Abstract

This paper examines the inherently political nature of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the appointment process, judicial behavior, and the influence of public opinion and how those cause justices to vote against their ideologies. The Supreme Court was created to be an independent judiciary, however, today that proves to be untrue. It analyzes constitutional provisions and the historical development of the Court’s powers, drawing on Federalist No. 78 to emphasize the importance of judicial independence. This study highlights the role of the President and Senate in appointing justices, exploring how political and demographic criteria affect nominations. Additionally, it addresses the Supreme Court's responsiveness to public sentiment, noting that case salience and media coverage significantly impact judicial decision-making. They are highlighting the tension between the Court's intended impartiality and the practical influences of ideological alignment and public opinion. By analyzing the attitudinal model and strategic behavior theories, this paper assesses whether justices can remain ideologically consistent or if they shift decisions to maintain the Court's legitimacy. Ultimately, this highlights that the Supreme Court operates within a complex interplay of law, politics, and public expectations, which shapes both the nomination process and judicial outcomes.

Semester/Year of Award

Fall 2024

Mentor

Anne Cizmar

Mentor Department Affiliation

Government

Access Options

Open Access Thesis

Degree Name

Honors Scholars

Degree Level

Bachelors

Department

Government

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