around Northern angst against President Jonathan for ignoring an informal power-rotation agreement that should have kept a Muslim Northerner as president this time around.[31]

The Political Origin of Boko Haram Violence

A common notion about the Boko Haram sect is that it is a fundamentalist jihadist movement bent on imposing the Sharia law on Nigeria. This perception is fostered both by its perceived philosophical and perverse spiritual underpinnings, namely, total abhorrence for Westernization and secularization. According to Joseph Lengmang, this foundation drives the group's activities, including its violence.[32] The abhorrence of westernization and secularity is also perceived to have been boosted by the reintroduction of Sharia in 1999 by the then governor of Zamfara state, Ahmed Yerima Although the re-introduction of the Sharia in Zamfara turned the abhorrenc of westernization and secularity ideology into a grassroots movement in the North, despite the subsequent adoption of the Sharia by 12 northern states widespread "disillusionment" accompanied the manner in which the Sharia was implemented. That faulty implementation provided profound dissatisfaction, which the Boko Haram sect tapped into to promote the idea that an Islamic state would eliminate the inconsistencies.[33]

But while the sect's emergence has generally also been attribute to the ideology of hatred for westernization and secularity, the Boko Haram phenomenon actually arose from a prevalent culture of political thuggery in Nigeria. By this culture, political gladiators establish political militias which they use in the fierce struggle for the capture and control of political power. These militia groups exist across the regions and states of the country where they assume different forms and perpetuate criminal political activities on behalf of their benefactors. In the North, Borno and Yobe states had the Ecomog, Bauchi, Sara-Suka, Gombe, Yan- Kallare, Taraba state, Banu-Isra'il, Adamawa, Yan-Shinko, Kano,

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[30]"Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi" Saturday Sun, January 21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/boko- haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.

[31]Sergie and Johnson.

[32]Lengmang, 88.

[33]Sergie and Johnson.

Yan Gumurzu or Yan daba. In the South, the defunct "Bakasi Boys" operated in the East and were particularly notorious during the administration of former governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju in Anambra state.

There is also the Odua Youth Movement in the South-West, and the "Niger-Delta Defense Force" in the Niger-Delta/South-South region. They are usually drawn from jobless university graduates and street wanderers, criminals, common thugs and in the North as abandoned *Almajiri's* (street children). In most of the old Eastern part of the country, most of the youths who constitute the army of militants and kidnappers graduated from being *political* militia gangs who were recruited for criminal political activities during elections and dumped by their benefactors afterwards.

The culture of nurturing political militia gangs is however not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. It dates back to the pre-independence era. From the 1950s, instances of political violence including the formation of political militias in the course of the contest for political power had become increasingly evident.[34] In the North, there were the Jammiyar Maukhatar, and the Positive Action as the armed political gangs of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), political parties respectively. In the East the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had the Zikist Movement, whereas the Action Group (AG) political party had the Awoists.[35]

However, an important distinction needs to be made among these political militia groups both in terms of the eras and political geographies in which they operated and in some instances still subsist. In the pre- independence era, whereas both in the North and South, political militias were unknown to have emerged from any religious origin, those currently in the North do. Currently also whereas in the South those which drift into sundry criminal activities like kidnapping and armed robbery do not link their cause to any known religious ideology, their counterparts in the North do.

Although the Boko Haram insurgents currently espouses religious ideological orientation, most of its foundation membership were essentially made up of elements drawn from the army of political militias in some parts of the North. The point of departure however is that hitherto, political militant gangs were raised by political parties rather than individual politicians. The Boko Haram, as a violent group specifically started off as Ecomog, a band of political thugs linked

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[34] A.O. Banwo, "Political Violence and Democratization in Nigeria: An Overview," in Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives, ed. B. A. Olasupo (Lagos: Frankad Publishers, 2003), 111.

[35] See Simeon H.O. Alozieuwa, "Nigeria's Social Groups, Power Struggle and the Political Economy of Violence" *Igbo Studies Review* 3 no. 3 (May 2014): 196.

to the former governor of Bornu State, Ali Modu Sheriff, and some other politicians in the state in the struggle for the control of Government House in Maiduguri, aimed specifically at dislodging the then incumbent governor of the state, Mala Kachallah. The conditions that bred the army of recruits for both the politicians and the Boko Haram sect also clearly predate both Yusuf and Boko Haram. These conditions include general adverse socio-economic conditions, which equally bred an army of disillusioned citizenry and youths who questioned the existing socio-economic and political system in Nigeria, and the Sharia fervor in the North, which favors the imposition of the Islamic legal system as an alternative to the Western system.

In Borno state, the former governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, was said to be instrumental to the prominence of the sect. It was alleged that he was one of their financiers and supporters until the alliance broke down.[36] Despite Sheriff's persistent denial of any link with Boko Haram, Ali Konduga, an arrested member of the sect, confessed to the agents of the Nigerian State during interrogation that a certain politician from Borno State stepped in to sponsor Ecomog when the relationship went sour with Ali Modu Sheriff.[37] Then acting Minister of Defense, Labaran Maku, was therefore right when he blames politicians from the North East for the "insecurity [which] is not religious but the after-effect of violent local politics."[38] Thus, the killing of government functionaries in Borno and Bauchi States in the early stages of violence clearly links "the rise of Boko Haram in Maiduguri and Bauchi … to politics."[39] Sheriff also views the Boko Haram violence as political and not religious.[40]

Ustaz Buji Foi, the alleged financier of Yusuf, deserves further mention at this juncture. Foi's days as chairman of Kaga Local Government Council under the Kachallah administration was '"unprecedented in the history of the area council"' in terms of "transforming Benisheikh, the headquarters of the (Kaga) council into a paradise of administrative transparency." He was "noted for his sense of

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[36]Boko Haram out to end 1914 amalgamation, install Islamic govt —Sanusi" Saturday Sun, January 21, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.gbooza.com/group/nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/boko-haram-out-to-end-1914-amalgamation-install-islamic-govt-sanu.

[37]"Suspected Boko Haram Suspect Fingers Ex-Gov Sheriff, Senator Ndume, Ex-Envoy As Sect Sponsors," accessed November 17, 2015, http://ireports-ng.com/2011/11/21/suspected-boko-haram-suspect-fingers-ex-gov-sheriff-senator-ndume-ex-envoy-as-sect-sponsors/.

[38]"Maku Accuses North East Politicians of Creating Boko Haram," *Newsdairy*, December 31, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, http://newsdiaryonline.com/maku-accuses-north-east-politicians-creating-boko-haram/.

[39]A. Agbo, "A Game of Vultures," *Tell*, January 17, 2011, 23.

[40]E. Bello, and L. Sabo, "Boko Haram Crisis Wasn't Religious," Leadership Weekend, August 8, 2009, 10.

fairness."[41] At the expiration of his tenure as the

Kaga Area Council chairman, Foi was appointed the caretaker committee chairman of the same area council. Described as a man of impeccable honesty, and "one of the few voices in the wilderness crying against corruption by politicians selected into public offices,"[42] Sheriff appointed Foi as commissioner for local government affairs. He was later redeployed to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and his house according to his neighbors was always visited by politicians including Governor Sheriff.[43]

Foi and his Boko Haram group had worked as part of the political militia that helped Sheriff win his election. In addition to a commissionership slot in the government, Sheriff was also effecting the full implementation of the Sharia as part of the pre-election deal with the group. Sheriff's reluctance to effect this latter part of the deal obviously angered the Boko Haram sect and strained the group's relationship with him. Thus, at the beginning of the Sheriff's second term in office, Foi approached him with a proposal to resign his office, because according to Foi, it was the only way he could make paradise.[44]

Sheriff preemptively dissolved his cabinet to forestall Foi going to town with the news that he left the cabinet.[45] The adoption of the Sharia in twelve northern states,[46] and Sheriff's failure to adopt the Islamic legal system in Borno where it was hoped could eliminate the inconsistencies observed in the implementation of the Islamic legal system in other northern states, could have inspired Foi's call for Sheriff's resignation after he walked away from Sheriff's government. Situating Foi's grouse within another context is also necessary. Besides the issue of corruption, as commissioner for religious affairs, Sheriff's administration had banned motorcyclists' movement in Maiduguri after 7 p.m. His administration also imposed a law that required motorcyclists to provide helmets for themselves and their passengers as a way of protecting them against head injuries in the event of accidents. This piece of legislation affected mostly the down-trodden and Almajiris, most of whom were used as political militia during elections, thereafter abandoned, flocking around the Islamic preachers who fed them daily with religious fantasies. Ustaz Foi was known for his "sense of fairness." On the surface, the motorcyclists' reluctance to obey the helmet legislation may appear a protestation of their poor material conditions. In reality, however at play was resistance politics against their

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[41] Reef.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Bello and Sabo,11.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Sergie and Johnson.

abandonment in the post-polls period by the Boko Haram group whose members worked as political militias as it was also against Sheriff's refusal to adopt the Sharia. The helmet legislation provided an ample opportunity for the Boko Haram leadership to mobilize its members against the government.

Governor Sheriff later relished how he set up a security outfit, "Operation Flush," to deal with Yusuf and his crowd, which included Foi:

> As a governor, I had to take charge and restore some measure of order to my domain. I started creating laws. I first started by making a law regulating motorcycles, because at night, you find over one thousand motorcycles in the city. They would move from one end of the town to the other with different kinds of weapons: cutlasses, swords, etc.... And because they don't wear helmets, I insisted that they begin to do so. I asked that their members be arrested and tried.[47]

Foi was killed in the aftermath of the crackdown on Yusuf's followers. Before his death however, the former commissioner had demanded to meet with governor Sheriff, a request that was reportedly turned downed by the then governor. According to Okereke, "there exist [sic] a school of thought that contend [sic] that the killing of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Ustaz Buji Foi was orchestrated to deny Nigerians true knowledge of the major sponsors and profiteers from the incident."[48] It was not ascertained whether Yusuf's father's low-level education and a corresponding poor material condition influenced his resignation of his secular job, as well his son's dropping out of school. But Yusuf, who had taken over from his father, whose Quranic school was receiving wards from people within and outside of the Maiduguri, became someone whose "popularity was phenomenal, making friends easily, and some politicians who sought the truth identified with his movement discreetly and assisted him tremendously."[49]

Perhaps amidst his preaching which resonated anti-corruption messages and disappointment with the western system of governance, past administrations before Sheriff's had become uncomfortable with Yusuf as his influence grew in the state. Attempts to restrict him to certain sections of the state prompted his father in-law, a known arms dealer who was also quite influential, to offer Yusuf the refuge of his large compound in the Railways Quarters in Borno State. It was at this location that Yusuf built "a movement that would ultimately unleash a phenomenal crisis which has not been seen in the history of Borno state since the Maitatsine

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[47] Bello and Sabo, 11.

[48] Okereke, 456.

[49] Reef.

violence of 1983."[50] Why authorities refused to revoke Yusuf's abode despite security reports of the unwholesome activities going on there, is suggestive that either Yusuf and his father in-law had become too powerful and untouchable by the authorities, or that in certain critical quarters, the movement Yusuf had built was of immense importance to the political actors holding the reins of government. Noteworthy, however, about the man who would later lead a group that declared Western civilization as forbidden, were some of the activities that went on in his large Railways Quarters abode. It was reported that, "despite claims that Boko Haram was against western education and its leader averse to western civilization, a trip to one of Yusuf's compounds outside of the Railways Quarters shows that he ran a nursery school that was involved in teaching English and Maths…. Yusuf had computers with internet services for communication."[51]

When the security forces stormed Yusuf's abodes, they also found a Toyota Sienna SUV, among seven cars and many motorcycles, which belonged to sect members who used them for commercial operations otherwise known as *okada*.[52] The discovery therefore contradicts the sect's posturing:

> Available information indicates that the group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their school of thought considers anything western as an aberration or completely unislamic.
> The group viewed the western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion's weakness. Hence their declaration that western education and indeed all western institution is infidel and as such must be avoided by Muslims…. It was gathered that most people sold their belongings to contribute to the coffers of fighting the cause of Allah to save Islam from the clutches of western influences and domination.[53]

Prior to his death, Yusuf's abode usually gave the impression of big party as the whole area of the Railway Quarters would be lined with exotic cars owned by very powerful individuals who would arrive with tinted glasses that shielded them from easy identification when visiting Yusuf.[54] It is also not known at what stage Yusuf began to use his large compound at the Railways Quarters as a training ground for militant activities. It is ironic that the same Yusuf, who a f t e r

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 210.

[54] Ibid.

the shooting of his members by the men of the Operation Flush boasted that "his group would be prepared to confront all the security agencies in the State as well as government,"[55] was also the same man who earlier had been cast as resisting Islamizing Nigeria by means of violence. It is therefore safe to speculate that while Yusuf did not believe in using violence to propagate Islam, turning his abode into a training ground for militant activities as well as the weapons found with his followers, were all part of the instrumentality used in supporting Sheriff in edging out Mala Kachallah, then the Governor of the Bornu State Government House, with the understanding that Sheriff would introduce Sharia in the state. Sheriff's failure to implement that pre-electoral understanding thus set his administration on a collision path with the sect. When Nigerian soldiers stormed their Bama camp in Borno in 2013, they found items such as used condoms which contrasted a Moslem preaching of a return to the Islam's glorious days of great piety[56] – thus exposing the contradiction between what the sect preached and what they practiced.

Undoubtedly, this questions their pious religious posturing. Each socio-economic and political environment has its peculiar character that can easily be exploited by criminal elements. In the Southern part of Nigeria, a predominantly Christian area, religion is treated as a distinct sphere of life, and separated from socio-economic and political issues. Hence in the old Eastern states, abandoned disgruntled political militia men drift into militancy, oil pipeline vandalism, and kidnapping to make a living. In the South-West, street extortion and money hustling, otherwise known as Area Boyism hold sway.

However in the predominantly Moslem North, where the Boko Haram violence occurs, criminal elements exploit the tradition of the Islamic religion ordering of social relations among people, including legal, contractual institutions, social and political institutions, and issues of economic propriety and practice[57] to blame western values for the mismanagement of the country's resources. In addition, the lack of Western education and high unemployment rate in the Northern region offer such group "a seemingly bottomless reservoir from which to draw disgruntled youth recruits."[58] With the thin line between Islamic religion and other spheres of life, extremist groups like Boko Haram that appear fed up with failed promises of politicians, would easily resort to seeking spiritual solutions to what is viewed as

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[55] Ibid.

[56] M. Mozayyan, "Glory in Defeat and Other Islamist Ideologies," in Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World, ed. H.J. Norwitz (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).

[57] Hoogvelt, 200.

[58] Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 212.

an insoluble problem.[59] Furthermore, coupled with some segments of the Northern Muslim population, allegedly unhappy with the compromise of state-level Sharia co-existing side by side with a secular system, these groups increasingly become radicalized and are more willing to periodically express themselves through violence. Within these groups also are elements who share the view that Western education is incapable of stimulating any meaningful development and prosperity in the region; hence their quest for the imposition of the Sharia on the country. [60]

Understanding the Boko Haram Violence

In the synopsis to an essay on the security challenge posed by the Boko Haram violence, I have postulated that analyses that consider the political context of the insurgency deserve particular attention, especially in relation to President Jonathan's contestation of the 2011 presidential election and the recently concluded 2015 elections.[61] Similarly, in another work, which focused on the tendency by Nigerian ethnic groups to employ violence in the struggle to capture central power, I stressed how forced co-habitation of the disparate pre-Nigerian groups in a single political economy by British imperialism engendered a socio-political environment which predisposes these social forces to intense struggle for power whose utility value is its guarantee of unfettered access to the public till. The utility of violence in the struggle for political ascendency, was "evident in the Hausa-Fulani hegemony of the 1960s through the late 1990s via the control of the country's military, the Yoruba presidency from 1999-2007 via the violence that trailed the annulled June 12 1993 presidential election and the Ijaw presidency via the Niger Delta militancy."[62]

Jean Herskovits has rightly argued that while the original core of the group remains active, Boko Haram has become a franchise for many criminal gangs who have adopted the name to claim responsibility for attacks when it suits them.[63] Although the Boko Haram sect had formed prior to the emergence of the Jonathan administration, the intensity which its violence assumed in the post-2011 general elections period, led to the inevitable conclusion that the insurgency is not only about fulfilling the pre-election threat by some Northerners of making the country

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[59] Lengmang, 101.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories."

