University Presentation Showcase: Undergraduate Division
Determining Cause, Blame, and Praise in Moral Reasoning: Do We Attribute Differently Depending on the Nature of the Outcome?
Presenter Hometown
Pikeville
Major
Psychology
Department
Psychology
Degree
Undergraduate
Mentor
Adam Lawson
Mentor Department
Psychology
Recommended Citation
Nichols, Connor A.; Moore, Faith D.; and Ross, Emily G., "Determining Cause, Blame, and Praise in Moral Reasoning: Do We Attribute Differently Depending on the Nature of the Outcome?" (2026). University Presentation Showcase Event. 26.
https://encompass.eku.edu/swps/2026/undergraduate/26
Abstract
The present study aimed to expand our knowledge of causal and moral judgements and the difference between blame and praise by partially replicating the second experiment in Lagnado’s (2008) study and then adding additional variables and scenarios. The current study investigated this by presenting 41 participants with scenarios and having them answer questions about causation and morality (either blameworthiness or praiseworthiness), focusing on sequences of events that led to either blame-eliciting or praise-eliciting outcomes. Our experiment manipulated three variables: scenario type, intentionality, and foreseeability. Some scenarios were praise-eliciting, and some were blame-eliciting; some scenarios were intentional, and some were unintentional; some were either subjectively foreseeable high or low, and some were objectively foreseeable high or low. We varied these combinations to see how they changed causal and moral judgements. Participants rated intentional actions as more causal, praiseworthy, and blameworthy than unintentional actions. Although blame-eliciting scenarios were rated as more causal and blameworthy overall than praiseworthy scenarios. Our results confirm previous research showing this same tendency (Guglielmo & Melle, 2019). This tendency towards stronger blame convictions could imply that being more critical about potentially dangerous individuals is more important than our judgment of good individuals (Anderson et al., 2020). Foreseeability had a strong impact on judgments, with both subject and objective foreseeability having a strong influence on both causal and moral judgments, with objective foreseeability being more impactful. The findings were interpreted using Alicke’s (2000) and Shaver’s (1985) theories of blame.
Keywords: Causation, Attribution, Ethics, Moral, Blame, Praise, Alicke, Shaver, Foreseeability, Intentionality, Scenarios, Causal Chain, differentiated blame hypothesis, Augmentation Principle
Presentation format
Poster
Determining Cause, Blame, and Praise in Moral Reasoning: Do We Attribute Differently Depending on the Nature of the Outcome?
The present study aimed to expand our knowledge of causal and moral judgements and the difference between blame and praise by partially replicating the second experiment in Lagnado’s (2008) study and then adding additional variables and scenarios. The current study investigated this by presenting 41 participants with scenarios and having them answer questions about causation and morality (either blameworthiness or praiseworthiness), focusing on sequences of events that led to either blame-eliciting or praise-eliciting outcomes. Our experiment manipulated three variables: scenario type, intentionality, and foreseeability. Some scenarios were praise-eliciting, and some were blame-eliciting; some scenarios were intentional, and some were unintentional; some were either subjectively foreseeable high or low, and some were objectively foreseeable high or low. We varied these combinations to see how they changed causal and moral judgements. Participants rated intentional actions as more causal, praiseworthy, and blameworthy than unintentional actions. Although blame-eliciting scenarios were rated as more causal and blameworthy overall than praiseworthy scenarios. Our results confirm previous research showing this same tendency (Guglielmo & Melle, 2019). This tendency towards stronger blame convictions could imply that being more critical about potentially dangerous individuals is more important than our judgment of good individuals (Anderson et al., 2020). Foreseeability had a strong impact on judgments, with both subject and objective foreseeability having a strong influence on both causal and moral judgments, with objective foreseeability being more impactful. The findings were interpreted using Alicke’s (2000) and Shaver’s (1985) theories of blame.
Keywords: Causation, Attribution, Ethics, Moral, Blame, Praise, Alicke, Shaver, Foreseeability, Intentionality, Scenarios, Causal Chain, differentiated blame hypothesis, Augmentation Principle
