Abstract
The failure of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program reflects the broader pattern of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, where political optics consistently outweighed long-term strategic planning. Intended to protect interpreters and locally employed civilians who risked their lives for U.S. forces, the program suffered from onerous documentation requirements, interagency dysfunction, and post-9/11 bias that created years-long backlogs and left thousands vulnerable to Taliban retaliation. These problems were not separate from the war effort; they emerged from the same shifting priorities, unrealistic expectations, lack of coherent strategy, and fixation on appearances over outcomes that defined the U.S. mission. Together, the failures of both the war and the SIV program contributed directly to the disastrous 2021 withdrawal, leaving many Afghan allies behind.
Using government reports, academic scholarship, and testimony, this study contrasts the restrictive, politicized approach of the War on Terror with examples seen in the Cold War, when refugee resettlement programs successfully combined humanitarian and strategic interests. The analysis further demonstrates that Afghan immigrants, particularly SIV holders, rank among the most thoroughly vetted groups, demonstrating reliable economic integration and minimal security risk.
The thesis concludes that a functional, well-resourced SIV system could have strengthened U.S. national security, upheld moral obligations, and mitigated the humanitarian disaster of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Instead, its failure led to the abandonment of U.S. allies, moral injury among veterans, and harm to U.S. strategic credibility. Fundamentally, the SIV program illustrates the consequences of allowing political perception to outweigh the tangible benefits of sound policy.
Semester/Year of Award
Fall 12-4-2025
Mentor
Patrick B. Litanga
Mentor Department Affiliation
Government
Access Options
Open Access Thesis
Document Type
Bachelor Thesis
Degree Name
Honors Scholars
Degree Level
Bachelors
Department
Government
Presentation
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Afa-1l5XtqiX4mZvkPK56fe0xz9QS_6I9XXET0O7AqE/edit?usp=sharing
Recommended Citation
Alexander, Christopher S., ""Strategic Failure: How Political Considerations Undermined the SIV Program and U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan"" (2025). Honors Theses. 1122.
https://encompass.eku.edu/honors_theses/1122