[62] Simeon Alozieuwa, "Violence as a Bargaining Tool for Political Ascendency in a Multi- ethnic Society: The Nigeria Experience," in Internal Security Management in Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism eds. Ozoemenam Mbachu and Usman Bature (Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited, 2013), 182.

[63] Jean Herskovits, "In Nigeria, Boko Haram Is Not the Problem," New York Times, January 2, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/in-nigeria-boko-haram-is-not-the-problem.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

ungovernable should Jonathan contest and win the election, but also geared towards the North's quest to reclaim power by 2015. In the period leading up to that election, some political forces from the North bitterly challenged Jonathan's moral authority to vie for the country's presidency on the premise that the North was yet to do an eight-year term in the context of North-South zoning and power rotation principles said to have been instituted by the then ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP).

Amidst the rancor surrounding his ascension to power in 2010 following his predecessor Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's death, as well as the opposition that mounted against his vying for the 2011 presidential polls, Jonathan had come up with an appeasement gesture towards the North- West region of Nigeria from where Yar'Adua hailed, namely, the choice of Namadi Sambo, the governor of North-West state of Kaduna, first as his deputy, and second as his running mate in the 2011 elections. Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa**,** the Chief Whip of the House of Representatives of the Nigerian National Assembly and leader of the North-East caucus in the House made a statement very significant in this analysis. According to him, "We felt that over the years, the North-Eastern region has been marginalized in all aspects of life in this country, [and] marginalization is responsible for insecurity in North-East."[64] Thus, "in the general context of Northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko Haram may be conceived of as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group."[65]

In attempting to establish a causality between the current season of violence in Nigeria and intense contestation for federal power that marked Jonathan/Ijaw ascendency since 2010, Nigeria's Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, had played down the perspective that links the mayhem to economic factors such as unemployment, mismanagement, misplaced priorities, social marginalization, and massive corruption. According to him, "to limit oneself to these factors alone, is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in the face and give it its proper name – and response."[66]

Former Nigeria's foreign affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi, conceptualizes the Nigerian army from July 1966 to May 1999 as an Hausa- Fulani ethnic militia in

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[64] Ahmed Mohammed, "Nigeria: North-East Suffers Marginalization," *Sunday Trust*, February 12, 2012.

[65] Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories."

[66] Wole Soyinka, "Wole Soyinka on Nigeria's Anti-Christian Terror Sect Boko Haram." *Newsweek,* January 16, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/wole-soyinka-nigerias-anti- christian-terror-sect-boko-haram-64153.

the unclassical sense of the term (ethnic militia) in that although the Nigerian army is composed of representatives of many of the nationalities of Nigeria, it was only the Northern Hausa-Fulani military representatives who had a sense of collective interests to advance and protect. Hence, the first intervention by a formal ethnic militia in Nigeria's politics was in July 1966 when the counter-coup took place and the series of coups since July 1966 were designed by the North to protect the North.[67] Following the end of the ideological Cold War between the West and East, military rule generally became an aberration globally. For Nigeria, perhaps the most important effect of that development was that the Nigerian army could no longer be appropriated as an ethnic militia by any ethnic group to topple an elected government - a tendency that had existed among the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group for most the country's political history until 1999. Indeed very significantly, in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sagir Mohammed, had formed a northern militia, the Arewa People's Congress (APC) to "protect and safeguard the interest of the North wherever it is."[68] And outside of the North, the APC is perceived by some as founded for "the maintenance of [Northern] hegemonic control in national politics."[69] More so, "unlike the other ethnic militias who seek change, the Arewa People's Congress seeks the maintenance of the status quo, irrespective of its crises of marginalization."[70]

Bingham Powell Jr. conceives of democracy as a strategy of government based on the gamble that the potential for participation and responsiveness that it offers will make possible a resolution of conflict without violence. Where large-scale violence or coercion does however appear, he contends, democracy is fundamentally threatened. Not only does the influence of coercion on decision-making weaken the importance of democratic resources, but failure of government to maintain order and security leads citizens to look more positively on authoritarian alternatives.[71]

Furthermore, from a strategic point of view, organized political violence has three very general objectives: to change the bargaining rules of the democratic game, to undermine the support enjoyed by the regime or its major parties, or to

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[67] Ajibola B. Akinyemi, "Ethnic Militia and the National Question in Nigeria," in U*rban Violence, Ethnic Militia and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, ed. Tunde Babatunde (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2003), 21.

[68] Kalu N. Obasi, Ethnic Militias, *Vigilantes and Separatist Groups in Nigeria* (Abuja: Third Millennium Ltd, 2002), 43.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Akinyemi.

[71] Bingham Powell Jr. *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 154.

intimate the opposition while mobilizing.[72] "And the association between rioting and deaths by violence was notably higher in ethnically fractionalized countries."[73]

There is a direct correlation among the following variables: the rejection of military intervention in politics, the North's marginal occupation of the Nigerian presidency since the commencement of democratic governance in the country in 1999, the emergence and transformation of the Boko Haram as an ethnic militia in the context of an appropriated machinery, and the current virulent violence in Nigeria, which has resulted in thousands of deaths. The huge resources committed to the counter-insurgency war in Nigeria could have been deployed to tackling many of Nigeria's infrastructure problems. And sustained violence and deaths have forced the Nigerian citizenry to begin to question whether the civilian (democratic) framework is capable of being secure. The Boko Haram violence in Nigeria obviously poses a real threat to the country's young democracy. In the context of an ethnically fractionalized country, the marginal occupation of the Nigeria's presidency by the Northern power elite since 1999 also resonates with the logic of "highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes are determined to bring society to its knees and under a specific fundamentalist strain."[74] Equally, the rise of the counter-terrorism outfit, the Civilian "Joint Task Force" (JTF), made up of the Borno youths in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital and the hotbed of the Boko Harm insurgency, evinces the conclusion that deadly violence is not, systematically and crossnationally, a product of patterns of citizen involvement and support, but of the strategic efforts of small groups of political elites. The Northern commoner who continually grapples with the factors of basic needs such as food, shelter, and housing is more concerned with the dilapidating effect of the insurgency on his daily life than the elite who worry about political power. This elite responds rather directly to the strains and limitations of ethnicity and lower modernization, to checks of constitutional structure, and to the policies of political opponents.[75] Are there, therefore, forces sworn to bringing back the military as Soyinka has postulated? The crux of the problem, indeed, perhaps, as Africa's foremost political economist, the late Claude Ake, rightly noted, is the over-politicization of social life: "[W]e are intoxicated with politics: the premium on political power is so high that we are prone to take the most extreme measures to win and to maintain political

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[72] Ibid, 158.

[73] Ibid, 157

[74] Soyinka, "Wole Soyinka on Nigeria's Anti-Christian Terror Sect Boko Haram," *Newsweek*, January 16, 2012.

[75] Powell Jr.

power."[76] The late former National Security Adviser, General Patrick Oweye Azazi, had declared that the Boko Haram violence was all about wrangling over power rotation. Azizi died shortly afterwards in a crash in a military helicopter. In his response to a private letter made public by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, President Goodluck Jonathan was also of the view that,

> At the heart of all the current troubles in our party and the larger
> polity is the unbridled jostling and positioning for personal or group
> advantage ahead of the 2015 general elections. The "bitterness, anger,
> mistrust, fear and deep suspicion" you wrote
> about all flow from this singular factor.[77]

Reference needs to be made to the attempts to explain the violence within the social/human needs theoretical framework, which going by the foregoing analysis has already encountered formidable difficulties. Indeed the then ruling People's Democratic Party, PDP, had dismissed Boko Haram as a not a product of poverty or misrule, but a local terror group.[78] Apart from among other prominent northerners like the former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor[79] and the governor of Niger state, Aliyu Babangida,[80] who link the Boko Haram violence to poverty, strong voices in the North have also faulted the social/human needs perspective. Former senate president, David Mark, argues that poverty and unemployment no longer offer a cogent explanation for the insurgency as these adverse socio-economic conditions are not exclusive to the North.[81] The Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Dioceses, Mathew Hassan Kukah, also adds quite an illuminating angle to the debate. According to the cleric,

> the Bureau of Statistics had released a report that Sokoto State
> was the poorest state in Nigeria. I wasn't prepared to join the
> debate, but if Sokoto is the poorest state in Nigeria and if Boko

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[76] Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories."

[77] "Read Jonathan's letter to Obasanjo," Vanguard, December 22, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www. vanguardngr.com/2013/12/jonathans-letter-obasanjo/.

[78] Ameh Comrade Godwin, "Poverty, misrule not reason for Boko Haram insurgency – PDP," DailyPost, January 26, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, http://dailypost.ng/2013/01/26/poverty-misrule- not-reason-for-boko-haram-insurgency-pdp/.

[79] "Sanusi Links Boko Haram to Derivation," This Day, January 28, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015 http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/sanusi-links-boko-haram-to-derivation/108039/.

[80] Suleiman M. Bisalla, "Nigeria: Revenue Allocation Skewed Against North - - Aliyu," Daily Trust, online, February 24, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201202240338. html.

[81] Emma Uche, "Mark To Northern Leaders: Boko Haram May Break Nigeria," June 26, 2012, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.nairaland.com/974667/mark-northern-leaders-boko-haram.

Haram is driven by poverty, shouldn't we (Sokoto) be the most violent state in Nigeria? How is it that we are still the most peaceful? What this does is that it explodes the myth and perhaps we might have founded our analysis on a wrong premise. I don't think you can scientifically correlate violence with poverty.[82]

Indeed hordes of beggars who line Katsina streets reflect the poverty in that North-Western state, yet it has neither bred nor harbored such a violent group.[83] Despite the broadening of its contacts with other Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which warranted the designation with its splinter group, Ansaru, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, the perspective which views the political militia strain of the Boko Haram sect as espousing a strong local concern intricately woven around the country's politics resonates very strongly. Serious consideration needs also be accorded to the impracticability of imposing the Sharia on a heterogeneously complex political community such as Nigeria. The core of the Boko Haram committed to Islamizing Nigeria remains a fringe group, which not only antagonizes mainstream Northern Muslims, but also are yet to evolve a broad coalition that will include mainstream Northern Muslims and their elite corps. The author has argued elsewhere that whereas the Mujahedeen are focused on Islam's days of glory or great piety, which to them assures the true believer of spiritual salvation and an eternally joyful existence in the world beyond, the average Nigerian Muslim political elite is most likely uninterested in the core Boko Haram's version of Islam, and may, in the words of M. Mozayyan, be more interested in a future that guarantees independent thought, social liberty, modernity, and economic remuneration in a world– progressive Islam.[84]

The transformation of the violence from a Bornu affair to a national affair fits into the characterization of the group as "a local terror group" by the PDP. Thus between June and August, 2011 when it struck at the police headquarters and the United Nations building both in Abuja, Nigeria's capital and arguably safest city, the Boko Haram sect had transformed from a violent group whose campaign was initially restricted to the North East part of the country to a more formidable force. It had graduated from a hitherto presumably bunch of rag-tag inconsequential miscreants that could be summarily dealt with to a virulent violent organization capable of issuing and making good its threat.

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[82]Bolaji Ogundele, "Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty – Rev. Kukah," May 8, 2013, accessed November 17, 2015, http://universalreporters247.com/2013/05/boko-haram-menace-beyond-poverty-rev- kukah/.

[83]Alozieuwa, "Contending Theories."

[84]Ibid.

The attack on the police headquarters was not only a cynical response to the boast by then inspector-general of police, Hafiz Ringim, that he would crush the group in the aftermath of its attempted attack of the headquarters in Maiduguri, the capital of the North East state of Borno, it was also for "the humiliating treatment meted out to our members by security agencies in various parts of the country."[85] The United Nations building bombing clearly, therefore, supports the PDP position that "some people are out to perpetrate acts of terrorism in Nigeria to create a semblance of insecurity."[86]

In an interview titled, "Boko Haram Menace Beyond Poverty," Kukah raised a very pertinent question:

> Can we explain why this Boko Haram is dominant in Maiduguri, Yobe and not in Sokoto or Kebbi? … If this was about religion, and Muslims are trying to expand the frontiers of Islam, which kind of a stupid man will be fighting inside his own house and hope to conquer other people?[87]

At the immediate domestic level, it is obvious the group is at war with those that armed and used them to defeat opponents in the political struggle and later abandoned them, and which explains the initial killing of politicians in Borno and Bauchi. While that local score might not have been settled, as the violence attracted national response from the federal center, some highly placed and highly disgruntled persons who lost out in the power stake began to appropriate the group for violence in the struggle for central power. This explains why while the sect makes attempts to penetrate Abuja, its campaign in the North-East persists. The factionalization of the group soon after Yusuf's death, apart from providing explanation for the group's current level of radicalization, also could prove that while the original group represented by the murdered Yusuf's father in-law, Fugu, remained the core commitment to the sect's initial ideals, the faction which actually killed him was the political armed gang determined to protest Jonathan's vying of the 2011 presidential polls and importantly, his contesting the presidency again in 2015.

The violence however appears to pay off. While central power might have moved out of the North, the Nigerian state under the Jonathan presidency continued to make huge concessions to that part of Nigeria which perhaps would not have been the case but for the insurgency; while the North-East in the meantime may

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[85] Ibrahim Mshelizza, "Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing," *Reuters*, August 28, 2011, accessed November 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829.

[86] Godwin, 'Poverty, misrule not reason for Boko Haram insurgency – PDP.'

[87] Ogundele. '

not have yet occupied central power as the North-West, North-Central, South-West and now South-South, certain socio-economic and political measures have been taken to address its crisis of marginalization than had previously been the case. On the socio-economic sphere, the government created a N100 billion Green Belt de-desertification project for some frontline states in the North. No such special initiative has been designed specifically for the South-East, which is being ravaged by gully erosion but has not taken up arms against the state despite its obvious marginalization from the country's topmost political office. There is also the Almajiri education program initiated by the federal government for the entire northern region. For the North-East region specifically, a N2 billion special intervention program was ear-marked in the 2014 annual budget for the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which have been devastated by insurgency and were placed under a state of emergency at some points in time.

In the political sphere, as the military crackdown on the insurgents persists, unlike the previous state of emergencies in the country, which were in 1964 and 2003, civil political structures remained in the areas where it had been declared. The chairmanship of the ruling PDP appears to have been conceded to persons from the area as a way of giving the region a sense of inclusiveness.

Conclusion

This paper focused on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria beyond the general theme of the current global Islamic violence. While acknowledging Islamist violence as a factor, it however places much premium on the local contexts of the violence and argues that the local political issues, more than any other considerations, offer more cogent explanation of the problem. The paper notes the religious origin of the sect, which later transformed into a militia group for politicians, a tendency that dates back to pre- independent Nigeria. From a local Borno affair, the group became a ready tool appropriated by some elements of national politicians struggling for the control of central power. These elements were specifically dissatisfied with the return of central power to the South following the death of Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, which denied the North the opportunity to be in power for many years. Jonathan's initially speculated interest in contesting the 2015 presidential elections rallied these forces together and pitted them against his government. Although initially the violence was perceived as a general Northern protestation of its loss of central power, it however later became clearly a North-East tool for bargaining for political ascendency. However, while the concern with the local political issues within the North-East area persists, increasing state clamp down on the sect eventually drove it into seeking alliance with international terror networks.

The Nigerian state has adopted some counter-terrorist measures to stem

the violence. Apart from the military option, some socio-economic measures have also been adopted. However, no visible political concessions have been made, especially at the national level where the political disagreement actually raised the scepter of the violence. There is, therefore, the need for a national consensus for a viable power-sharing arrangement among Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups in order to give each component

a sense of belonging in the country's power equation. The arrangement should come in the form of a constitutional legislation that provides for the rotation of power among the component parts in a pre-agreed formula.

Indeed, democracy as a government of the people for the people and by the people should be adapted within the reality of Nigeria's multi- ethnicity to ensure that no group is made to feel left out of the country's political power. Perspectives which suggest that it matters less where the political leadership at the national, state, or local government levels emanate from tend to ignore the reality that although no particular ethnic group in Nigeria can claim exclusive monopolization of pillaging the commonwealth at any point in time, politics in Africa still remains privatized by the continent's leaders. Indeed, according former Senegalese leader, Leopold Senghor, politics in Africa is not the art of governing the state for the public welfare in the general framework of laws and regulations, but that of the politician's politics, the struggle of clans, the tendencies to place well one's self, one's relations and one's clients in the *cursus honorum*; that is the race for preferments.[88] Ensuring, therefore, that every part of the country shall occupy the highest political position in the country in a pre- determined and predictable arrangement will bring stability and peace to Nigeria. President Jonathan for instance hails from a small community in Bayelsa, if not the smallest state in Nigeria. He is of Ijaw ethnic group, a minority ethnic group in Nigeria. His ascendency, therefore, proves that every part of the country has a "best" candidate that can be presented for Nigeria's leadership.

Acknowledgments

Notes on Contributor

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[88] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa," in *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change,* ed. Peter Lewis (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 17.

Nigeria. His research interests include, defense and security studies, peace and security mechanisms in Africa, terrorism and conflict studies, political violence, rebel/militia groups, politics of resources, and media studies'.

BOOK REVIEWS

Adebajo, Adekeye, ed. *Africa's Peacemakers: Nobel Laureates of African Descent.* Cape Town: Zed Books, 2014, iii + 336 pp.

In fifteen chapters, *Africa's Peacemakers*: *Nobel Laureates of African Descent* describes the lives, careers, and Nobel significance of the thirteen Africans and people of African descent who have won the Nobel Peace Prize. This unique and creative volume features essays by luminaries in several fields, such as Adekeye Adebajo and Ali Mazrui (introduction), Pearl T. Robinson, James O.C. Noah, and Lee A. Daniels, Chris Saunders, Maureen Isaacson, Elleke Boehmer, and Gregory F. Houston, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Morad Abou-Sabe , Janice Golding and Gwendolyn Mikell, and Adekeye Adebajo and Rosaline Daniel. This author list is comprised of researchers, colleagues of laureates, and other leaders in their fields. Laureates are grouped into sections based upon nationality. The introductory chapters tie Barack Obama to the legacy of other Peace Prize winners.

Adebajo and his authors strive to discuss Africa's relationship with the wider world through the lens of the lives profiled here. They discuss the laureates' formation through historical forces and interpret each person's role in further directing future trends. Additionally, each author pays attention to the Peace Prize's ramifications related to relations between recipients' countries and the larger world, particularly with Western powers. The themes of each article vary, with some placing more emphasis on pre-Nobel careers and others on the Peace Prize's effects on future work or giving a more general overview of laureates' lives. This approach makes for a varied and diverse work.

Within their introductory chapters, Adebajo and Mazrui discuss the long and strong connections between American civil rights and African liberation movements, marking early the connection between anti- apartheid groups in particular and Americans who drew inspiration from them. This relationship forms the basis for the work's initial chapters, honoring the three Americans and four South Africans who have won the Peace Prize. Early on, Adebajo identifies the wide range of life experiences and struggles that each laureate boasts. Importantly, he also comments on the prevalent view of the Nobel Peace Prize as an endorsement by Western powers, noting that recipients may find differing views amongst their own countries' citizens than they do from the non-African world at large. Authors of subsequent chapters elaborate on this theme.

In addition to making connections between groups of laureates, Adebajo also points out the commonalities between individuals, noting, for instance the relationships between Ralph Bunche and Martin Luther King, Jr., who marched

together during civil rights protests in the 1950s and 1960s, and Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela, who worked together during those same decades. These help to create a thread between some of the laureates and support another central argument, that the Peace Prize committee has been keenly interested in issues of racial reconciliation. It also helps to draw out the differences between other recipients, such as Mohamed ElBaradei or Kofi Annan, who have worked in different spheres.Additionally, the authors point out this study's limitations in assessing each laureate's accomplishments in depth and espouse a commitment to critical views that eschew hagiography.

Mazrui's chapter discusses the importance of the Gandhian tradition in Peace Prize awards and also features an extended discussion on African and diasporic identity. Mazrui makes a distinction between laureates who are African by birth and those who become African by adoption and notes that individual views of and relationships with the continent vary amongst the highlighted Peace Prize recipients. This is an important point as well, as the laureates themselves seem to view their own relationships to the continent in vastly differing terms. In chapters on the three Americans, the authors each spend time discussing tendencies toward hawkishness versus peace-mongering in their subjects. Given Obama's fairly recent reception of the Peace Prize, this is a noteworthy conversation. This long historical trajectory also, of course, lends itself to a variance in the essays' examination of lives fully lived and the one which continues to unfold. While it may be early to accurately and completely assess Obama's legacy, the authors have attempted to add historical context to their discussion. Writing about the four South Africans who have become Nobel laureates, the authors emphasized biography and relationships to the larger liberation movement when discussing Luthuli, Tutu, and Mandela. De Klerk, as the continent's only white recipient and arguably its most controversial receives a treatment that examines both his oft-peaceful rhetoric and relationship with his own National Party as well as a discussion of the Third Force and other covert operations of violence in his post-Nobel presidency.

Boutros-Ghali provides the most personal reminiscence in the book, with his writing on Sadat contrasting greatly with Abou-Sabe's on ElBaradei. These two figures are far less linked than the Americans and South Africans in terms of commonalities. Additionally, as the only two laureates who are their countries' sole representatives, Kofi Annan and Wangari Maathai combine into a section, with much discussion of their strong Western ties and relationships to wealthy nations. Finally, the last section discusses gender and class in the contrasting lives of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee. Adebajo pays careful attention to critiques of Sirleaf, including her arguable tendencies toward nepotism and corruption. As in the case of Obama, it is more difficult to assess the legacies of these last two

laureates given the fact that their careers remain far from incomplete.

This work does not include a concluding section, which is the only thing it seems to lack. Overall, each author makes important connections between their own laureate, other Peace Prize recipients, and the wider world. The lively and engaging essays present a variety of perspectives and a plurality of different lenses for examining their subjects. This makes each chapter very unique in both its scope, tone, and contribution. Africa's *Peacemakers* could likely be read as a whole or as a contribution to work on any of the individuals discussed within.

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Arsan, Andrew. *Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa.* **Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, xviii + 341 pp.**

This important study of a modern and commercially-oriented diaspora beginning in the late nineteenth century consists of eight chapters divided into three parts: "Roots and Routes," "Words and Laws," and "Days, Thoughts and Things." "Roots and Routes" provides the eastern Mediterranean background to the migration of Lebanese, a topic which has not been detailed extensively in previous works on this diaspora community in Africa. It also provides the push and pull factors that have motivated their migrations. For example, except for scholars and other experts in the history of the region, the centrality of the silk industry to the homeland areas of the migrants, and the effects of its decline is an important factor that has contributed to this migration. Also of note are the events that led many to settle in *Afrique Occidentale Francaise* or AOF, as France's West African possessions came to be known in the early twentieth century. The author looks at the French responses to the Lebanese in AOF, also presenting the importance of the Lebanese Mandate status following World War I and the quasi-protected status of the Maronite Christian population to the free migration of the Lebanese throughout the French colonies. Part Three, "Days, Thoughts and Things," considers the daily lives of the migrants (Chapter 6) and attempts to look at their political lives--both in AOF and in the Lebanese homeland (Chapter 7).

Andrew Arsan, is a Lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the University of Cambridge, and this, it would seem, makes Africa, despite the title of the work, peripheral to his study. Arsan's research concentrates on the first half of the twentieth century, though parts of the introduction and the last chapter, termed "Coda: The Making of Postcolonial Selves" give significant details about the current situation of the Lebanese in the former AOF. Arsan bases his work entirely on archival and published primary sources and a rich bibliography of secondary sources. A note at the beginning of the study, "Of Names and Words" (xvii-xviii), presents the thorny issues of transliteration and nomenclature for these residents in French West Africa" on the margins of whiteness" (xvii).

The author presents his goals in the study as "reconstructing the social, economic and political lives" of the migrants in order to better understand diasporic experience and to "examine the fraught responses this unsettling presence [of the Lebanese] prompted in French functionaries"(2). He
succeeds quite well in the second of his goals, with an in-depth examination of the conclusions and misunderstandings of this group exemplified in various colonial archive reports and contemporary newspaper articles in France,

Lebanon, and West Africa. He also introduces much information on the roles of the non-functionary French merchants in their frequently successful attempts to direct colonial government responses to the Eastern Mediterranean migrant community. As to the first goal, he has certainly attempted to flesh out the lives of the migrants, dealing more extensively than previous studies on confessional separations, specific village origins, and class differentials among the migrants. The study concentrates throughout on the role of their places of origin in the lives of these migrants, giving telling details in the last chapter on how their lives in AOF brought change and wealth through large remittances back to the homeland. But the study is curiously lacking in African content, because it is curiously lacking in a consideration of the African peoples among whom these migrants settled.

The index is quite brief (331-341) for such a richly detailed work. The end notes (257-304) are detailed, for the most part, giving source citations only and very little parenthetical rumination. The book definitely needs a glossary of terms, particularly for the numerous non-English terms that are used frequently. The bibliography is full (305-330), giving credit to the depth of research in secondary and archival sources pursued by the author.

Throughout the work, however, I saw many instances where author-collected oral sources would have added much to the familial details of this diaspora. These are details that could have presented more on Afro- Lebanese relations in everyday life, for instance, as well as highlighted the roles of women. The author recognizes the lack of oral sources by stating this would have "required another work, quite different to that I have undertaken" (2). However, without considering the African people among whom these Eastern Mediterranean migrants settled, how well can one fully discuss and understand this diaspora in AOF? Though the author tries mightily to present the important roles of Lebano-Syrian women in this diaspora, they still seem to be tropes, rather than fully fleshed out actors. This, again, is due to the reliance on archival and published sources.

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Boucher, Claude (Chisale). *When Animals Sing and Spirits Dance Gule Wamkulu: The Great Dance of the Chewa People of Malawi.* **Mtakataka: Kungoni Centre of Culture and Art, 2012. xxviii + 276 pp.**

Claude Boucher's *When Animals Sing and Spirits Dance Gule Wamkulu: The Great Dance of the Chewa People of Malawi*, with additional text from Gary J. Morgan, Director of Museum Studies at Michigan State University, and photographs by Arjen van de Merwe, offers a refreshing, insightful, and brilliant interlink between what could be regarded as artistic compendium and the fundamental spiritual cultural heritage of an African community, the Chewa people of Malawi, in the dynamic context of everyday paradigms of holistic life experiences. Through a drama-laced strategy, the book masterfully employs symbolic characters depicted in masks and woven structures in an analytical syringe of songs and dances to "play out" the realities of cultural philosophical values and communal expectations of the Chewa people.

The crux of the book is revealed in two major sections. The first is the introduction written by Gary Morgan. Here the reader is exposed to the historical background of Malawi in general, the historical origin of *gule wamkulu*, and the religion of the Chewa people. It also introduces the reader to the role, as well as the form of *gule wamkulu* characters. The history of the origin of the symbolic and ritual evolution and the eventual transition of the *gule wamkulu* characters are also extensively discussed. With the introduction, the reader is prepared for the subsequent intriguing and illuminating details to follow in the main section of the book.

The second presents the kernel of the book in seven major themes as "dramatized" through the performances of the gule wamkulu dancers. The themes vividly capture the Chewa people's worldview on moral codes. The holistic nature of the themes is compelling. They strategically cover the existential instructions for the citizens of the community, such as history and politics; community, authority and ancestors; sexuality, fertility and marriage; childbirth and parenthood; health, food and death; witchcraft and medicines; and personal attributes. The author brilliantly portrays the interpretations and dramatic uses of these themes in ways that vividly represent the authentic voices of the local people that may be impossible to achieve in any other format. Perhaps more importantly, the Chewa people's heritage of the spiritual linkage to the ancestral world, in which the ancestors continue to impact their living descendants as agents of societal moral standard, is substantially highlighted. This without any doubt constitutes a significant representation of the fundamental religious worldview of Africans on the circular nature of human

existence and the "never ending" reciprocal obligations and privileges between the living and the living dead, i.e. the earthly and the spiritual domains.

I find the intellectual and communicative strengths of this book enormous. It is comprehensively researched and the author admirably subsumes his subjective considerations of the themes discussed and allows the voices of the Chewa people to be heard in their "undiluted" forms. The colorful illustration employed throughout the book definitely enhances the reader's imaginative and empirical understanding. The images are compelling and make the reading of the book engaging and less cumbersome. Also, both the mask name and the theme indexes at the end of the book provide the much-needed information on the locations of prominent words and ideas. In addition, the glossary of Chichewa terms and the interpretations of the songs in Chichewa and English afford the reader, who may not speak the Chichewa language, the basic understanding of the contents.

Surprisingly, with the author having a background as a Catholic priest, I did not find an interfaith discourse that I believe would have positively linked the moral codes of instructions of the Chewa thematic worldviews with the Christian (Catholic) moral expectations in the inculturalization spirit of Vatican II. This I believe would have raised the profile of the book as a doctrinal literature in the promotion of African Christianity (perhaps I was looking for too much) given the focus, objectives, and scope of the book. Notwithstanding this critique, the book presents a formidable resource as a "hypothesis" ready for further scholarly research for those interested in the rich African spiritual heritage in the context of existential humanity. In this regard, the book attests to the 2005 UNESCO description of *gule wamkulu* as "a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity." On the whole, Boucher deserves to be applauded for his scholarly endeavor in writing this book.

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Carrier, Neil and Gernot Klantschnig. *Africa and the War on Drugs.* London: Zed Books, 2012, i + 176 pp.

Neil Carrier and Gernot Klantschnig appraise Africa's place in the global drug trade. Their book comes at a time when numerous publications call attention to the dangers of drug trafficking in Africa and its challenge to democratic and corrupt-free governance, as well as sustained economic development. These works argue that drug cartels have become interwoven with government institutions and engage in sustained violence against rivals and law enforcement. They connect growing terrorism in Africa to drug trafficking, arguing that the destabilization of the continent by drug-related activities affects investment and poses a threat to long-term economic development in Africa. *Africa and the War on Drugs* challenges these prevalent portrayals of Africa as being in jeopardy due to its new position as a transshipment port for Europe-bound drugs. The authors question contemporary Western views that treat drug use as a recent phenomenon in Africa and depict the drug trade as detrimental to Africa's economic development. They also criticize Western approaches to drug control. Their categorization of drugs go beyond hard substances such as heroin, cocaine, and cannabis to stimulants like kola nuts, coffee, khat, tobacco, and alcohol.

The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter traces the history of drug cultivation and use in Africa, and focuses on drugs – khat, cannabis - that have been historically present in the continent. Chapter two assesses the link between drugs and development in Africa, while chapter three examines the continent's emerging role as a drug entrepot, arguing that it had a long history of involvement in the international drug trade. The final chapter criticizes current drug policies that are propagated by international agencies and offers alternative approaches to the fight against illicit drugs in Africa.

Carrier and Klantschnig argue that evidence of drug production in Africa dates back to twelfth century Kenya, where El-Ghafeky, a Spanish doctor, recorded the use of kola. Archaeological evidence and travelers' accounts also show that cannabis and khat existed in Ethiopia as early as the fifteenth century. However, these drugs served social, cultural, and practical purposes, such as improving stamina and alertness. In the West, they functioned more recreationally.

Following the rigorous policing of traditional drug-smuggling routes in the 1970s and 1980s, drug traders turned to Africa as an alternative course.

In the process, substances like heroin and cocaine became diverted to local markets, leading to increased drug problems. As a result, the United Nations embarked on a "drug war" in Africa, arguing that drugs posed a challenge to the continent's development. The UN also claimed that African states could descend

to the status of narco-states, territories that are overrun completely by drug cartels, devoid of any law enforcement. Carrier and Klantschnig, however, argue that Africa held a substitutable place in the drug trade, dependent on the policing of routes. The continent's drug trafficking operated in a small-scale, profit-oriented, and temporary structure that differed from the cartels and mafias portrayed in official discourses. The continent did not count as a major consumer or producer of heroin and cocaine, a fact that invalidated any fear of African nations' degeneration into narco-states.

Far from causing underdevelopment, the authors assert that the cultivation of substances, such as the illegal cannabis and quasi-legal khat, offered revenue to many farmers and states like Malawi, Swaziland, Somalia, and Mozambique. Development problems arose instead from the repressive and prohibitive policies enforced in Africa by international anti-drug agencies. These strategies concentrated on strengthening weak African states in their enforcement of suppressive drug laws, to the detriment of research-based, socio-economic, and health approaches to drug control. The funds provided by these organizations, according to the authors, strengthened corruption, state brutality, and human rights violations by African governments. They conclude that Western funders dissociate Africa's drug problems from the global drug market, especially because of the high demand of these substances abroad.

Carrier and Klantschnig dedicate a part of their book to the effects of drug consumption in Africa – unemployment, HIV/AIDS, low productivity, drug abuse by gangs and rebel groups, state destabilization by cartels – and provide detailed examples of the impact of drugs on other societies, such as Afghanistan and Colombia, where they pose grave challenges. However, they conclude that drug consumption in Africa poses no threat to the continent's development. One wonders about their definition of development. Unless they view it as separate from economic and social issues, their conclusion that drug use stands apart from Africa's development is contradictory to the very background that they provide on the effects of drugs. Their statement that, "it must be emphasized that a detrimental effect of drugs and development in Africa has nowhere been demonstrated through sound research," despite their examples of "real dangers and potential dangers" of drug consumption in the continent, is even more disconcerting (56-57).

Though the authors make a strong argument regarding Western exaggerations about the linkage of drugs to Africa's growth, they underplay the real and potential impact of drugs on the continent as well as the increasing complicity of political actors in the drug trade. They gloss over the fact that drug habits in the continent have since shifted. They scarcely acknowledge that youths in Africa employ drugs recreationally as much as their counterparts in the rest of the world. In an

effort to support their argument that drug production in Africa offers revenue to African states, the authors either ignore or downplay the long-term effects that the proliferation of illegal drugs would cause in African economies. Illicit drugs have been connected to violence, lawlessness, and terrorism in Africa and elsewhere. Its tolerance in Africa, as recommended by Carrier and Klantschnig, can only result in further disruption, thereby impeding economic growth and investment. While the roots of violence and state corruption in Africa may have minute connections to the drug trade, drug consumption exacerbates an already bad situation. It also potentially plunges the affected countries into a public health crisis.

The authors raise an important concern about the unreliability of international agencies' statistics on drug trafficking in Africa, which they portray as estimates that lack current empirical research. However, it remains unclear how their methodology differs in this regard or how they navigated the challenge. One wonders to what extent their contemporary source materials – academic dissertations, newspaper and media reports, and online statements – diverge from the unreliable approximations that assail official documents generated by foreign agencies and national governments.

Despite its shortcomings, Africa and the War on Drugs contains thought provoking reflections on the campaign against drug trafficking in Africa. Carrier and Klantschnig depart from Western interpretations of Africa's drug issues and offer historical and cultural insights into the continent's drug habits. Their recommendations include important alternatives in drug law enforcement, such as the need to incorporate views from academic and health sectors in order to implement rules that consider the safety and rehabilitation of drug users. They also draw attention to current drug-related threats to Africa, namely, the proliferation of fake drugs and the largely unregulated use of "legal drugs" like alcohol and tobacco. Their work stands not only as an academic piece but also an informational kit for international agencies and stakeholders in the anti-drug campaign.

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Cheru, Fantu and Renu Modi, eds. *Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa: The Impact of Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian Investments.* New York: Zed Books, 2013, xiii + 263 pp.

Due to factors like climate change, population growth, and decreasing availability of fertile land and water, there has been a growing competition for land. These adversities have led to increasing debates, media attention, and research surrounding agricultural development, food security, and land use. The roles and actions of emerging powers, like China, India, and Brazil in international development, world economy, and influence in global governance are of particular interest. Thus, the collection of work provided by editors Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi is a needed and welcome addition to the growing research in this field.

Organized into twelve chapters and divided into four parts, Cheru and Modi introduce the work pragmatically, committing to a balanced analysis based on empirical evidence of the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Brazil, China, and India in Africa's development. This is partially an attempt to highlight the complexity of FDI, but also to illustrate that the development process is not simply a dichotomy split along the lines of Western Europe and the United States versus agricultural development focusing on small-scale farming and environmentalism. Cheru and Modi also emphasized that the work is an effort to prevent equating FDI with neocolonialism and land grabbing. However, while the emphasis is on FDI generally, the book does broadly examine investment, trade, and development assistance from China, India, and Brazil to Africa. Parts II, III, and IV respectively cover the experiences of India, Brazil, and China with African agriculture. Part II focuses on India's private and public sector involvement with African agriculture. Brazil's experience, including the Dialogue Forum with South Africa (IBSA), is covered in Part III, and focuses on biofuel production. Finally, Part IV focuses on China, highlighting its domestic successes in agricultural development and poverty reduction based on strong government incentives and how this translates into its foreign investments.

Cheru and Modi state that the goal of the book is to examine whether "private and sovereign investments from China, India and Brazil create new opportunities for the transfer of appropriate farm technology, build local capacity and know-how, reverse the persistent productivity decline in agriculture, generate local employment, improve local living standards and ensure food security" (xii). The overview in Part I begins this examination with a discussion of the potential of FDI from India, China, and Brazil and a historical perspective on the role of FDI in Africa's agricultural development. Sam Moyo's chapter provides critical

analysis and historical account of the risks of FDI and its tenuous record in Africa. Ultimately, Cheru and Modi argue that FDI can be a successful vehicle for development, social transformation, and poverty reduction if paired with a "strong and effective development-oriented state" (2).

Cheru and Modi succeed in their commitment to a balanced analysis of FDI from Brazil, China, and India, as there are a variety of perspectives given by the chapter authors, ranging from the avid supporter of FDI, cautious supporter, to the more critical perspective. This is best illustrated in Part II. For the most part, the views closely align with the Indian government and private sector – that India is committed to helping Africa overcome poverty and underdevelopment. To illustrate, Gurjit Singh asserts that "India's engagement with Africa in the agricultural sector has largely met expectations" and that "Indian companies have been good about meeting their corporate social responsibilities by creating local employment, transferring technology and contributing to domestic and intra-African trade" (73-74). However, contributions from Dessalegn Rahmato and Rick Rowden in Part II critically examine India's commitment by examining large-scale land acquisitions by Indian companies using a land rights framework. For instance, Rahmato argues that there has been "hardly any technology transfer" to the average Ethiopian farmer, and that these projects are often technologically "not transferable to or affordable for smallholders" (105).

The editors also succeed in highlighting how each of the emerging countries' own domestic agricultural development experiences relates to their respective engagements in Africa. This is especially evident in the section on China, particularly the chapter by Xiuli Xu and Xiaoyun Li, but can also be found throughout the book in varying degrees. However, this brings to light the paradox of the potential success of such emerging countries' investments when there may still be significant domestic struggles. For instance, how can India be considered a success in food self- sufficiency when a large part of its own population goes hungry? Or how does one reconcile China's stance on civil liberties with that of a "strong, effective development state" (8)? Further, this also raises larger issues of transfer of success and whether it's possible.

Despite Cheru and Modi's claim to base the book on empirical evidence, Rahmato's work on Indian investments in Ethiopia is the only piece that does so. However, this is tempered by their success in gathering diverse perspectives on this topic and highlights a broader role and function of narrative, discourse, and social construction in how the role of emerging countries' involvement in international development is perceived and defined. Thus, with the evidence based largely in narrative form, Cheru and Modi offer the conclusion that "the overall impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments and technical assistance to African

agriculture has been positive." However, given the large reliance on narrative, such conclusions fall short of rigorous evaluation.

Ultimately, this book advances the understanding of the subject of FDI investments in Africa by emerging countries. It is particularly helpful as it pulls together diverse accounts from Brazil, India, and China, and provides consideration of each of the emerging countries development trajectories and what it may mean for Africa. Finally, it offers a foundation upon which future work and evidence can build to help explain and understand the role of emerging countries in FDI.

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Gallagher, Julia. *Britain and Africa Under Blair: In Pursuit of the Good State.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011, viii + 166 pp.

While employed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during Tony Blair's prime ministership, Julia Gallagher found herself struck by the distinct rhetoric about Africa that Blair and his cabinet expressed. In Britain and Africa Under Blair, Gallagher seeks to understand this "new" moral, ethical discourse which differed from that used to describe the rest of the world. Where Africa was concerned, Blair's government expressed an "ethical foreign policy," which was "grounded in utopian and cosmopolitan ideas and highly idealised… [as well as] offered a grand, heroic identity for Britain" (4). The rhetoric, interestingly, was not restricted to the New Labour party; politicians from all parties seemed to employ it. Africa was thus set above party politics as the government undertook a moral crusade to "help" the continent, claiming that it was supporting human rights and creating social justice, all the while contributing to global stability and economic improvement.

Gallagher's approach has a second, crucial façade. She argues that Africa was a perfect "Other" where Britain could project its international efforts, which contributed to domestic notions about the ideal British state. She derives her argument from the realm of psychology by considering how individuals – and by extension, the states they comprise, she argues somewhat controversially – can solve internal traumas and maintain well being. In the case of the British state, this was achieved in part through attempts to "'repair' external objects," that is, trying to fix the problems facing African peoples (69). This is an original argument that is grounded on Gallagher's conviction about the "importance to human wellbeing of a connection to a sense of the good" (73). She provides the evidence for this thesis in the second half of the book through contemporary case studies of recent British engagement in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, though one wonders whether Kenya or Zimbabwe might have provided more complex, richer examples.

Gallagher begins with a theoretical chapter that weighs the "good" a state might wish to accomplish against its "political" considerations, and dips into the history of the British Empire to begin explaining the intellectual background to New Labour's approach to Africa. The first half of the book, indeed, is really an intellectual history of the idea of the "goodstate" in Britain since the late eighteenth century. Gallagher's approach reminds this author of Alice Conklin's efforts in writing the history of early colonial French West Africa. Like Conklin, Gallagher believes in the importance of ideology in British efforts in Africa, and links later Labour ideologies to the period of the Scramble for Africa and beyond.

For Gallagher, "doing good" was no simple veil covering economic and

geo-political considerations, but an important aspect of British policy and consciousness. The various strands of the "good" of British state policy from the past through New Labour are clearly explored, though these sections leave a sense of uneasiness about the omission of those slightly less "good" aspects. There is also a problematic tendency to take statements from politicians like Joseph Chamberlain or publications like the Times at face value without subjecting them to critical analysis, something Gallagher acknowledges in the conclusion.

It is perhaps in the second half of this book that Gallagher makes her most striking contribution. She evaluates interview testimony from a variety of contacts she made during her years working in government. They range from Clare Short to Malcolm Moss, and serve to justify her claims about the perceptions of Africa among Britain's high-ranking contemporary politicians. Politicians viewed Africa idealistically; whereas British domestic politics was a murky maelstrom of chaos and argument, Africa's "massive problems appear[ed] to generate clear-cut solutions," and permitted the justified expression of British power abroad, despite the fact that African issues were rarely vote-winners at home. The same ideals, Gallagher continues to demonstrate, were mirrored by officials in the field who felt genuine satisfaction in their work, and felt a deep responsibility to it. They spoke, officials believed, for the common man and woman of Africa, and steered clear of politics as much as possible. Here, in "empty" Africa, "British officials [could] embody the good state" (122). After the Thatcher years in which Britain had failed to sanction apartheid South Africa and its later inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide, the nation state came to hold little moral authority. New Labour "felt itself to be inheriting a damaged state," and international activity and the crusade in Africa, undertaken with little ostensible self-interest for the government, served as a venue for moral action in the new, globalized world (127).

To my mind, there is one major weakness in this work. Gallagher is convincing in tracing the ideology of the "good state" until the beginning of the twentieth century. But the remainder of the century yawns like a gaping hole between that point and the Blair years: how did the ideology of the "good state" transform due to the Second World War, for instance? And what about the golden age of colonial development, in the 1940s and

1950s? These would seem like vital subjects for study and analysis of them might permit the author to more directly link the periods together. Finally, and perhaps this is a historian's grouchiness, the author has the tendency to assert rather than demonstrate; the actual evidence for many statements is sparse. This could be, in part, a result of the author's total familiarity with her topics, but it is occasionally unsettling for the non-specialist reader.

This is a highly theoretical and erudite work. Hegel and Rousseau share the

pages with Mbembe and Mudimbe, and Gallagher possesses the enviable skill of being able to relate philosophy, intellectual history, and psychology directly to her topics in a comprehensible manner, although these sections do limit the flow of the prose in places. Overall, Gallagher's argument is largely effective. While she may not succeed in wholly convincing readers about her convictions, she certainly provides an important perspective that will inspire scholars of the continent to heed her insights and think more deeply about their own research.

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Giles-Vernick, Tamara and James L.A. Webb Jr, eds. *Global Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, 1 + 246 pp.

Few will argue against the reality that Africa bears a heavy disease burden, yet little scholarship exists that situates Africa's struggles with disease in a broader global health perspective. Tamara Giles-Vernick and James L.A. Webb Jr. formulated a smart collected volume that takes an interdisciplinary and multi-lateral approach toward understanding how "health initiatives launched within Africa by actors based outside of the continent" have addressed disease, chronic health problems, and complex conditions such as malnutrition and injection drug use (3). At the heart of the text, Giles-Vernick and Webb are concerned with presenting the long history of intervention, from the introduction of biomedicine during the colonial era, through the developmentalist frames of early post-colonies, to the late-twentieth century focus on HIV transmission and drug culture. Weighted toward historical accounts, the book is broken into three parts, with nine chapters plus the introduction.

Part one examines the historical picture of Africa's experience with global health. The first chapter, by William Schneider, examines the history of smallpox eradication, noting that colonial efforts led to some successes and opened the door for later, comprehensive vaccination work under the WHO from the 1960s to the 1970s. Schneider gives the only full-scale success story, in a complicated history of intervention and retrenchment. In the second chapter, Webb analyzes "large-scale use of insecticide" in Liberia to eradicate malaria between 1945 and 1962 by the United States, followed by the WHO and UNICEF (42). Webb's chapter gives a cautionary tale of limited success offset by emergent problems as vector resistance to DDT and Dieldrin (DLD) weakened the institutional commitment to a program with expansive financial and logistical challenges (61).

The dual problems of economies of scale and lack of foresight to manage shifting disease environments as an outside agent, prevents effective change, no matter the scheme. Guillaume Lachenal's chapter "proposes a genealogy of treatment as prevention" in HIV/AIDS interventions by examining colonial efforts to manage African health despite "indecision over what constituted (individual) treatment and (collective) prevention" (72-73). Lachenal situates HIV/AIDS programs at the nexus of smallpox, malaria, and "biomedical messianism" as a warning against premature predictions of success (84). In chapter four, Jennifer Tappan draws together the colonial and post-colonial to "evaluate the scientific and medical rationale underlying the distribution of dried skimmed milk" by medical officials in an effort to curb early childhood malnutrition (93). While officials claimed the supplement was not meant to replace breast milk, Tappan shows that the message received was to "make the powder into milk for their children to drink and not one informant could recall being instructed to add the powdered milk to a

child's food" (102). Biomedical emphasis on technological treatments, foods, and insecticides privileged specialized knowledge and marginalized the beneficiaries.

Part two takes on a more presentist set of health dilemmas through a historical lens, with three chapters that incorporate history, anthropology, and biomedicine. These chapters have the most to say about current health issues that Africans must navigate in their daily lives. Giles- Vernick's contribution, with Stephanie Rupp, explores how "cross-species transmissions" became the most significant factor in recent infectious disease outbreaks (117). Rather than privileging western scientific explanations, the authors analyze African narratives of contestations and interactions with great apes. The significance of socialized distance between humans and apes suggests a complicated set of cultural practices to reduce exposure to a dangerous disease ecology that holds everything from sleeping sickness to Ebola (129). In chapter six, Anne Marie Moulin places Egypt's recent plague of iatrogenic Hepatitis C into a broader framing of Africa's medical history that reveals how treatment for schistosomiasis infected millions of people with the liver disease. The violence of iatrogenesis also contributes to the historical memory of forced vaccinations coupled with an intense mistrust of medical specialists who appear corrupt and ineffective. While some may doubt Moulin's assertion that iatrogenic infection factored into the Arab Spring of 2011, the compounded social malaise of political corruption and failed public health does suggest compelling grounds for social protest (150). From a newly identified plague of Hepatitis C, Myron Echenberg examines how Cholera went from one of the "most feared maladies of the nineteenth century, [to]…a severe diarrheal disease," which since the mid-

1970s threatens Africa on a regular basis (159). Echenberg provides several statistical tables to show locations and rates of incidence, revealing that across the major geographic regions several states exhibit a high frequency of cholera, which suggests important indices for assessing risk. From here, Echenberg examines three key risk factors: landscape or ecological changes; political instability or armed conflict, which precipitate refugees; and water or sanitation as a consequence of public health failures. The failure of appropriate measures to address disease outbreaks, transmission, and sanitation points to further problems for disease prevention as external pressures drive the agenda.

Part three moves into the complexities of where Africa's public health challenges require innovation before intervention. These last two chapters address the dilemmas around HIV/AIDS transmission and control efforts that further alter African bodies and material practices, based upon donor models about appropriate efforts. Michel Garenne, Alain Giami, and Christophe Perrey examine the emergent role of "medical male circumcision" (MMC) as a recommended practice to reduce the spread of HIV since March 2007 (186). The authors examine the

historical practice of male circumcision in a variety of African communities, from the Nuba to Zulu, and its cultural significance for Africa's monotheistic religions. They also point toward the trauma and sanitary challenges of circumcision, showing that despite the appearance of reduced HIV infection the statistics are not significant enough to be clearly indicative. The last chapter, by Sheryl McCurdy and Haruka Maruyama, on heroin use and HIV interventions in Africa shows how global flows carried new practices in its currents: "a foreign-led, top-down drug control approach, and a public health—and human rights-focused harm-reduction approach" (212). Africa became a transit nexus for heroin, connecting production sites in Pakistan and Afghanistan with markets in Europe and the United States. East Africa became an important hub for heroin after 1999, which also transformed heroin use in the region from something smoked or inhaled to an injectable drug. The change to injecting heroin also increases the risk of transmitting various blood-borne diseases, such as HIV and Hepatitis C. As McCurdy and Maruyama note, the top-down approach criminalizes users, while the harm reduction exemplifies treatment and prevention methods that "enable drug users to make better choices that will help them reduce their risk-related practices" to better "manage their drug dependence and comorbidities" (224).

Giles-Vernick and Webb have assembled a valuable collection of perspectives on the global health challenges African countries face today and their historical roots. Each study is localized and rich in details, which will encourage discussions and further analysis of the problems presented. The book has excellent utility for a variety of course applications, from Global Public Health for medical and nursing programs to Medical Anthropology or Histories of Science and Medicine to more specific applications in a number of African Studies fields.

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Hammar, Amanda, ed. *Displacement Economies in Africa: Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity.* **London/New York: Zed Books, 2014, vii + 260 pp.**

Displacement Economies in Africa, an anthology edited by Amanda Hammar, breaks new theoretical ground in its introduction as it examines the troubling question of displacement economies that result from Africa's vast and apocalyptic range of upheavals, stemming from wars, misrule, ecological devastation, and allied challenges that confront its nascent nation-states. Internal displacement, as well as the more familiar variety of refugee export, receive close attention, and the economic spaces vacated and created by these difficulties come under very close analysis for the inevitably novel alternative socio-economic and political relational configurations that they spawn. Major changes occur in both formal and informal economic arrangements, and some players derive maximal benefits while others lose out as inchoate forces at play shape new universes of opportunity and disadvantage. The instrumental agency sometimes exercised by the displaced, yet often ignored, comes in for close scrutiny, and the resourcefulness of the victim in the midst of adversity becomes compelling terrain for heuristic review. This is a bold and insightful introduction to the book.

Andrea Behrends discusses the Darfur-Chad borderlands, and, in charting differential responses to displacement, she identifies scenarios ranging from continuing, even if temporary, attachment to agricultural production, lives free of assistance from aid agencies, partial dependence on aid-supports, through to total reliance for social reproduction on the charity of the latter. Through extensive discussion of the lives of the displaced, she demonstrates the choices that individuals are forced to make in fashioning their peculiar survival strategies in dire situations of conflict. These decisions were often influenced by conditions of intense political volatility as rulers of Chad and Sudan warred with each other, significantly constraining the choices of the displaced, heightening the appeal of the aid agencies, and dimming for many the prospects of an eventual return to pre-conflict locations and lifestyles.

The war-torn Casamance region of Senegal is Martin Evans' terrain of analysis. He shows convincingly how the forces of secession in the area introduce displacement but also discusses the possibilities of a "return" once some normalcy begins to dawn. The returnee faces challenges of physical as well as relational fracturing and deterioration, and economic opportunities have to be rebuilt even as generational tensions emerge as the youth take on the elders in the much-contested political stakes. New land tenurial arrangements become necessary, and administrative re- alignments breed tensions and roil communal solidarity, with

former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.re-alignments breed tensions and roil communal solidarity, with former guerrillas claiming a seat at the table.

Amanda Hammar's chapter deals with the implosion of a Zimbabwe badly governed by Robert Mugabe's ZANU/PF in the period after 2000. She charts the major problems of a failed state, Mugabe's megalomania, the serial insecurities of a majority population heavily dependent on the informal economy, and the re-shaping of social class as white commercial farmers and their African workers suffer exclusion while the working classes experience both internal and external displacement. The well connected amass wealth, but their goal is the most primitive and grotesque of accumulations, not re-investment to foster economic growth. The middle class recomposed, with heavy dependence on the informal economy, particularly with the crushing burdens of Structural Adjustment. The poor do worse, even as new economic relations emerge in areas like Masvingo, where "class, gender and generational differentiation" (90) threw up new initiatives that sustained beleaguered households, especially in the area of livestock. Displaced white farmers cooperated creatively with new black owners to their mutual benefit, and ZANU/PF is too embarrassed to formally note this vital relationship. The illicit trade in foreign currency has imbricated the social classes, bringing some relief to the internally displaced, while raising fortunes for the apparatchiks. The introduction of the American dollar has restored some sanity to the economy, but not before much disruption of material conditions occurred across the board.

For Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues, the diamond-rich north- eastern Lundas of Angola, in a season of crisis, is the field of exploration. Independence in 1975 brought no respite to a war-weary nation, and difficulties were compounded by instability in the neighboring Congo. Illegal mining (garimpo) became the refuge of many as population groups variously experienced displacement, involuntary confinement to both safe and unsafe areas, forced mining labor at the command of UNITA, and sundry material dislocations amidst an influx of competing Congolese refugees. The end of the war generated yet more insecurity as the government showed the flag, garimpo became more hazardous, and legal mining became more dominant for the approved few. Non-mining jobs were now the new attraction, and the hardy, and generally insecure, garimpeiro now easily fell foul of the law, and were greatly harassed.

Nairobi's Eastleigh Estate, home to many displaced Somali, is Hannah Elliott's purview in this anthology. She is particularly drawn to the trade in camel milk, which became the com-mercial, social, and therapeutic refuge of a displaced population that was much traumatized by civil war. The milk trade, run on a trust system, drew visiting Somali from abroad, gener-ated income for real-estate investment, cemented social ties, and elevated the urban "middle-woman," the

widow, and the spinster, who avail themselves of the indeterminacy of their clan location to rival the patriarchs.

We continue with the Somali-displaced in Peter Hansen's contribution, but this time with an emphasis on the returnee, post-conflict. Few returned to Somaliland permanently, but, from the Somali diaspora, many invested savings and time in real estate, businesses, conjugal arrangements, and social networking. The returnees found great comfort in belonging to an established network of familial and social ties, transcending the anonymity that could never bring social distinction to their efforts in the diaspora. Neither the fledgling "government" nor family members encouraged their permanent return, for, as a floating population, they offered Somaliland a whole lot more materially.

With Sarah Bracking, we return to Zimbabwe, this time to examine the dynamics of asset-relocation in a period of economic hardship and displacement. The wealthy, both those with ZANU/PF connections, and those without, sought creative ways of spiriting their funds out of the besieged economy to safer havens abroad. Many escaped state predation as taxes rose, and victimization came to those out of favor with the government. Bank officials helped some to get their funds out, and others found creative ways of evading detection. A lot of bribes were paid in these spoils politics of the redomiciling of capital, and the elite joined the poor in many acts of extraversion. The state took to manipulating remittances sent to family members from Zimbabweans abroad, and creative delays in completing transactions ensured good rents to state officials and the well- connected. The business in foreign currency spawned a network of Chinese, Angolan and Zimbabwean capitalists, and, at a time of great immiseration for the majority, significant fortunes were made by the wealthy.

Morten Boas and Ingunn Bjorkhaug probe northern Uganda in their chapter, examining the psychological trauma of confinement, in which displacement is of a short distance, and the displaced can see their original homes, and yet cannot live there. This circumstance bred poverty and utter hopelessness. The Acholi communities, traumatized by Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and other bandits, lived in a "prison-like economy" of the internally-displaced, in camps that offered little agency, operating under curfew, with only a few opportunities for trade, limited cultivation, or military service. In perpetual fear of terror, and encompassed in mythical, preternatural beliefs of Kony's occult powers, these populations languished in abject dependence on charity.

Jeremy Jones reviews the Zimbabwean crisis of the 2000s, and highlights the misery, but also the resourcefulness, of those who were "stuck" in their original locations while being traumatized by a collapsed formal economy. He traces Mugabe's slide into extravagant financial commitment to war veterans, state

corruption, urban opposition to ZANU/ PF (and the reprisals this drew), and the ultimate collapse of the formal economy. People of all social classes took to illegal means for survival, with the poorly educated youth being the biggest victims, their lives completely unhinged from the tenuous material moorings they once knew.

The final essay comes from Timothy Raemaekers, and it deals with the displacement of the youth in an eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ravaged by war. Few Congolese ever made it to the aid camps, many pursuing solace in neighboring countries. A number found shelter in forest environments, with a large majority being hosted by more cohesive families that could offer some protection. Aid agencies were rigid in their munificence, and only those directly under their wing could expect their sustained charity. Being mostly unarmed, the youth had to devise a means to survive. They were at the mercy of the G8, that "closed group of transnational traders who dominate[d] almost every aspect of urban economic life," (236) a virtual government in the eastern Congo. The vibrant informal economy in the towns supplied some temporary jobs, but one's ethnic roots often determined what was available to these youthful "strangers." Periods of peace improved work chances, but host families exacted a high material price, and were generally cold comfort in harsh economic times.

This is a well-packaged, and insightful anthology, and it richly fulfills the claims of the introduction in covering displacement, especially the internally-displaced, from a very rich field of empirical investigations. While noting that a map or two would have provided greater context for the unfamiliar reader's understanding of the complex sequences and locations, this collection is a task well accomplished.

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Heaton, Matthew M. *Black Skin, White Coats: Nigerian Psychiatrists, Decolonization and the Globalization of Psychiatry*. **Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013, x + 249 pp.**

In recent years, the study of Africa's transition from colonialism to independence has proven to be a particularly fruitful avenue of historical inquiry, as scholars have documented both the opportunities and challenges Africans faced as they struggled to define the boundaries of nationhood and identity while articulating new understandings of modernity. With his recent work on the history of Nigerian psychiatry in the decades surrounding national independence, Matthew Heaton has contributed an important chapter to this unfolding narrative, inserting the perspective of Nigerian psychiatrists into larger debates over the process of decolonization and the appropriation of Western knowledge within African landscapes.

The book's title, a play on the classic 1952 text by Frantz Fanon, signifies a point of departure rather than arrival, as Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists of the 1950s and 1960s were able to reject the Manichaean logic of Fanon in favor of a pluralistic approach to medicine that adapted Western psychiatry to the Nigerian landscape while simultaneously redefining their field in light of local perspectives. In this way, Heaton argues that Nigerian psychiatrists challenged the binary distinctions between colonizer and colonized that have often defined the study of modern medicine in the non- Western world. Heaton's book thus offers an important corrective to other studies of African psychiatry that have emphasized the dislocations and miscommunications of the colonial encounter, in which Western doctors all too often pathologized and dehumanized colonial subjects exposed to the Western medical gaze.

By contrast, the heroes of Heaton's narrative are the first generation of Nigerian psychiatrists trained in the West, men like Thomas Adeoye Lambo and Tolani Asuni, who challenged the assumptions of the racist ethnopsychiatry that had dominated the field of colonial mental health for much of the twentieth century. That movement had argued for the existence of an "African mind" that was impulsive, emotional and allegedly less prone to mental illness than the supposedly more logical Western subject. In the book's most important chapter, Heaton shows how Lambo's work in the

1950s and 1960s shifted the field towards the new paradigm of transcultural psychiatry, defined by the premise that mental illness was a product of what Heaton calls "universal similarities of human psychological processes that transcended perceived boundaries between races and cultures" (4-5). Thus, a subsequent chapter on the mental illnesses of Nigerians living in the United Kingdom shows how Lambo and other Nigerian psychiatrists resisted racial and essentialist

explanations for the prevalence of mental illness among migrant populations. Likewise, Heaton shows how Nigerian doctors worked to reformulate so-called "brain fag" syndrome, an illness once thought to be unique to Nigerian culture, by placing it within the spectrum of universally acknowledged mental illnesses.

Though the above examples suggest a process whereby Nigerian psychiatrists redefined African illnesses according to the accepted terminology of Western medicine, Heaton does a fine job of showing how Nigerian medical personnel also worked to redefine the field of international psychiatry through an engagement with local practices. In this regard the most important effort at integrating international and local medicine was made through the establishment of the Aro Mental Hospital, founded by Lambo near his home of Abeokuta in the 1950s. Here Lambo and other Nigerian doctors offered an approach to healing that combined Western techniques, such as psychopharmaceutical treatment and electroconvulsive therapy, with traditional African healing practices that were more holistic than those found in Western medical institutions. In fact, as Heaton shows, Lambo not only worked with traditional medical practitioners at Aro, he also spent much of his career insisting on the value of indigenous healers to achieving successful therapeutic outcomes. Yet the incorporation of non-Western medicine into the practice of Nigerian psychiatrists was also clearly elitist in orientation, as Nigerian doctors situated themselves as intermediaries, or as Heaton refers to them, "gatekeepers of the mind" who were "the only ones with the appropriate balance of culturally specific knowledge and scientifically universal knowledge" (152).

Heaton's narrative is written in a clear and effective—if at times repetitive—prose, and his argument about the importance of transcultural psychiatry to the decolonization process is well-made. However, Heaton's analysis would also have benefited from a deeper engagement with the theoretical implications of his main contentions. Heaton is surely right to position figures like Lambo as "gatekeepers," yet this term also raises important questions about the cultural and national agendas of this newly educated elite, as well as their desire for social control. Nowhere is this more clearly apparent than in the doctors' concerns about the emergence of recreational drug use by young urban men in post-independence Nigeria. As Heaton shows, Asuni believed that widespread cannabis use hurt family stability and constituted "disruptive and irresponsible behavior" (170) that threatened the health and productivity of the nation. Yet the author never weighs in on whether these fears were rational or simply a manifestation of an undefined social and cultural agenda. Given the importance Heaton ascribes to these seminal psychiatric figures, a deeper exploration of their own perspective on the meaning of nationhood and independence would have helped to contextualize their interventions in local and international medical debates, while also raising

the question of whether, as intermediaries, these doctors' efforts at social control constituted a neo- colonial continuation of colonial-era priorities. Relatedly, the book's focus on elite perspectives seems to preclude a deeper discussion or analysis of how other participants in the field of Nigerian mental health, such as traditional healers and patients, navigated the post-colonial landscape being constructed by men like Lambo and Asuni.

That Heaton's book raises these questions is surely a credit to the author's exhaustive research into the medical debates of the independence period and his clear presentation of his argument. For these reasons alone, Black Skin, White Coats will become essential reading for scholars of the history of African psychiatry and African medicine, as well as for specialists of modern Nigeria. It will also surely open new fields of inquiry into the study of contemporary African encounters with Western science and philosophy.

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Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri. *Women and the Informal Economy in Urban Africa: from the Margins to the Centre*. London: Zed Books, 2014, x + 140 pp.

Setting out a critique of Western urban planning models as applied to African cities, while recognizing not only the positive contributions of economic informality but also articulating its indigenous characteristics, and at the same time asserting women's agency and dynamism as a basis for new models in advancing urban growth is ambitious for such a slim volume, yet is precisely what Mary Njeri Kinyanjui's incisive observation and analysis achieves in this concise, groundbreaking work.

The subtitle of the book, "*From the Margins to the Centre*," captures the essence of Kinyanjui's enterprise. Through an in depth case study of Nairobi, Kinyanjui sets out to reposition the African city as a unique, coherent entity as opposed to an inexplicable aberration on the margins of urban planning theories. At the same time, she re-conceptualizes economic informality from a site on the edges of survival to a site of dynamism and sustainable solidarity built on indigenous concepts. She embodies all of this in the movement of women, spatially and entrepreneurially, from the edges of the city to its center, in a rejuvenation of the central business district through ingenious new uses of retail space by small scale women traders.

The book, in Kinyanjui's own words, "urges the need to investigate the diversity and creativity within the African city in terms of the African indigenous market concept, solidarity entrepreneurialism, inclusion of women in urban panning and collective organization as a method of organizing business, … [and] including gender in the construction of urban theory" (5). The author's emphasis on the dynamism and promise of innovations stemming from economic informality and particularly from women in this sector, stands in contrast to much urban planning theory and development literature.

Although not formally divided, the book may be said to fall into three sections. The first and last chapters articulate Kinyanjui's position in relation to other development and urban planning theorists. In chapters two through four, Kinyanjui delves into historical and archival records to trace the development of the city from its colonial inception, through independence and successive post-independence administrations. Aspects addressed include spatial segregation, men and women's place in the city over time, as well as the changing relationship between government officials and street hawkers. Throughout, Kinyanjui stresses the continuity in the development of the informal economic sector, including its roots in indigenous market concepts, which are explicitly elucidated. In this way, Kinyanjui's treatise brings the postcolonial school of thought to the field of urban

planning, insisting that the social and historical context of a city's development be considered in any evaluation or development of future plans. This also forms a basis for Kinyanjui's unabashed critique of the inadequacy of Western theories of urban planning for Africa's context, and her call for the innovations employed in economic informality to be recognized for their contribution to the development of the city's human capital and studied for new urban development paradigms.

Kinyanjui shifts to an analysis of empirical data, gathered from surveys and interviews of Nairobi women in economic informality, in chapters five through eight. This analysis is thematically organized, including chapters on "women's mobility," the "characteristics of women in economic informality," "women's search for spatial justice," and "women's collective organizations," respectively. Kinyanjui is conscious about allowing "subaltern" women's voices to come through in her work. In this section she also formulates a critique of the women's movement of the 1980s and 1990s in Kenya, by highlighting the intersection of class and culture, and alleging "modernist" formulation of the women's movement failed to engage the majority of Kenyan women coming from less middle class or Western-influenced backgrounds. She suggests that women in the informal economic sector are forming a new movement, which has not yet been recognized in academic discourse; an intriguing position that merits further study.

Kinyanjui's data on women in economic informality brings to light a significantly different picture of the sector than that found in other studies in terms of demographics and sustainability. Significantly, she asserts: "The movement [toward women's economic accumulation] is not haphazard, as envisioned in the literature on the impact of informality in the city; it is discussed and coordinated" (110). Kinyanjui's analysis of women's collective organizations gives rise to several exciting possibilities: from the potential for solidarity entrepreneurialism and existing women's groups to form a basis for addressing participation and spatial justice in the city, to a view of collective entrepreneurial organization as a challenge to individualistic, concentrated capitalism. Kinyanjui, suggested that rather than being mainly conceptualized in relation to land reform, one must focus on recognition of emergent social alliances.

A slight tendency to essentialize women operating in economic informality in some sections of the book is overcome when the empirical data and extensive quotes from women themselves are shared in later chapters. One might have wished for enhanced editing to avoid occasional repetition in the manuscript, but overall, Women and the Informal Economy in Africa makes important contributions to theories of urban planning, spatial justice, indigenous entrepreneurialism, and gender studies; accordingly, it will appeal to scholars and practitioners in a range of fields.

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Muehlenbeck, Philip E. *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, xxi + 333 pp.

In *Betting on the Africans*, Muehlenbeck focuses on President John F. Kennedy's relationships with a number of prominent African leaders to analyze his efforts to improve US-Africa relations during his presidency (January 20, 1961 - November 22, 1963). From the outset, Muehlenbeck contrasts "Kennedy's policies of courting Third World nationalism" to the subsequent abandonment of these efforts in a larger shift towards an agenda focused on "Cold War concerns of anticommunism" that dominated other administrations (xiv). This is significant because, as Muehlenberg asserts, the shift away from Kennedy's policies and ideologies relating to Africa and the developing world facilitated a considerable growth in anti- Americanism in subsequent presidencies (xiv).

Muehlenbeck carefully navigates the historiography of mid-twentieth century US-Africa relations by squarely situating this work as an effort to balance "modernization theory with personal diplomacy" (xv). As a result, Muehlenbeck seeks to consider Kennedy as a deeply strategic, yet highly personable figure in the construction of bonds between the US and Africa. Perhaps most importantly, Muehlenbeck perceives decolonization as "the most important historical force of the twentieth century," thus, in gaining African leaders as allies, Kennedy had the ability to gain great respect from Africans while strengthening foreign policy (xvi). Ultimately, it is Muehlenbeck's approach to Kennedy's efforts in US-Africa relations through personal diplomacy that is very striking because it emphasizes a very different kind of diplomatic history that is underrepresented, especially within the histories of Africa, the Cold War, and US relations with Africa and Africans.

While the book could have easily devolved into a series of disconnected case studies in Cold War history, Muehlenbeck carefully crafts a framework for considering the strengths and weaknesses of JFK's personal diplomacy by first beginning with a discussion of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Muehlenbeck then shifts to the Kennedy administration and his approach to African nationalism and US policy. After this somewhat prolonged introduction, Muehlenbeck delves into Kennedy's relationships with individual African leaders like Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. After examining these spaces, Muehlenbeck transitions to a discussion that focuses on the impact of Kennedy's policies towards Africa and African nationalists, and how these exchanges bled into other areas of domestic and foreign policy. For example, Muehlenbeck gives considerable attention to the precarious nature of Kennedy's stance towards minority rule in South Africa.

While Muehlenbeck attempts to center his dialogue on personal diplomacy, there are critical issues with this approach. For example, Muehlenbeck makes great effort to emphasize Kennedy's early support for African nationalism, especially during his years in Congress and the 1960 presidential campaign. Yet, he essentially explains away the Congo Crisis, which is simply discussed through the lens of how it influenced Kennedy's relationships with other African leaders. This is problematic because Muehlenbeck goes to great lengths to differentiate Kennedy's policies from other Cold War-era leaders, yet actions in the Congo or (in)action in South Africa are not simply aberrations as Muehlenbeck asserts on page xvi, they are indicative of an approach to diplomacy that was deeply personal in some cases, but also very telling in the continuation of pro-Western policies that sought to maintain stability and control in the midst of the Cold War.

While the bulk of Muehlenbeck's limited discussion of the Congo Crisis centers on Lumumba and his death in 1961, it seems as if there is a careful forgetting of the fact that this conflict did not end after the death of Lumumba. There is no sustained or meaningful engagement in an effort to make sense of the extreme limitations of "personal diplomacy" in the case of the longer process of the Congo Crisis. This is troubling because one cannot simply ignore the immense diplomatic implications of the Congo Crisis because it was one of the most important conflicts in the continent of Africa in the years immediately following independence. Designating Kennedy's stance in the Congo Crisis as an anomaly is problematic because it downplays the significance of this horrific event in African history within US policy. While Muehlenbeck provides an engaging and multi- faceted approach to the various ways in which Kennedy practiced personal diplomacy, it is difficult to label this as his dominant method of approaching African politics when some of the most influential and troubling parts of US-Africa diplomacy existed outside of this realm during the Kennedy presidency.

Nevertheless, Muehlenbeck's work is very successful in a number of other areas. Muehlenbeck's chapter on the rivalry between Kennedy and De Gaulle in Africa is especially noteworthy, as it carefully outlines the shifting nature of US-French relations with the (re)construction of spheres of influence during the early 1960s. As Muehlenbeck astutely assesses, De Gaulle "[envisioned] himself as a protective shield from superpower hegemony and Kennedy [saw] himself as a protective shield from French neocolonialism" (163). Thus, in continuation of this theme, Muehlenbeck outlines subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to extend, consolidate, or challenge influences in Africa from both the US and France. While Muehlenbeck's brief introduction to Francophone Africa's affinity with De Gaulle was a bit superficial, the chapter was very successful at capturing the nuanced rivalry between the two leaders by carefully demarcating strategic spaces

in Africa, analyzing motivations, exploring personalities, and assessing policies. Additionally, Muehlenbeck's discussion of US- France tensions that influenced Peace Corps volunteers on the ground in Francophone Africa emphasized ways in which international politics intersected with daily life in a very tangible manner.

Muehlenbeck's chapter on Kennedy's relationship with Sékou Touré was intriguing because it emphasized the complex transformation of US-Guinea relationships, as evidenced by the fact that Eisenhower previously dismissed the Guinean leader as a communist (58). Thus, gaining a relationship with Guinea was a bit more complex than using Kennedy's charm to secure the allegiance of a nation that was already friendly with the US. Yet, through the engaging and well-researched chapter, Muehlenbeck presents the argument that Kennedy "was able to not only influence Guinea back to a position of neutrality but by the end of Kennedy's life the Guinean leader had even become slightly pro-Western" (58). In order to demonstrate this argument, Muehlenbeck chronicles debates over US aid to Guinea, both from US and Guinean perspectives, Touré's visit to Washington in 1962, and the US Civil Rights related, and fabricated, controversy at the OAU conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. By examining these episodes, Muehlenbeck argues for the transformation of US-Guinea relations, which would ultimately facilitate "Guinea's support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis, the Congo crisis, and the outbreak of racial violence in the American south, and they could judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did-but also what he said" (72). This chapter is important because it is the first of five case studies of Kennedy's personal diplomacy with some African nations. Yet, as the chapter on Kennedy and Touré reveals, Kennedy's relationships with these leaders varied greatly and provided a range of political opportunities for all actors.

Overall, Muehlenbeck's Betting on the Africans is an intriguing and important work that emphasizes the significance of personal diplomacy during Kennedy's presidency. While there are obvious issues with Muehlenbeck's limited discussions of the aforementioned aberrations, the book is largely successful in its efforts to shift towards a different type of Cold War politics, namely, one that focused on Kennedy's personal diplomacy. While there are many books on Africa and the Cold War, I am confident that this monograph will be an important source of information for scholars and students interested in international diplomacy, Africa, and the Cold War.

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O'Sullivan, Kevin. *Ireland, Africa and the End of Empire: Small State Identity in the Cold War, 1955-75.* Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012, x + 230 pp.

The diplomatic history of small to medium-size states during the post- World War Two era is an emerging historiographical topic that complicates the study of the Cold War era and provides an important corrective to the overwhelming focus on how great powers interacted with and on Africa. In the process of forging a strong international identity, the emergence of newly independent African states created the perfect opportunity for a variety of states with limited resources to engage with a new group of countries. Africans could be invited to study or train, foreign advisors could be sent to the continent, or foreign aid and diplomatic support could be provided. Irish diplomats chose mostly the last option. Kevin O'Sullivan's Ireland, *Africa and the End of Empire* offers a needed, well-researched, and engaging intervention into the relationships between smaller European states and newly independent African countries. In this diplomatic-focused history, O'Sullivan demonstrates the complicated narrative of the Irish relationship with Africa through an examination of the Katanga Crisis, Biafran War, and debates over minority rule in southern Africa. This engagement provided Ireland the space to emerge diplomatically and increase its importance on the international scene. O'Sullivan helps change the focus of diplomatic history during the 1960s and 1970s from one on agendas driven by the Cold War to smaller states with their own plans to shape the African continent.

With the experience of being colonized and having to struggle for independence, Ireland is able to forge strong connections with the developing world. O'Sullivan makes a strong case in highlighting the considerable influence Ireland enjoyed in Africa considering its size and lack of experience in the realm of diplomacy. However, as O'Sullivan demonstrates throughout his work, this special link was a fragile balancing act with the Cold War looming in the background. Irish diplomats needed to consider their complicated relationship with Great Britain, their desire to obtain membership in the European Community, and ties with the Nordic "fire brigade" countries (198).

Additionally, in the process of showing Ireland's delicate balancing act, O'Sullivan highlights a number of additional complicating factors, including the Irish need for trade with southern Africa, meager resources to devote to the cause, and a public with widely varying interests in Africa. By concentrating their diplomatic efforts on Africa, Ireland proves itself to be a "global citizen" and responsible member of the European Community (198). Shifting their support from political considerations in the immediate post-war era to foreign aid by the

1970s, Ireland evolves from being a devotee of United Nations policies to an active member of the "fire brigade" involved in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement to an important player in African affairs moderated through the European Community.

O'Sullivan is at his strongest when examining specific case studies as illustration of Ireland's unique relationship with particular areas of Africa. He demonstrates a mastery of these complicated events and is able to provide a new and interesting perspective, especially regarding Ireland's role in the Katanga Crisis. To my knowledge, Ireland's role in the Katanga Crisis has been largely unexamined, even though the country played an important role in dealing with the crisis, provided military support, and learned from their engagement, to the extent that it shaped Ireland's response to future African issues. O'Sullivan also provides insight into how Ireland dealt with the Biafra crisis and demonstrates the dilemma the country faced in balancing its desire to recognize the Biafra government against the need to rescue missionaries and protect future relationships with the Nigerian state. He shows how Ireland's involvement in Biafra allowed the country to foster an independent foreign policy and increase the public's concern over Africa. This engagement possessed important consequences, as the public began advocating for a more transparent approach to foreign policy initiatives.

The source material O'Sullivan engages with is impressive. In addition to using traditional newspaper accounts and mining archival sources, he seamlessly incorporates his own interviews with and published memoirs of a variety of Irish diplomats and leaders involved in the events. Another strength of the book is the use of non-governmental organization archival material, as it moves the narrative outside of formal diplomatic channels. By successfully using an impressive quantity of non-state material, O'Sullivan highlights the evolution of early NGOs, complicates our understanding of Ireland's ties to the continent, and shows the degree of the Irish's public interest in Africa.

While the book provides an excellent overview of Ireland's long and varied relationship with the continent, several small issues need mentioning. O'Sullivan makes a strong case about the importance of small states in international diplomacy and shows the struggle of developing and maintaining an independent diplomatic relationship. Yet, he could have elaborated the importance of this case study with regard to the end of the British Empire. Readers remain unsure how Ireland's diplomacy complicates our understanding of the decolonization process, and the demise of the British Empire requires a more explicit and developed response. A large body of literature exists on this topic, and although O'Sullivan cites this literature in the bibliography, he could have engaged with it to a higher degree in order to provide a more forceful interjection in the historiography. Additionally, African voices would have been beneficial, especially when dealing with the

fascinating example of rescuing Irish missionaries on the ground during the Biafra conflict. Here, we see an important group caught between two opposing forces, which served to complicate the Irish response. The inclusion of such material could easily support the idea that Africans were certainly using their emerging connection with Ireland for their own agendas, just as Ireland needed Africans, and thus were more active participants in this evolving relationship.

The study of Ireland's engagement with Africa that O'Sullivan provides is an important intervention in diplomatic history. While diplomatic historians will benefit the most and appreciate the backdoor diplomatic maneuvering and intrigues, those interested in the Biafra crisis will also be satisfied. Overall, O'Sullivan provides an important contribution to diplomatic, Irish, Cold War, and African history as Ireland sought to carve out its own particular place and forge its own diplomatic relationships. Now, a sequel is needed that looks at Irish responses in a more neoliberal world and how HIV/AIDS responses mobilized the Irish population and elicited new diplomatic and aid-driven responses.

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Resnick, Danielle and Nicholas van de Walle, eds. *Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, x+310 pp.

Over the last few years, scholarship on foreign aid in Africa has increasingly focused on three related qualitative paths: intentions, forms or types of aid, and their variable impacts. Where for too long the focus seemed limited to "how much is required?" or testing assumptions via economic regression about aid's impact on macroeconomic growth, increased consideration for the types of and intentions behind aid, and its uneven economic and political impact, is a welcome trend. This edited volume, completed under the auspices of the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UN-WIDER), attempts to parse out the impact of aid on African democracy, both in terms of transitions and consolidations. The collection comprises three broadly comparative chapters, seven case study chapters—covering Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Benin, and Ghana— and a final "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations" chapter. Those seven case studies were carefully selected as part of a comparative research design: they all transitioned to multi-party democracy in the 1990s and have held at least four presidential and parliamentary elections since the transition. By narrowing these parameters for the selection of African cases, which still display considerable variation in terms of development status, aid flows, and democracy indicators, the impact of aid on democratic consolidation (compared to more authoritarian polities) can be better assessed. A wide range of figures and tables provide excellent illustrative support for both quantitative and qualitative approaches employed by the contributors.

The book opens with a straightforward research question that is hardly simple to answer: "When, why, and how has foreign aid facilitated, or hindered, democratic transitions and consolidation in recipient countries?" (1). Because aid directed at easier-to-measure economic and social outcomes may undermine democratic processes, and aid focused on supporting nascent democratic trends may become implicated in and overly influence local political processes, much care has to be taken to gauge aid's impact. The editors thus rightly adopt a nuanced, multi-method approach where comparative quantitative and qualitative methods are combined with in-depth country case studies. This study partly builds on insights from van de Walle's earlier seminal work.[1] There, van de Walle identified how the foreign aid regime evolved from the independence era, institutionalizing a range of norms and practices that impacted not only development-related

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[1] Nicholas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

inputs and outputs but also the evolution of the post-colonial African state and the neopatrimonial politics operating within it. His initial (2001) assessment of the 1990s democratization wave on the seemingly permanent economic and governance crisis suggested minimal direct influence on state capacity to deliver public goods and to constrain executive power and neopatrimonial politics. While this assessment came right before the NEPAD and "China in Africa" era which transformed to some degree the international development regime and improved terms of trade for a growing number of African commodity exporters, van de Walle also hinted that "There are reasons to believe that in the long-term, democratization may well improve economic management by increasing the accountability and transparency of governments" (276). Thus, if democratization may gradually improve economic management but decades of foreign aid may have undermined economic development, understanding varying and perhaps competing objectives within a complex aid regime becomes exceedingly important.

This edited collection seeks to "disaggregate" democratization and consolidation processes as well as different types of aid over time to better understand the "conflicts and complementarities between development and democracy aid" (3). All the core definitions—democratic transitions and consolidation, development and democracy assistance—are provided early on to ground the comparative and case study chapters, and Table 2.1 (30) delineates different components of the democratization continuum. While not wholly distinct, targeted democracy assistance—only 6-8% of total aid flows (7)—is dwarfed by development assistance and generally exhibits less donor agency coordination. Qualitative differences are critical, however; there is usually short-term tension between promoting democratic change and economic stability. This may include trying to build up horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms rather than simply working within existing executive structures. What this study does well is demarcate the more obvious forms of democratic assistance that support transitions to multi-party elections versus the more complex ways aid may be intended to sustain consolidation processes.

While every chapter makes a significant contribution to the collection, the quantitative comparative chapter three by Dietrich and Wright illustrates the complexities of addressing the core research question. The authors create new datasets that capture qualitative variables for democratic transitions and consolidation over time, not solely relying on measures offered by existing databases. They examine how different types of aid influence transitions to multi-party regimes, multi-party failure, electoral fairness failure, incumbent turnover, and term-limit failure. Overall, Dietrich and Wright admit their findings are weak or inconclusive: they find "some evidence consistent with the proposition

that economic aid increases prospects of multi-party transitions in [Sub-Saharan Africa]. . . . However, we find little support for the contention that democracy assistance is correlated with other aspects of democratic development" (83). Despite their inconclusive results, Dietrich and Wright offer important insights into methodological challenges including endogeneity bias intrinsic to foreign aid flows, and lay the groundwork for the in-depth country case studies that follow. Each country case study is an important contribution—theoretically and empirically—to the general foreign aid and democracy literature as well as to understanding the political economy of development and democratization in each country. A few short policy recommendations designed to improve both democracy assistance and direct budgetary support close out the book.

Ultimately, the book supports the contention that development aid can play a positive role in the promotion of democratic transitions, specifically to multi-partyism. However, the real conundrum remains aid's role in consolidation processes. Democracy assistance can improve vertical accountability mechanisms especially around elections and to support civil society groups, but could do more between election cycles to strengthen electoral and party institutionalization. Two issues are not specifically addressed in the volume: first, the possible effects of patronage networks and the informal realities undermining consolidation, and second, there is no consideration of the influence of the designed formal political institutions, that is, the constitution(s) after democratic transitions. Perhaps democracy assistance and donor leverage can never overcome badly designed constitutional frameworks, from powers invested in the executive branch to weak amendment formulas. Thus, if the informal networks are powerful and the constitution itself does not enable adequate prospects for constraints (horizontal accountability mechanisms or the rule of law), then no amount of democracy assistance will help. That notwithstanding, this collection stands as an ambitious and highly valuable study that tackles the complexities of aid's impact on one desired outcome for assistance, the promotion and entrenchment of democracy. For anyone interested in foreign aid in Africa and the interaction of aid and democracy, this collection represents a leading-edge contribution.

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Spiers, Edward. *The Victorian Soldier in Africa: Studies in Imperialism.* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2013, v + 212 pp.

The "human experiences" of the Victorian soldiers who fought in Africa to expand the British Empire at the turn of the twentieth century have received little scholarly attention. Yet, as Edward Spiers presents in *The Victorian Soldier in Africa*, recently released in paperback, letters "from the front" by soldiers to acquaintances and weekly newspapers at home reveal their combat experiences and their close connections with the army and the civilian community in Britain. Often composed by soldiers enduring extremely demanding terrains and climatic conditions, the letters convey views of imperial wars rarely expressed in the official dispatches, corroborate the testimony of contentious issues, provide fresh insight about the men's experiences in various aspects of the same campaign, and supply a greater range of perspectives from soldiers in different regiments (2). Significantly, the letters also soften the image of the army in Britain during the period when men hardly considered careers in the military and "few families had a positive image of the army as a career" (12).

The value and significance of these letters cannot be overstated. But Spiers cautions against taking them at face value, because of what he has identified as their "shortcomings." He cautions that some authors "were profoundly shocked by the experience and were not always lucid in their recollections; others embellished their accounts" (40). Soldiers without a clue about the casualty figures provided imagined estimates, made factual errors, and downplayed the enemy's resilience, essentially authoring letters that are "limited in perspective" (28). Creating further complications, these communications passed through the hands of military censors and local newspapers editors who likely tinkered with their tone and meaning. Notwithstanding, the letters convey eyewitness accounts of the Victorian army in action and reveal the hardships the soldiers encountered in Africa.

Structurally, the nine chapters of the book follow chronological order, covering twenty-eight years of Victorian wars in Africa (1874–1902). Spiers begins by discussing the British military success in West Africa against the Asante people of modern Ghana, a victory ascribed to the soldiers' valor and the superior firepower of breech-loading Snider. In the second chapter, the author examines similar imperial campaigns and victories in the Ninth Cape Frontier War and the Anglo-Zulu War in South Africa. In both campaigns, however, the Victorian soldiers encountered "a succession of assaults," especially from the Zulu warriors who sent them to "eternity" (49, 50), before reinforcements began to arrive. Spiers's third chapter, also on South Africa, highlights the British campaign in battling the Boers

in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881. Over the next three chapters, which consider the war in northeastern Africa, Spiers focuses on British intervention in Egypt, the fight against the Mahdists, and the Gordon relief expedition. While the seventh chapter brings back the discussion to southern Africa, in Bechuanaland (modern Botswana), the penultimate chapter takes the reader back up north—to the war in Sudan, whose purpose was to reconquer the region after the essentially failed Gordon relief expedition. Spiers concludes by "re-engaging the Boers" in the Second Anglo-Boer War in southern Africa (1899–1902).

The book's strength resides in its significant use of substantial primary materials in the form of personal letters and diaries that convey the soldiers' "human experience" in their own voices. To the benefit of scholarship on the subject, Spiers allows the men to speak for themselves, adding commentary on their views and assessing key actors, such as native auxiliaries in Africa and politicians in London. For these reasons, Spiers's book is a valuable contribution to the scholarship.

But the book is not without fault. One wishes that Spiers would have discussed at much greater length the social relationships between the soldiers and non-combatants, especially women—a topic he covers very briefly in two paragraphs, one in chapter six and the other in the epilogue section. The book's cursory treatment of the soldiers' social interactions produces the unsettling and, indeed, cliché, image of an impassive Victorian man completely lacking human connections. As the book has it, the men seem to have cared about more victories, the possibilities of earning promotions and medals, and increased self-esteem (93, 180) than they did about native bearers, laborers, and traders, whom they often subjected to physical punishment whenever they felt that they had been cheated (185).

Nonetheless, this book fits squarely within the literature of imperial, colonial Africa, and military histories, as well as in the capacious field of Victorian studies. College instructors in these disciplines who wish to use the book as a classroom text will surely find this paperback edition affordable and useful. Although fairly short, its chapters convey deep meanings about British wars in pre-colonial Africa. Undergraduate students should find the chapters easy to read and comprehend. The book carries visual images in general maps—eight in all—simplifying the work of readers seeking to identify the major theatres of the wars. Unfortunately, the lack of other visual elements (e.g., photographs and charts) may limit the ability of the uninitiated to contextualize the conflicts.

Viewed narrowly, The Victorian Soldier in Africa captures imperial war stories in Africa, accentuates the hyper-masculinity of British soldiers, and hints at the aggressive nature of the British Army. Speaking broadly, however, the book challenges our perception of the meaning of nineteenth and twentieth century

imperial expansion in Africa, encouraging its readers to think critically about a transformative period that in many ways determined the fate of the continent for many generations to come.

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Takougang, Joseph. *Cameroonian Immigrants in the United States: Between the Homeland and the Diaspora.* Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014, xxi + 143 pp.

Between the census of 2000 and 2010, the African immigrant population in the United States nearly doubled in size from 881,300 to almost 1.6 million. As recent census numbers continue to show, African immigration to the United States remains dynamic and fast changing. While East and West Africa remain dominant as points of origin for African immigrants in the United States, other regions of Africa, in particular Central Africa, are gaining ground, increasing in a very short period their presence and precipitating a need to broaden the conversation around African immigration in the United States. In Cameroonian Immigrants in the United States, Joseph Takougang provides an important guide to understanding the unique development of the Cameroonian Diaspora in the United States. He analyzes Cameroonian immigration and the circumstances that have shaped it as one of the most recent and fastest growing immigration waves from the African continent.

Divided into five chapters, the first chapter of this well-timed book addresses the post-colonial immigration efforts of Africans to the United States. Here Takougang acknowledges the important role of African students during the colonial and the immediate post-colonial periods as progenitors of African immigration. He also underscores the failure of African leaders in the post-independence period to live up to their promises of political and economic prosperity. In one country after another, the devastating failure after independence of the neo-colonial experiment in governance prompted many in the early 1980s and, most noticeably, in the 1990s to flee abroad to among other destinations, the United States. Cameroon, however, as Takougang shows in Chapter 2, for a short period, would prove the exception to the pattern of socio-economic and political strife and conflict that wracked the African continent. Contrary to the popular image widely publicized in the early 1980s of the failing African state, Cameroon enjoyed both political and economic stability well into the late 1980s, a fact attributable, as the author notes, to "the economic pragmatism and liberal policies of the government, the dynamism of its private class and the nation's remarkable political stability" (17). The boons of this period, however, would be temporary, as they were influenced by a decline in export products, increasing corruption, as well as stringent reform policies mandated by Structural Adjustment Programs. Cameroonians began to look abroad, first to former colonial metropoles in Britain and France, but with the passage of restrictive immigration policies in these countries, the United States became the destination of choice.

In the last three chapters of his book, Takougang addresses the adjustment of Cameroonian immigrants in the United States, supplementing his analysis with first-hand accounts about their experiences. Many will appreciate the inclusion of these stories as the stories of Cameroonian students, who arrived in the immediate post-colonial period (up to 1990), echo the hardships suffered and sacrifices made often described in the narratives of other African students during this period. As Takougang undoubtedly intended, the further addition of the stories of Cameroonian immigrants of the post-1990 population wave allows for important comparisons between these two generations of Cameroonian immigrants. Here Takougang shows that whereas the early generation of immigrants was fairly consistently students, male, and from the English-speaking region of the country, there is more gender, regional, and ethnic diversity among the post-1990 generation. There is also less of an adjustment period for this generation due to established networks of friends and family already living and settled in the United States.

The last two chapters explore the struggles and challenges Cameroonian immigrants face in their efforts to make "home" and "community" in the United States while maintaining important ties and bonds with their homeland. Takougang documents the evolution of community organizations in helping to build community, beginning with the establishment in the 1970s of student organizations like the Cameroon Students Association (CAMSA), which would influence the establishment of future national as well as ethnic and alumni organizations, all focused on helping to preserve social, political, and economic bonds and relationships with Cameroon. These bonds are further reinforced, as Takougang shows, with the mutually dependent relationships that remittances exemplify for Cameroonians. The money sent home helps to alleviate the strain for many of a persistent struggle to access even the most basic necessities, while providing those abroad with a sense of responsibility as well as prestige and "celebrity status" that can be accessed on return visits back home.

No work is without limitations, and this work is no exception. It certainly could have benefited from a more rigorous accounting of sources, particularly the interviews utilized, and a more detailed explanation of the push factors that helped to spur the post-1990s immigration wave of Cameroonian immigrants. These few issues, however, should not at all detract from the significance of this book as one of the first comprehensive efforts to analyze Cameroonian immigrants in the United States. It will stand, I hope, as a foundational cornerstone of scholarship on both the Cameroonian and African immigrant Diasporas in the United States.

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Terretta, Meredith. *Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in Cameroon*. **Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014. vii + 367 pp.**

Over the past years, many African nations have commemorated forty and fifty year independence anniversaries from European colonialism. Recently, scholars have devoted attention to the contexts and legacies of African liberation struggles that were hallmarks of the era famous for ubiquitous Afro-optimism and pan-Africanism. In this book, Meredith Terretta offers a critical analysis of "the history of the practice and discourse of Cameroonian nationalism, spearheaded by the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), as it unfolded in intersecting local, territorial, and global political arenas in the 1950s and 1960s " (2). By examining the various local and international contexts that informed the UPC's efforts to oust France from Cameroon, Terretta convincingly argues that the UPC demonstrated broad organizational pragmatism in pursuit of legitimacy. In this extensive analysis of French Cameroonian nationalism, Terretta also cites how the UPC made use of "two political concepts indigenous to the Grassfields region – lepue and gung - as the terms used to translate 'independence' and 'nation'," (13) respectively, in order to situate the liberation struggle in a culturally-relevant, discursive framework of "global" politics (4).

One of the strengths of this book is Terretta's detailed ethnographic analysis of the formation of Bamileke identities over time. Critical to this endeavor, Terretta highlights how the meanings of lepue and gung were interpreted and reformulated by UPC supporters to gain support from Cameroonians throughout the liberation struggle. From the mid to late 1950s, the UPC sought to develop grassroots support at the local level. Bamileke identity was not only shaped by existing ethnic and kinship affiliations in central Cameroon, it was also influenced by the cosmopolitan and burgeoning nationalism of young Cameroonian women and men who, in the early 1950s, migrated to the Bamileke and Mungo regions looking for work. Critical to understanding the politicization of these youth, Terretta contends that the meanings of both lepue and gung were frequently interpreted, appropriated, and altered by UPC cadres to legitimize the liberation movement's existence in the eyes of both local Cameroonians and international agencies. In addition to its local organizing efforts, the UPC also drew the attention of the international community at the United Nations by submitting thousands of Cameroonian signatures on petitions in support of liberation.

Although the UPC's local and international efforts were critical strategies meant to augment and legitimate the UPC as a liberation movement, Terretta also

explores the divisions that shaped these strategies. She concludes that, although the UPC sought to fashion itself as a unified front, the organization was also affected by generational divides and gendered expectations. With the enactment of the French loi-cadre, colonial officials sought to empower loyalist chiefs and youth who would support France's intention to remain a colonial presence in Cameroon. The power struggle between the UPC and French colonial policies often resulted in protests and violent clashes among Cameroonians within the Mungo and Bamileke regions. With different Cameroonian actors jockeying for either full or mediated independence from France, new opportunities emerged for young men and women to challenge existing cultural and social norms. Many youth joined the UPC against their elders' wishes and became part of the nationalist cause. Pro-UPC Cameroonians also pursued nationalist strategies that highlighted customary practices of local political succession, especially when they advocated for the ascendency of pro-independence "chiefs" like Fo Pierre Kamdem Ninyim. Since Fo Ninyem was sympathetic to the UPC cause, he was subsequently detained by French officials since his status as a "chief" was supported by many in the UPC. In this example of Fo Ninyim, Terretta demonstrates how colonial authorities actively infringed upon local cultural practices in order to thwart nationalists' ambitious.

Terretta also explores the international strategies of UPC members. Similar to other nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere, the UPC "fashioned their independence-era political repertoire out of a combination of public discourse, print culture, symbols, political cartoons, clothing, religiosity, and the political symbolism of the UN in an international arena" (116). Critical to the UPC's quest for legitimacy, both in French Cameroon and abroad, was the liberation movement's petitioning efforts among a broad spectrum of Cameroonians. As Terretta shows, the signatures of Cameroonians were sent to the UN to pressure the French to leave the "Trust Territory." Given the sheer volume of petitions sent to the UN Trusteeship Council between 1946 and 1960, however, a fundamental weakness is the author's inability to analyze the rich primary sources now available. It would have been interesting to learn about the processes, methods, and challenges that must have faced UPC members while collecting, or soliciting, signatures. For example, were petition signatures peacefully solicited or coercively obtained, were they independently verified in anyway and, if so, what evidence did the UPC (or UN) use to validate the authenticity of the petitions? Moreover, in the years leading up to independence, the UPC sent roughly "fifty thousand petitions to the Trusteeship Council" advocating for independence from France, but in what concrete ways did these petitions play a role in generating legitimacy for the UPC at the local and international levels (113)? These minor

quibbles aside, Terretta highlights how the petitions themselves connected UPC organizers to the local Cameroonian population and helped to galvanize support for liberation. The UPC's petitioning efforts brought peoples' grievances about French colonialism in Cameroon to the attention of the international community.

Despite both the UPC's grassroots and international success in challenging lingering French colonialism in Cameroon, Terretta also underscores the fact that French officials and their Cameroonian sympathizers infiltrated UPC networks, exploited cultural practices, and made use of African loyalists in order to thwart the liberation movement. After banning the UPC and propping up the regime of Ahmadou Ahidjo, violence engulfed French Cameroon. Terretta contends "that Bamileke chiefs, guided by their own political concerns, those of their chieftaincies, and those of their emigrant populations, understood what was at stake as they chose to side with one trend or another in the territorial political arena of 1956" (173). Thus, Terretta reveals the complex intersections between Cameroonian nationalism and French colonial machinations as various actors sought opportunities for political and economic power in the waning days of French colonialism in Cameroon.

Given the variety of rich primary sources and level of analysis in this book, Terretta makes a significant contribution to the liberation history of Cameroon and, more broadly, to analyses of African liberation history. By emphasizing how "global" issues, contexts, and cultural practices overlapped to inform the legitimacy and strategies of the UPC, Terretta's book offers scholars interested in nationalist struggles a thorough example of the complexities of African liberation.

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Wendland, Claire L. *A Heart for the Work: Journeys through an African Medical School.* **Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010, xiv + 330 pp.**

In A Heart for the Work, obstetrician and anthropologist Claire L. Wendland writes about medical student training in Malawi's first medical school. In contrast to Western medical school ethnographies, this work does not find students becoming increasingly detached from their patients as they study sick bodies and the science of medicine. Instead, empathetic connections to the afflicted are strengthened. Wendland's research demonstrates that although medical curricular are increasingly harmonized around the world, the processes and influence of medical education are not. As elsewhere on the globe, doctors are held in high regard in Malawi and medical school is hard to enter and challenging to complete. But Malawian medical students have no assurance of an upper-middle class wage or state-of-the- art clinics at graduation. Many are "called" to medicine, others choose it for the prestige, and some study it because they have shadowed relatives in health care or practiced as clinical officers themselves. Chapter Three details students' socioeconomic enablers and motivations for pursuing a medical career. Although there are multiple paths to medical school, and Wendland is careful to include the many exceptions in her ethnography, the journey to Malawi's College of Medicine is most easily navigated by upper-class, male, Christian students.

Matriculation is only the first of many challenges to receiving and perfecting scientific training in this resource-limited setting. As the author observes (and titles the very rich sixth chapter), "resource is a verb" in Malawi and "resourcing" is a skill honed in medical school. Resourceful doctors procure tests and medicines despite shortages, and improvise creatively, when essential tools are impossible to obtain. Exceptional physical diagnosis skills stand in the gap in the absence of high-tech diagnostics. Students and faculty are unworried by personal and professional risks associated with diverting resources, which are overshadowed by avoidable adverse outcomes that arise from the dearth of the materials of health care.

Very early in their education, students at the College of Medicine and its associated Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital become nominally supervised clinicians. As trainees, they have close and extended work with terminal patients and a very small community of classmates with which to share difficult experiences. Irrespective of previous preparation (some students have worked as clinical officers), all the students struggle emotionally to work through the suffering and poverty of their patients to deliver care. Working with too few tools and personnel, students and interns recognize that they cannot but draw upon the expertise and experience of nurses and clinical officers. As Wendland observes,

with the exception of female students, who are often mistaken for nurses, Malawian medical students are immediately and continuously accorded the very high respect reserved for medical doctors. This might have prevented the authoritarianism and power struggles that have been documented for Western medical students.

The possible trajectories for graduates of the new College of Medicine could only be projected at the time of writing. The book does this by layering student aspirations and newly-graduated intern experiences on to available data and interviews with Malawian physicians. In spite of an often-stated desire to migrate, and the belief that this is the most popular path of their predecessors, Wendland speculates that most of the medical school's graduates will become general practitioners in Malawi. Data from a recent study suggests that this is where most recent graduates are and Wendland finds most of those she followed through medical school in domestic posts soon after graduation. However, the author does not project very far, but perhaps an ethnography should not. As the alumni population builds, the least objectionable posts in Malawi are filled and the school gains reputation, even as the motivations and means to migrate could actually increase. This is certainly the experience of African countries with older medical schools;[101] but as Wendland mentions, doctors who migrate may still contribute to health care in Malawi in some way or form.

A Heart for the Work does identify important systemic problems that promote emigration from Malawi. A two tiered pay structure for faculty members at the medical school, which gives expatriates much cushier wages and benefits than Malawians, stands in the way of "Malawianizing" the Medical school and is a principal factor that could drive brain drain. While financials are enumerated as disincentives to stay in Malawi – Malawian government doctors not only earn less than their contemporaries abroad, they are more poorly paid than other professionals like lawyers and accountants – the students cite the dearth of tools needed for optimal clinical care and the risk of contracting life-threatening disease on the job as principal inducements to emigrate. Wendland observes that although pay and work conditions in the public health system are poor, they can be supplemented with social capital, with part-time private practice and with what Valéry Ridde has referred to as "perdiemitis," income supplements obtained by attending externally-funded training workshops that are replete across Africa. As Ridde has observed, the opportunity to make a living from perdiems solves some problems but is its own disease.

A Malawian health practitioner is a doctor or nurse all the time and everywhere. Most are compelled to work round the clock from home as well as the hospital, and

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[101] C. Ihekweazu., I. Anya, and E. Anosike, "Nigerian Medical Graduates: Where Are They Now?" *Lancet* 365 (2005):1847-8.

for little pay. A couple of months can, on occasion, be skipped from the payroll due to "computer problems" and back pay may be difficult or impossible to secure. These disincentives occur alongside an almost complete absence of regulatory, professional or public oversight of clinical practice. As a result, Malawian doctors are viewed by their students as either exceptional or "saint like" in their practice and commitment to their patients, or working, or failing to work, with "clinical impunity." Almost no doctors did "a decently competent job for eight or ten hours and then [went] home" (171). The Malawian medical students aspired to practice with "Heart", an unusual "empathetic responsibility" (177), which Wendland's book captures very well. The students hoped not to "become so absorbed in the trauma that [they would] miss the gift" (173). Western Medical school ethnographies inevitably record that the stresses of medical school result manifests in derision and even dislike of patients.[102] Wendland observes similar stresses and frustrations among Malawian medical students but remarkably finds no ill-will towards patients. Instead, the students direct their anger at their government, whose failure to properly resource the health system is held accountable for the failures and stresses that come with practicing medicine. And in contrast to Western medical trainees who become increasingly detached from politics, Malawian students become more politically aware activists in the course of their training. Rather than becoming disgusted at their patients, they work to mobilize them to demand better health care from their government.

Scholars and students of African medical practice need to read this richly illustrated picture of medical students, teachers, and other health practitioners in Malawi. Many recent studies of post-colonial medicine focus on external aid and its impact on the African clinic. By contrast, Wendland's eye is remarkably trained on the African medical establishment and thus provides valuable context for other studies. A *Heart for the Work* will also be valuable to health policy makers and medical educators as well s pre-medical and medical students in Africa and elsewhere. The author's personal experience working as an obstetrician as she engaged in her ethnographic research could be perceived as a confounding. However, the dearth of clinicians means that neither she nor "Queen's" hospital could afford to have her work only as an anthropologist. Her dual practices there, as well as her extensive experiences in medical education and clinical practice in the United States, come through in many unusual and positive ways.

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[102]See for example, S. J. Reiser, *Medicine and the Reign of Technology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

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Youngstedt, Scott M. *Surviving with Dignity: Hausa Communities of Niamey, Niger*. United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2013, xv + 226 pp.

Hausa scholarship has developed primarily around communities in Northern Nigeria and Eastern Niger. In *Surviving With Dignity*, anthropologist Scott M. Youngstedt shifts the focus to long-standing Hausa communities in Niamey. This book is the result of over twenty years of research in Niger, and Youngstedt effectively draws from his own friendships with Hausa men to inform his larger work. Bringing together personal Hausa narratives and proverbs with global economic policies, Youngstedt situates Niamey at the center of larger conversations on globalization and modernity.

The first half of Youngstedt's book frames Niamey within a global context. In his introduction, Youngstedt establishes the two concepts of suffering and dignity as essential to understanding how Hausa communities interact with shifting social and economic dynamics in Niamey. He links suffering to poverty and global structural violence, whereas dignity is found at the individual level and intimately tied to Hausa ideologies. After a brief history of Niamey's growth from an eighteenth century Zarma town to a present day cosmopolis, Youngstedt then analyzes how international organizations have had devastating effects on the Nigerien economy. In particular he points to the five Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. The consequent lack of economic opportunity in Niger leads to Youngstedt's next topic, Niamey's global diaspora. Youngstedt contributes an interesting perspective in his analysis of internal migrations in which he places Niamey as a stepping-stone for Hausa men moving from rural to international destinations. He also examines how technological developments such as money transfers, internet usage, and cell phones help maintain global Hausa networks connected to their symbolic home in Niamey.

In the second half of his book, Youngstedt delves into his local case studies. His fourth chapter looks at how *hira*, Hausa men's conversation groups, serve as a grassroots institution in which Hausa communities negotiate local meaning amidst global societal changes. In his fifth chapter he considers three overlapping spheres through which Hausa experience modernity; Africanist-traditionalist, Muslim-Islamist, and Francophonist- globalist. Here he focuses primarily on modernity from an economic perspective, and the tension between local understandings of globalization and growing economic inequality. His sixth chapter, briefer than earlier ones, focuses on the economic struggles of male youth in Niamey with

examples highlighting the financial difficulties of marriage and the role of hip hop as a means of expression.

One of Youngstedt's strongest contributions in this book is his use of *hira* in the fourth chapter. His analysis focuses on both the structure of these groups and the role they serve in Hausa communities in Niamey. He looks at structural variances between unofficial *hira* and the more recently developed formal groups, *fada*. Ultimately it is the function of *hira* that fits very well into Youngstedt's framework. It is here that the encounter of suffering and dignity meet within a local cultural context; these conversation groups allow for an active negotiation of what modernity and globalization mean within the Hausa community. This is also where Youngstedt's own language skills and long-term friendships align most strongly with his methodological approach.

The limitations of this book are self-addressed by the author. Youngstedt notes that within Niamey there is ethnic flexibility, yet his work relies on Hausa as an exclusive category. His personal experiences add dimension throughout the book, but lead to one major limitation, the lack of Hausa women's voices. Youngstedt addresses this by highlighting the existing scholarship on Hausa women, but leaves room for the role of women and *foyande*, women's conversation groups, to be further explored. In addition, throughout the book Youngstedt's local case studies play a supporting role to an analysis that is often shaped around quantitative data from international organizations and surveys. The exception to this is his strongest chapter on *hira*, which highlights a point in the book where the author is able to use local understandings of modernity to shape his own analysis. The result is a glimpse of a more complex understanding of these concepts within a Hausa epistemological framework and an approach that Youngstedt could have developed further.

The strengths of Youngstedt's work outweigh these limitations. He successfully places Niamey at the forefront of the conversation on globalization, and highlights the growing work of Hausa scholarship in Niger. He does so in both an informative and compassionate way by offering the reader a history of Niamey, the global policies that have impacted its growth, and a glimpse into the lives of the Hausa men who are negotiating on a daily basis with living in a modern world that has created severe economic inequalities. Most importantly, Youngstedt points scholars to many promising directions, such as the roles of gender and ethnic flexibility, to continue the worthy scholarly hira he has initiated.

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